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earlier critical discourses. Such discourses, although not 
totally forbidding art, put limitations on the creative 
process, for example, by banning certain forms, perform-
ances, or audiences. They also influence the genres that 
are made (Barendregt, p. 24). Female Muslim performers, 
in particular, feel compelled to deal with a discourse that 
considers them immoral and un-Islamic (Gazzah, p. 26). 
If art can be seen as something that may rectify a so-
ciety’s problems and edify people, it can also be seen 
as reflecting a critical stance towards existing govern-
ments and societies. Some artists feel the need to docu-
ment issues of contemporary society in their work, and 
to offer social or political criticism (Bank, p. 18). Others 
aim to change existing images of Islam and Muslims, i.e. 
by making films like Ayat Ayat Cinta to show the compas-
sionate face of Islam (Van Heeren, p. 20).
Art can be a powerful catalyst precisely because of its 
ambivalent nature; it cannot be reduced to one single 
meaning, but produces multiple meanings at the same 
time. It is always created in a certain time and place, but 
can transcend boundaries of language, nation and reli-
gion. Art has always incited complaints on the basis of 
morality, but may also improve ethical standards. It can 
readily paint utopian visions, as well as bleak pictures. 
And just as it opens up new possibilities for battling 
stereotypes, it can also create new ones. This should re-
mind us that art does not just represent how things are 
in the world but actually contributes to the shaping of 
our world.
Imagination is not bound by time or place. Works of art, 
though conceived and produced in a specific place at a 
specific moment, travel in time and space. Ali Hassoun, a 
Lebanese artist trained in Italy, painted “The Disquieting 
Museum” inspired by “The Disquieting Muses” created al-
most a century ago by the Greek-Italian painter Giorgio 
de Chirico. This spring, the former painting was shown at 
an exhibition of “Arab Artists between Italy and the Medi-
terranean” aimed at bridging the cultural divide separat-
ing the West from the Middle East (cover). 
The exhibition is but one example of how art is pro-
moted as a means of overcoming national, cultural, eth-
nic, and religious differences. Music and visual arts, not 
bound to verbal communication in a specific language, 
seem particularly suitable for such a purpose. Thus, the 
performance of music was and still is an occasion where 
people of different religions and ethnic backgrounds 
meet each other (Zubaida, p. 6). Interestingly, govern-
ment institutions and funding organizations have also 
discovered this potential of art and accordingly sponsor 
multicultural projects. While this might be laudable, cos-
mopolitan experiences should not be reduced to such 
representations alone.
As Maurizio Albahari argues, existing asymmetries may 
be recreated when majorities ask minorities to engage 
in multicultural dialogue, since dialogue can only be 
thought of once salient differences have been established 
in the first place (p.12). Moreover, intercultural and cos-
mopolitan experiences may just as well take place in un-
advertised everyday communal life. And what if art gets 
taken up to prove membership in humanity, and treated 
as a bridge to humanity’s common ground? Raising such 
questions, Kirsten Scheid argues that people should not 
be applauded for applying notions of art-making in “un-
expected” places (p. 14).
But art is not always understood as multicultural or 
interreligious; it can also propagate national, ethnic, or 
religious identity. National governments promote art as 
a way of creating and reinforcing national awareness. 
Such a vision of art may coincide with the wish that art 
may enlighten people and build a civilization, raising the 
cultural levels of a supposedly “ignorant” population. 
Increasingly, not only secular, nationalist governments, 
but also more devout actors promote art in order to raise 
standards of civilization and morality. Reformist preach-
ers today argue not only that art is not reprehensible, but 
that it may even be central to religious practice, and a 
tool for spreading the message of Islam (Winegar, p. 28).
In promoting art as something that can bring people 
closer to God, these reformist preachers deviate from 
The International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) 
develops, supervises, and engages in innovative, high quality research 
on social, political, cultural, and intellectual trends and movements in 
contemporary Muslim communities and societies. Its research and research 
network comprise ISIM’s societal capital: ISIM provides insights gained in 
its research programmes to the benefit of society at large. 
ISIM’s research approaches are interdisciplinary and comparative, covering 
a large geographic range that includes North Africa, the Middle East, sub-
Saharan Africa, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia, and Muslim com-
munities in Europe. Broad in scope, ISIM brings together the various areas 
of disciplinary expertise in anthropology, sociology, religious studies, politi-
cal science, and cultural studies. 
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It might sound out of place to speak of, 
let alone, invoke the idea of cosmopoli-
tanism in the current global conditions 
that are dominated by the language of 
“clash” – clash of cultures, civilizations, 
religions, or ethnicities. The discourse 
of clash is currently so overwhelming as 
though it were the central feature of our 
international, religious, and communal 
life. The media apart, academia is also inclined to concentrate far more 
on human “conflict” as a subject of scholarly inquiry than on “coopera-
tion” and “sharing.” Precisely because of this prevalent preoccupation with 
clash, it becomes morally imperative to underline the other, more com-
mon but unnoticed and inaudible processes of human conduct, to show 
how people belonging to different cultural groupings can transcend 
their immediate selves by intensely interacting in their life-worlds with 
members of other ethnic or religious collectives. Would we still imagine 
today’s Iraq as the “natural” embodiment of sharp ethnic and religious 
boundaries (because the “nation” was no more than an artificial and im-
posed construct), if only we knew how the twentieth century Iraq was 
replete with instances of individuals, families, and neighbourhoods from 
Sunni, Shii, Jewish, and Christian communities engaged in interactions 
and shared lives (see pp. 6-7)? The recent upsurge in the literature on 
cosmopolitanism (even though highly diverse) points to welcome efforts 
to rectify the discourse of confrontation and mistrust, by resurrecting the 
ideal of living together. But how do we perceive “cosmopolitanism”?
Cosmopolitanism refers to both social conditions and an ethical 
project. In the first place, it signifies certain objective processes, such 
as globalization and international migration, that compel people of di-
verse communal, national, or racial affiliations to associate, work, and 
live together. These processes lead to diminishing cultural homogene-
ity in favour of diversity, variety, and plurality of cultures, religions, and 
lifestyles. In this sense Dubai, for instance, represents a cosmopolitan 
city-state in the sense that it juxtaposes individuals and families of di-
verse national, cultural, and racial belongings, who live and work next 
to one another within a small geographical space. Indeed modern ur-
banity per se can potentially contribute to cosmopolitan habitus by 
facilitating geographies of coexistence between the members of dif-
ferent religious or ethnic groups. But this may be so not just because 
people of different religions and cultures naturally come to live and 
interact with each other; after all neighbours might dislike and distrust 
one another. Rather because proximity and interaction can supply op-
portunities for divergent parties to experience trust (as well as mis-
trust) between them.
Cosmopolitanism has also ethical and normative dimensions; it is a 
project, something to be cherished. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is 
deployed to challenge the language of separation and antagonism, 
to confront cultural superiority and ethnocentrism. It further stands 
opposed to communalism, where the inward-looking and close-knit 
ethnic or religious collectives espouse narrow, exclusive, and selfish 
interests. Cosmopolitanism of this sort also overrides the “multicultur-
alist” paradigm. Because although multiculturalism calls for equal co-
existence of different cultures within a national society, it is still preoc-
cupied with cultural boundaries – an outlook that departs from cosmo-
politan life-world where intense interaction, mixing, and sharing tend 
to blur communal boundaries, generating hybrid and “impure” cultural 
practices. The initiative of the Palestinian-Italian music group, Radiod-
ervish (see pp. 12-13) to create multilingual songs where lyrics range 
from Italian, Arabic, to English and French, amplifies such a cosmopoli-
tan project of crossing cultural and linguistic boundaries. 
But is this lifestyle not the prerogative of the elites as the critiques 
often claim? Certainly elites are in a better material position to experi-
ence cosmopolitan lifestyles; they are 
the ones who can easily afford frequent 
travelling, developing taste for differ-
ent cuisines and alternative modes of 
life and cultural products. In addition, 
unlike the poor, the privileged groups 
need not to rely on exclusive commu-
nalistic networks as a venue to secure 
social protection – something that 
tends to reinforce more inward-looking communalism. However, the 
objective possibility to experience mixing, mingling, and sharing is not 
the same as the subjective desire to do so. The question is how many 
of those elite expatriates residing in the metropolises of the global 
South share cultural life with those of the poor of the host society? In 
a closer look, the cosmopolitan Dubai turns out to be no more than 
a “city-state of relatively gated communities” (pp. 10-11) marked by 
sharp communal and spatial boundaries, with labour camps (of south 
Asian migrants) and the segregated milieu of “parochial jet-setters,” 
or the “cosmopolitan  es” of the Western elite expatriates who remain 
bounded within the physical safety and cultural purity of their own re-
clusive collectives. 
It is a mistake to limit cosmopolitan exchange solely to the preroga-
tive of the elites. Indeed, there is a serious need to pay scholarly atten-
tion to the cosmopolitanism of the ordinary people in their daily lives. 
Evidence from twentieth century Cairo, Baghdad, or Aleppo suggests 
how, beyond the elites, the ordinary members of different religious 
communities – Muslims, Jews, Christians, Shiites, or Sunnis – were en-
gaged in intense inter-communal exchange and shared lives in the 
localities or at work. In the everyday life, women in particular act as 
protagonists in initiating cosmopolitan exchanges and association. In 
mixed neighbourhoods, women generally move easily between hous-
es, chatting, exchanging gossip, and lending or borrowing things from 
their neighbours. They participate in weddings, funerals, or religious 
festivals. Children of different confessional affiliations play together in 
the alleyways while teens befriend and men go on neighbourly visits. 
All these exemplify what I like to call “everyday cosmopolitanism” of 
the subaltern. 
By everyday cosmopolitanism I mean the idea and practice of tran-
scending self – at the various levels of individual, family, tribe, religion, 
ethnicity, community, and nation – to associate with agonistic others 
in everyday life. It describes the ways in which the ordinary members of 
different ethno-religious and cultural groupings mix, mingle, intensely 
interact, and share in values and practices – the cultures of food, fash-
ion, language, and symbols – in history and memory. It signifies how 
such association and sharing affect the meaning of “us” and “them” and 
its dynamics, which in turn blurs and problematizes the meaning of 
group boundaries. The “everyday cosmopolitanism” may not go as far 
as the often abstract and philosophical notions of Stoicist “world citi-
zenship,” but engages in the modest and down-to-earth though highly 
relevant ways in which ordinary men and women from different com-
munal cosmos manage to engage, associate, and live together at the 
level of the everyday. 
Asef Bayat is Academic Director of ISIM and holds the ISIM Chair at Leiden University.
everyday 
Cosmopolitanism
Perpetrated by the media and policy circles, 
the language of clash currently dominates 
interreligious and intercultural relations, 
overlooking the more common human practices 
based upon association and cooperation. It 
is therefore high time to invoke the notion of 
“everyday cosmopolitanism” both as a scholarly 
inquiry and an ethical project.
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ple plates being sent between houses, 
often reciprocated by the recipient’s 
typical food, or some sweets. 
Music constituted another sphere 
of inter-communal mixing. Jews were 
particularly prominent in the musical 
arts from the nineteenth century, as 
instrumentalist, singers, composers, 
and cafe and cabaret owners. The Iraqi 
delegation to the Arab Music Congress 
in Cairo in 1932 consisted of Jewish in-
strumentalists and one Muslim singer. 
The first orchestra of Iraqi national 
broadcasting in 1936 was predominantly Jewish. One of the most fa-
mous divas of the middle decades of the century was Salima Murad, a 
Jewess who converted to Islam to marry another famous singer, Nazim 
al-Ghazzali. Iraqi Jews in Israel have maintained their devotion to Iraqi 
music into the second and third generations, and Iraqi Jews in London 
import those musicians for their weddings and celebrations. I recall an 
occasion some years ago when a group of Iraqi Jewish musicians from 
Israel arriving in London to perform at a wedding were invited to the 
home of another Iraqi Jew for an evening with a prominent Muslim 
Iraqi musician who then lived in London. They were all friends in Bagh-
dad in the old days, and it was an emotional reunion. They played and 
sang together well into the night.
Communal boundaries
The picture so far may appear a rosy one of friendly inter-communal 
interaction and cosmopolitanism. In fact most people, especially the 
poorer classes, were enveloped in their family and community lives, 
and the ritual calendar of their religion. Communal identities were 
never forgotten, and the boundaries may have been lowered for some, 
but never eliminated. Intermarriage across religious boundaries was 
strictly taboo, and on the rare occasion on which it occurred (always 
the non-Muslim partner converting to Islam) was considered a great 
disaster for the families concerned. Boundaries are not necessarily lo-
cations of conflict, but they can become so when politicized, as they 
were in the course of the twentieth century. Arab nationalism, even 
when secular, drew heavily upon religious-communal sentiments. In 
this perspective Jews (and Christians) were associated with hostile co-
lonial powers, and for Jews, the Zionist movement and Israel.
Iraqi politics under the Monarchy (displaced in 1958) consisted of var-
ious fronts of accommodation and opposition to a government close 
to British interests, and to the West in the Cold War. The ideological 
opposition was divided between the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and 
Arab nationalist groups. The Arab nationalists (in various parties, culmi-
nating in the Baath) tended to be recruited predominantly (though not 
exclusively) from Sunni Arabs. The ICP, which had solid popular constit-
uencies, appealed to the whole spectrum of the Iraqi population: Arabs 
and Kurds, Sunna and Shia, Christians and Jews. Quite apart from its 
ideology and pro-Soviet allegiance, it was an “Iraqist” and cosmopoli-
tan party. Jews, for the most part, avoided open involvement in politics 
where they were particularly vulnerable. But many young people, intel-
ligentsia, but also artisans, were attracted by the prospect of participa-
tion in a secular, universalist, and liberationist movement. Communist 
Jews, some of whom attained leadership positions, were to share in the 
sacrifices and persecutions of their comrades, and the political prisons 
became another arena of everyday cosmopolitanism.
Arab nationalist and Islamic sentiments and movements assumed 
markedly anti-Jewish positions and actions during the 1930s and 
1940s, reinforced with the foundation of Israel in 1948. The 1936 Arab 
revolt in Palestine and the continuing confrontations with Jewish set-
tlers there, led Arab nationalists to see all Jews as complicit. The Rashid 
Ali coup d’état in 1941 was anti-British and pro-Nazi, and though short-
lived, presided over an intensification of anti-Jewish aggression, culmi-
nating in a “pogrom,” known as the Farhud, targeting the Jews of Bagh-
dad and some other cities, during which some 200 Jews were killed 
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Everyday Cosmopolitanism
Jews & Others in Iraq
The history of the Jewish presence in 
Iraq is often forgotten, erased by mu-
tually hostile nationalisms, Arabist and 
Zionist. A consideration of that history 
and of the embeddedness of the Jews 
in Iraqi society and culture presents 
an interesting reminder of the every-
day cosmopolitanism that pervaded 
Iraqi urban (and some rural) society 
for much of the twentieth century. 
This everyday cosmopolitanism is here 
traced in various spheres and fields of 
general social life as well as profession-
al activities. These relations across communal boundaries were subject 
to the impacts of the political and ideological episodes of the century: 
WWII, pan-Arab nationalism and pro-Nazi movements, the Communist 
movement and Jewish participation, and Zionism and the ultimate 
foundation of Israel.
Social mingling
With the foundation of the modern Iraqi state (British Mandate 1920; 
Independence 1932) Christian and Jewish individuals were well placed 
to participate in the emerging public life in government services, the 
professions, the arts, journalism, and business. Missionary schools and 
the Alliance Israelite Universelle established schools in Baghdad and 
other main cities in the course of the nineteenth century, educating 
their pupils in European languages and modern curricula. This partici-
pation led to the fostering of organic relations between individuals 
and families from different communities, in business and professional 
relations, friendships, and social mingling. Even in rural areas, Jewish 
doctors assumed vital roles in community life and service, and Jewish 
landlords, acquiring land after the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth 
century, assumed paternal relations to their tenants and employees, to 
the extent of organizing Husseiniya ceremonies in the Shia mourning 
month of Muharram.
Women were often the most active and curious in social interactions 
of neighbourhood and female society. In oral accounts and written 
memoirs, the theme recurs of women moving easily between houses 
in mixed neighbourhoods, exchanging gossip and cooking recipes, as 
well as telling and commiserating over the many common matrimonial 
and domestic problems. They also participated in each other’s festivi-
ties and occasions, exchanging greetings and items of food on their re-
spective religious festivals of Eid, Purim, and Christmas. Jewish women 
in Shia neighbourhoods would sometimes join 
their neighbours on balconies and doorways to 
watch the mourning processions for the martyrs 
in Muharram. Women were also more receptive 
to religious intercession from whatever source to 
solve personal problems of fertility, health, wealth, 
and happiness. One such is the shrine of Shaykh 
Abdel-Qadir al-Gailani in Baghdad, known for its 
efficacy in solving problems of fertility, which was 
frequented by Jewish and Christian women.
Food constituted an interesting cultural field 
of interaction between individuals of different 
communities. The barriers of food taboos were 
transcended among friends, either by non-ob-
servance or by special provisions. From personal recollections, Muslim 
hosts would insure that their table included fish and vegetables for their 
Jewish guests who may observe Casher (Kosher) prohibitions, and Shia 
diners would ignore the taboo on commensality with non-Muslims ob-
served in many Shia communities but ignored in mixed urban contexts. 
While most of the cuisine of each community represented variations on 
common themes of Middle East cooking, there were dishes specific to 
each, such as the Jewish Sabbath dish. In Baghdad this was a special 
chicken and rice dish cooked slowly overnight, known as tebit. Neigh-
bours, attracted by the aromas, had their curiosity satisfied with sam-
The current image of Iraq in the media and 
public discourse is of a country sharply 
divided by communal boundaries and 
conflicts of religion, ethnicity, and community. 
This image goes right against any notion 
of “cosmopolitanism.” Yet, research into 
the history of the country in the twentieth 
century would show that, while communal 
boundaries and conflicts did exist, these 
were socially permeable, allowing much close 
interaction between individuals, families, and 
neighbourhoods across the boundaries.
The barriers of 
food taboos were 
transcended among 
friends …
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classes. In these milieus, communal boundaries were lowered, and 
common mixing, friendships and partnerships flourished for much of 
the twentieth century. Yet, it was those cosmopolitan middle classes 
who fell victim to repeated campaigns of repression and expulsion. 
First, the Jews, who constituted a considerable tranche of the edu-
cated, professional, and business classes, were forced to leave. Then, 
during the 1970s and 80s, many Shia communities were subject to dis-
appropriation and expulsion by the Saddam regime. Waves of political 
repression and persecution decimated the ranks of the intelligentsia, 
many killed and others in prison and exile. Repeated wars and devas-
tation, followed by the UN sanctions, led to the impoverishment and 
humiliation of those classes and heightened pressures which drove 
many into exile.
The violence and disorder which followed the 2003 invasion in-
cluded campaigns of assassination and kidnapping targeting profes-
sionals, including doctors, scientists, and professors, leading to a mass 
flight of these classes into exile. Iraq, then, has been largely denuded 
of the main carriers of everyday, as well as cultural, cosmopolitanism. 
The raging communal violence has also led to the ethnic cleansing of 
neighbourhoods, leading to greater homogeneity, and the erection of 
communal barriers, sometimes physically in the form of walls of sepa-
ration. Christians, and other religious minorities have been particularly 
targeted and many driven into exile or internal displacement. What re-
mains of Iraqi cosmopolitanism may now be found in London or Paris, 
and possibly Amman.
As for the cosmopolitanism of the Middle East more generally, can 
we see a waning of the ethnic and communal interactions of the ear-
lier twentieth century? Certainly, the convergence of nationalism with 
Islamism which seems to prevail increasingly in many countries has led 
to a homogenization of populations and regions, and accelerated mi-
grations of religious minorities to the West, after the almost complete 
ending of the Jewish presence in the region outside of Israel. What of 
globalization: does it lead to a new cosmopolitanism, or to added bar-
riers generated by sharpened transnational nativist and religious ide-
ologies?
and many injured and raped; a traumatic event in collective 
Jewish memory. British forces soon re-occupied Baghdad 
and restored the Monarchy. During this episode many Jews 
were protected by their Muslim neighbours and friends, es-
pecially in the provinces, where a traditional sense of mutual 
obligations was particularly strong.
At the level of everyday relations ideological antipathies 
did not always inhibit friendships and associations. Nazi 
propaganda was prevalent in schools, especially espoused 
by Palestinian and Syrian teachers. A Jewish informant, who 
was at school in the late 1930s, relates walking hand in hand 
with his Muslim classmate in the street, the latter using the 
other hand to write on the wall with a piece of chalk “kill the 
Jews”! This same informant was in a political prison in the 
1940s, as a communist, when a visiting high level medical 
inspector astonished the guards by stopping to greet him 
since they had been at school together.
Iraqi Jews had an ambivalent and shifting attitude to Zion-
ism. Zionist emissaries sent into Iraq with the British forces 
during WW2 were disappointed with the apathy and even 
hostility of the local Jews, whom they decried in their re-
ports as not proper Jews, integrated into “oriental” society, 
immersed in the pastimes and vices of their milieu: sitting 
around in cafes, drinking Arak, gossip, and gambling. Yet, as the Jews 
felt the increasing pressure and discrimination in the later 1940s, Is-
rael and Zionism acquired greater attraction. For some, mostly young, 
the pull was ideological and attraction to the prospect of a western 
lifestyle and full citizenship. For others it was the push of persecution, 
loss of jobs, and arbitrary rule. In the end these pressures and attrac-
tions culminated in the emigration of the great majority of Jews, some 
120,000, mostly to Israel in 1951, in accordance with a secret agree-
ment between Iraqi leaders and the Jewish Agency which allowed Jews 
to leave without their possessions, on condition that they renounce 
their Iraqi nationality. A few thousands remained in Iraq, and some en-
joyed a period of calm and prosperity in the years of the Qasim regime 
(1958–63), only to be subjected to further pressure under the Arabist 
and Baathist regimes of the 1960s, culminating in a wave of persecu-
tion and terror following the 1967 Arab defeat, then the Baathist coup 
of 1968 which brought Saddam and a bloodier regime to power. The 
bulk of the remaining Jews left as soon as they could after that.
Nation-state formation
Iraq is now seen as the epitome of violent sectarianism. A common 
assumption is that this state of affairs is in the nature of the country, 
being an “artificial” creation, forcing together diverse communities 
who cannot coalesce into a “nation.” Most modern nations, however, 
started as artificial mixes, and it is the process of nation-state forma-
tion itself which creates various forms of the “national” at the socio-
economic and cultural levels. Iraq was no exception. The account of 
“everyday cosmopolitanism” given here shows elements of this nation-
al formation and the lowering of communal barriers for much of the 
twentieth century, especially with regard to the ambiguous position of 
the Jews in relation to this “national.” The present situation is the prod-
uct of the disruptive processes unleashed by the Saddam regime, its 
extraordinary repressions and disastrous wars, and exacerbated by the 
American invasion of 2003.
It may be argued that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Iraq was not unambiguously an “Arab country.” Quite apart from the 
sizeable Kurdish population, the “Arab” component participated in a 
highly hybrid culture with echoes of the Turko-Iranic world. Nowruz, 
the spring festival of the Iranic world, was widely celebrated in many 
communities. Iraqi Arabic was, and remains to a certain extent, imbued 
with Persian and Turkish vocabulary. In the 1970s Saddam Hussein 
found it necessary to issue an order banning “foreign” words and ex-
pressions in Iraqi songs. It was the national state, Arab nationalist for 
the most part, which made Iraq into an “Arab country” in the course of 
the twentieth century. This project was also part of the mass national 
education, then government bureaucracy, all in standard Arabic. Yet, all 
these policies and processes never fully succeeded in eliminating the 
pervasive hybridity of Iraqi culture.
At the same time, the national state and its fields spawned orienta-
tions, spaces, and institutions for the flourishing of a different kind of 
cosmopolitanism, that of the intelligentsia and the educated middle 
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Marginalization
During and immediately after the 
First World War, when it was occupied 
by the Entente, Istanbul remained a 
shelter for an Ottoman world soon to 
be demolished by the emerging forces 
of national Turkey. Mıntzuri himself 
survived in Istanbul and was spared 
the deportation and murder that be-
fell his family and the Armenian com-
munity of his village in Anatolia. In his 
own words, it was these events that 
first compelled him to write about his 
home and people. 
In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the city went through a proc-
ess that may only be described as paradoxical. On the one hand, the 
government settled in Istanbul those non-Muslims it thought would 
not integrate well into the new Turkish nation, the numbers of Greek, 
Armenian, and Jewish inhabitants of Istanbul swelling as a result. At 
the same time, however, a process was set in motion by which the same 
incomers were gradually rendered socially invisible. During the 1920’s 
and 30’s, the new regime followed a policy of cultural homogenization. 
Language and dress of all its inhabitants were to be uniform, at least in 
public. Large sectors of the different minority communities agreed to, 
and even supported this policy. In their view, cultural Turkification was 
the price they must pay to become equal citizens of the new nation. 
The government’s promise of equality was not kept, however. Legal 
discrimination of minorities remained widespread and led to the emi-
gration of many individuals. Eager to sponsor a new Turkish class of en-
trepreneurs, the state subjected all minority communities to economic 
marginalization. In 1942, this trend peaked with the so-called Wealth 
Tax (Varlık Vergisi), which ruined the livelihoods of these communi-
ties’ businessmen and small craftsmen.2 Worse was yet to come, the 
pogrom of 6 and 7 September 1955, against the city’s Greek Orthodox 
community, marked the deathblow of communal diversity in Istanbul. 
Following conflicts over Cyprus, a mob supported by the government 
destroyed Greek property and churches. Almost all Istanbul Greeks left 
the city as a result.
Revaluation of the cosmopolitan past
Among both academics and members of Turkey’s general public, this 
period of Turkish history only began to be reconsidered in the 1990’s. 
A new generation of critical historians began to call into question the 
official silence surrounding the state’s treatment of non-Muslim mi-
norities. For the first time, issues like the Wealth Tax and the anti-Greek 
pogroms of 1955 were examined from a non-nationalist perspective.
In contrast, Ottoman history offered the example of a seemingly 
more tolerant treatment of the city’s minorities and peaceful co-ex-
istence of all its inhabitants. Outside academia, the reawakened in-
terest in Ottoman Istanbul concentrated on the city’s belle époque at 
the turn of the twentieth century. The public was particularly drawn 
to the Europeanized urban culture of Pera (today’s Beyoğlu, a quarter 
north of the Golden Horn) with its cafés, theatres, casinos, hotels, and 
embassies. The popular imagination was stoked by tourism and media 
campaigns involving Istanbul’s nineteenth century architecture and 
black and white photos of its once sophisticated denizens. It was not 
long before these images became marketable: Beyoğlu’s nineteenth-
century areas have been renovated and fitted with cafes, restaurants, 
and a luxury shopping mall. Property prices have risen as a result. In 
quarters originally fashionable among artists and intellectuals for their 
multiculturalism, nineteenth century architecture has become an asset 
on the private property market. Likewise, shopping malls, cafes, res-
f l O r i A n  r i e d l e r In attempts to market their capital, Tur-
key’s political and business elites present 
Istanbul as cosmopolitan, and welcom-
ing in outsiders as managers of global 
corporations or simply as tourists. Yet 
before the 1990s, when the Turkish pub-
lic began to rediscover and revaluate its 
rich multicultural history, Istanbul’s now 
much vaunted cosmopolitanism was all 
but forgotten. Among the many pub-
lications to nourish its rediscovery are 
the memoires of the Turkish-Armenian 
author Hagop Mıntzuri. His last work, 
Istanbul Memories, presents a firsthand 
account of the author’s life in Istanbul, where he arrived as boy when 
the city was still the Ottoman capital.1 It was Mıntzuri’s first book to be 
accepted by a mainstream Turkish publishing house, though it was only 
published in 1993, some fifteen years after his death. Istanbul Memories 
consists of a series of articles, previously published individually in the 
1970’s by a small Armenian newspaper based in Istanbul. Only when 
these articles were translated from Armenian into 
Turkish, and then gathered in book form, did the 
public gain access to Mıntzuri’s unusual and valu-
able recollections of the city. While the book serves 
as a timely reminder of the tragic loss of diversity 
suffered by Istanbul during the first half of the 
twentieth century, its recent publication is ample 
proof of the current desire to resurrect the idea of 
Istanbul as a historically, and thus somehow intrin-
sically, cosmopolitan setting.   
To the modern reader, Istanbul Memories presents 
a lively and colourful picture of the Ottoman capital 
around the year 1900. Mıntzuri moved there, at age 
twelve, from a village in Eastern Anatolia to work 
alongside his father, grandfather, and uncles in the 
bakery the family had leased. They belonged to 
thousands of poor villagers – among them Albani-
ans, Greeks, Turks, Kurds, and Armenians – who had 
migrated to the Ottoman capital to earn a living. As 
seen through the eyes of a boy from the countryside, the city was full of 
new, strange, and exciting things: the sultan’s palaces, trams, cafes and 
beer-gardens, department stores, and book shops. At the same time, the 
book portrays the intimate social relationships of the immigrant crafts-
men, shop owners, and workers with whom Mıntzuri lived and worked. 
According to Mıntzuri, regardless of their origins, these workers treated 
each other with respect and cordiality.
In the nostalgic reminiscences of an old man, the rising ethnic ten-
sions and intercommunal violence that characterized the late Ottoman 
era of his youth play no part. Mıntzuri could ignore these tensions, be-
cause, like other Mediterranean port cities of the day, late Ottoman Is-
tanbul seemed like an unusually peaceful place if one were to consider 
the violence of the transitions ahead (as Turkey was recreated from the 
debris of the Ottoman Empire as a national state). Writing in the 1970s, 
Mıntzuri had seen his once famously diverse capital turn its back on 
this diversity. This process was drawn out over a period of almost half 
a century. 
While Mıntzuri’s nostalgic accounts of Ottoman cosmopolitanism 
mesh perfectly with recent social and economic trends, the book lays 
bare certain contradictions between contemporary and past discours-
es regarding the realities of cosmopolitanism in Istanbul. One of the 
most pertinent of these contradictions concerns the often troubled 
relationship between diversity and migration.
Rediscovering istanbul’s 
Cosmopolitan Past
The image of Istanbul as capital of one 
of the world’s greatest empires is often 
used to emphasize its cosmopolitanism, a 
convenient marketing tool in today’s global 
economy. Just as historical monuments are 
used to remind the tourist of Istanbul’s role 
as the cradle of civilization, the claim to 
cosmopolitanism employs the notion that, 
in Ottoman times, many religious and ethnic 
groups coexisted peacefully in the city. Yet 
in repackaging Istanbul in this way, certain 
signs of diversity are championed while 
others are notably passed over. 
…Istanbul’s 
diversity was 
created by 
migrants, in 
Ottoman times as 
well as today.
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and daughters of rich Armenian traders and Turkish officials 
at school. Yet, Mıntzuri never belongs to their world; he is al-
ways excluded on the basis of class and income. Throughout 
his life, and particularly during Republican times, Mıntzuri 
must struggle to make ends meet (though never explicitly 
stated, this is presumably due to the economic policies of 
the time). The author’s penury, his feelings of alienation and 
distress after losing his home and family contribute to the 
intimacy of his work. 
Istanbul Memories represents the voice of poor peasants 
migrating to Istanbul. It recaptures a past that has all but 
disappeared from the public memory, which retraces migra-
tion patterns back no further than the 1950’s. Mıntzuri’s life 
story is a reminder that Istanbul’s diversity was created by 
migrants, in Ottoman times as well as today. Despite the 
popularity of the aforementioned claim to cosmopolitanism, 
Istanbul’s middle classes have not always been as welcom-
ing to outsiders as is now implied. By the 1950s, almost all 
of Istanbul’s non-Turkish communities of Jews, Armenians, 
and Greeks had left the country under pressure from the 
nationalist government. They were supplanted by an influx 
of Anatolian migrants, predominantly from Central Anato-
lia and the Black Sea coast, among these Alevis and Lazes. 
Raising its population from one to more than five million in 
1980, and thus rendering the city overwhelmingly Turkish 
and Muslim, these new arrivals struggled to integrate into 
modern Istanbul. Rather, they were accused of lowering 
standards of “civilization,” and of destroying civic culture and 
the urban environment with their shantytowns. Migration 
became a scapegoat for any number of problems, from land 
speculation to political nepotism. In public memory Anato-
lian migrants even stand accused of being responsible for 
the 1955 pogrom.4 This is not altogether surprising, it is true 
for example that, among the shock troops that plundered 
Greek property, beat up its owners, and torched churches, 
there were many Anatolians, some bussed in for the occasion. New-
comers to the city were the natural political clientele of the Democratic 
Party, which organized the riots against the Greeks of Istanbul. Never-
theless, the claim that it was only the migrants that were responsible 
for the pogrom’s atrocities is unreasonable; without the help of the 
local authorities and inhabitants such violence would simply not have 
been possible.
Ultimately, despite modern claims to cosmopolitanism, the arrival of 
migrants has rarely been welcomed by Istanbul’s established popula-
tion. The injustice of this attitude is worth noting. For, despite the lev-
els of prejudice, the new waves of Anatolian migrants have managed 
to establish themselves in Istanbul and, in so doing, have returned to 
the city much of its historically diverse flavour. Moreover, with the eco-
nomic opening of Turkey in the 1980’s and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, still more immigrant communities have started to settle in the 
city. During the 1990’s, the war against the PKK in Turkey’s South East 
also brought in Kurdish refugees. As their numbers soar, the migrant 
communities increasingly assert their political, religious, and cultural 
identities. As these displays meet with the global (consumer) culture 
associated with new businesses and visiting tour-
ists, a peculiarly modern form of multiculturalism, 
a hybrid of past and present, is developing.5 More 
than a hundred years after Hagop Mıntzuri first 
arrived in the city, Istanbul’s cosmopolitanism 
has been revived conceptually, through a nos-
talgic appeal to its Ottoman past, and practically, 
through the arrival of vast numbers of migrants 
from other areas in Turkey and beyond. As a re-
sult, Mıntzuri’s childhood vision of Istanbul, as a 
diverse and booming metropole, begins once 
again to ring true.
taurants, and pubs in the inner city entertainment district of Beyoğlu 
have increasingly used its nineteenth century architecture as a stage 
for consumerism.3
This repacking of Pera/Beyoğlu, as a cosmopolitan locale par excel-
lence, is particularly important because of its resonance with contem-
porary struggles over Turkish identity. To the city’s modern middle 
classes, the area stands as a symbol of urbanity and sophistication, 
rooted in a history that is European, modern, and “civilized.” Equally, 
this picture accords with a determinedly secularist vision of the city as 
a whole. A contrasting view became politically relevant in 1994, how-
ever, when the Islamist Welfare Party won the local elections for the 
first time. To these Islamist politicians, Pera/Beyoğlu’s Europeanized 
multiculturalism carries profoundly negative connotations, ones that 
speak predominantly of cultural alienation and loss of traditions. 
The translation and publication of Istanbul Memories must be con-
sidered in light of the ongoing reappraisal of Istanbul’s cosmopolitan 
past. At first glance, Mıntzuri’s nostalgic recollections of turn of the 
century Istanbul, penned by a member of one of its minority commu-
nities, connects very well to the popular imagination today. Old pho-
tographs, provided by the publisher, add to its appeal. However, the 
book has more to offer than the usual clichés on cosmopolitism. For, 
Mıntzuri’s deeply personal eye-witness account of a once multicultural 
and peaceful Istanbul, prior to the advent of nationalism, is free from 
the political agenda that so distorted the image of Ottoman cosmo-
politanism in later times.  
Migrants transforming the city
Mıntzuri does not merely present nostalgic visions of Istanbul’s cos-
mopolitan past. He also points to stories of migration which, though 
easily forgotten by inhabitants of Istanbul with a dislike of “outsiders,” 
remain very much part of the city’s character. Istanbul Memories was 
written by a rural migrant, and thus a social underdog. Given this fact, 
it is not surprising that the themes of poverty and exclusion are here 
ubiquitous. On first arriving in Istanbul, the author has to buy new 
clothes and lose his accent so as not to stand out. He lives in a world 
very different from belle époque Pera, though no less multicultural and 
diverse. Indeed, in his account, these two worlds sometimes meet. For 
instance, when he ventures into Pera or sits side by side with the sons 
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m O h A m m A d  m A S A d rights and privileges that come with 
it, including substantial governmental 
subsidies and a distinct preferential 
treatment. Most Emiratis live in sepa-
rate or detached houses, usually up-
scale walled villas, in neighbourhoods 
where similar Emirati families find liv-
ing more comfortable; for example cer-
tain parts of Jumeira, Um Suqeim, and 
Garhoud. Though occasionally expatri-
ate families may live nearby, even next 
door, meaningful interaction between 
locals and foreigners is extremely lim-
ited and often nonexistent. However, the mutual need and routine in-
teraction can promote shared interests and also create mutual respect, 
understanding, acceptance, and sometimes, even friendship.
Increasing numbers of Emiratis for example are sending their chil-
dren to private schools where they will have an opportunity for daily 
interaction with other children and teens from around the world. These 
young Emiratis are full participants in the kind of multi-cultural experi-
ence that is virtually impossible in the regular public schools system, 
where students are exclusively nationals (occasionally mixed with a 
limited number of children of Arab expatriates). Other areas of interac-
tion include higher education and private sector employment. Many 
young Emiratis, including women, attend colleges and universities, 
some of which are open to all students, with western curricula, and a 
multi-national staff and faculty teaching in English. Once graduated, 
many of these Emiratis choose to work in private businesses, where, 
unlike working in the government sector, they get to intermingle daily 
with colleagues and customers from around the globe.
These changes in education and employment are increasing the 
chances of breaking the divide between the national and expatriate 
communities. To some degree, this trend is the result of the policy of 
“emiratization,” whereby private businesses in some sectors (such as 
banking and financial services) are encouraged through incentives (or 
required by law) to hire local citizens in specific jobs. This process is also 
driven by a growing sense of frustration among many locals that their 
country is practically being run at many levels by expatriate manag-
ers and workers. The sharp increase in the cost of living in Dubai has 
also pushed a significant number of Emirati families into a position of 
greater financial need. Thus more nationals are now actively seeking 
private employment.
But despite these profound changes, the majority of the working na-
tionals are absorbed into government and public sectors, if they do 
not own or co-own their own businesses. This is understandable, given 
the work environment in this sector and the governmental policy of 
comprehensive subsidies for its employees. Very few private employers 
are willing to pay the kinds of salaries and benefits afforded to locals in 
the public sector, assuming they are eligible to work there in the first 
place. While some governmental sectors have been almost completely 
nationalized, with most employment (save for service jobs and manual 
labour) in the hands of Emiratis, other ones, such as education, are still 
heavily dependent on expatriates. If anything, the need for larger in-
fluxes of expatriate labour is all the more urgent as the city grows expo-
nentially and the government has a hard time filling in the expanding 
job market with trained nationals. 
Some of the more interesting daily cosmopolitan experiences hap-
pen in the old Dubai, namely, Deira and Bur Dubai, home to some of 
the poorest of the nationals and long-term residents; mostly people 
who came to the city generations ago from other parts of Arabia, Iran, 
or South Asia and continued to live in Dubai without necessarily be-
coming fully naturalized. This area is also a favorite for transient expa-
For much of its recorded history, Dubai 
has been recognized as a cosmopolitan 
city. Sixty years ago, the late traveller 
and photographer Wilfred Thesiger re-
marked that Dubai’s suqs were “crowd-
ed with many races,” including Arab 
townsmen, Beduins, slaves, Baluchis, 
Persians, Indians, Kashgai tribesmen, 
and Somalis.1 The Dubai of today is a 
far cry from that of the mid-twentieth 
century. The city has been totally trans-
formed into a gigantic metropolis, 
growing at breathtaking speed and at-
tracting a deluge of guest workers, investors, and tourists from around 
the world.
The unprecedented growth of Dubai would have been impossible 
without foreign labour. Reliable numbers are hard to come by, but most 
sources estimate that expatriates from around the globe now account 
for more than ninety percent of the city residents, dwarfing the local 
Emiratis to a small minority. As the city grows, its cosmopolitan nature 
expands and intensifies reflected in such areas as dress, food, language, 
religion, and other aspects of lifestyle filtering through everyday life.
However, Dubai often finds itself caught between its carefully crafted 
and branded image as a city of harmonious living and a global hub of 
business and tourism, and its reputation as a harshly segregated city 
living off the indentured labour of exploited Asian workers. These per-
ceptions have generated a lively debate about the nature of the Dubai 
experiment and attracted both praise and condemnation. For many, 
Dubai is a success story, regardless of the reasons and costs. The city’s 
openness for example to bold ideas in designing urban spaces is seen 
by some as an indicator of Dubai’s unique place as “the prototype of the 
21st century,” making it into a designer’s paradise.2 Others however dis-
miss Dubai as an unsustainable experiment of a vast gated community, 
rooted in mindless consumption and economic injustice.3
Much of the unsympathetic views about Dubai seems to emanate 
from a preconceived rejection of capitalist consumerism. But to see 
Dubai through this prism only is problematic and ill-informed. It is a 
gross simplification to describe Dubai as a gated community. The rela-
tive freedom of movement within the city and the millions of visitors 
and newly-recruited workers constantly streaming into it are hardly 
signs of a gated city. It would be more accurate to say that Dubai is a 
generally open city-state of relatively gated communities. Similarly, it 
is hard to believe that Dubai is a mirage. The city has been around for 
longer than many western cities; and its growth, regardless of how it is 
characterized should not render it less real than Monte Carlo, Las Vegas, 
or Singapore.
The social architecture of Dubai is premised on a sharp division and 
separation of the main three communities: local Emiratis, western, Arab 
and subcontinental expatriates, and South Asian workers. These com-
munities are generally differentiated by their civic rights, socio-eco-
nomic status, residential location, lifestyle priorities, and cultural identi-
ties. Some of the spheres of separation are the result of the kinds of jobs 
people have and how much money they earn; others exist by virtue of 
the natural gravitation of different groups of people towards communi-
ties and localities that reflect their national or cultural identity. Conse-
quently, these groups enjoy different sets of choices and freedoms.
Citizens
At the top of the social pyramid is the national Emirati community, 
also known as the nationals or the locals. Statistically, this is a shrinking 
minority, comprising no more than ten percent of Dubai’s inhabitants; 
it is also the only group that enjoys the UAE citizenship with all the 
Dubai’s phenomenal development is celebrated 
by some as a model of cosmopolitan living, and 
downplayed by others as a non-sustainable 
urbanism rooted in exploitation. Whatever 
the truth is, the mix of peoples and lifestyles 
in Dubai is remarkable, as expatriates from all 
over the world move there to live and work. Yet 
this cosmopolitanism is tempered by dynamics 
of segregation and the exclusion of the 
majority expatriate population from civic life. 
This article examines these conflicting faces of 
cosmopolitan living in Dubai.
dubai 
What Cosmopolitan City?
Everyday Cosmopolitanism
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revolves around work and survival, with little emotional solace or es-
cape. This is still largely an excluded class, where workers have little 
contact with others outside of their coworkers and superiors.  
Other groups of urban nomads are mostly in a better position to 
nurture transnational identities. For them, the feeling of an outsider 
is never gone, but the lack of strong or irreplaceable affiliations and 
belonging combined with an extended residency in the city highlight 
a sense of connection to Dubai and what it has to offer. The securities 
of work, good life, harmonious living, safe city, and modern facilities 
cannot be underestimated, and to the extent Dubai can offer these the 
bond between city and inhabitants can only get stronger.
Transnational utopia?
Dubai is definitely not a utopia, though it has at its disposal an end-
less capacity to accommodate everything and anything. The tempo-
rariness of most of its inhabitants and the lack of equality in terms of 
citizenship and residency rights are two conditions that deepen the 
separation and give rise to tension. To make Dubai a truly modern city 
that cares for all of its residents and its future, the city has to overcome 
the root causes that continue to tarnish its reputation. Among these, 
the severe segregation of its communities, the sub-human conditions 
of Asian labourers, and the lack of civil society are among the most 
urgent. Sorting out these problems will propel the rise of an urban cos-
mopolitan existence that is much more humane and sustainable. 
Dubai may not be the ultimate cosmopolitan city, but it can rightfully 
claim to be more cosmopolitan than other cities in the region. In ad-
dition to its history of multi-ethnic living and openness, it is certainly 
not lacking in diversity, resources, boldness, and fame to make cosmo-
politan living much more than a touristic promotion or a skin-deep 
phenomenon. There is recently some movement in this direction, most 
notably the changes in property ownership laws, enacted five years 
ago. These changes create the prospect of a long-term or permanent 
residency, often in the same buildings or projects, of many thousands 
of people from around the globe who are seeking property investment 
or a well-paying job with a modern lifestyle in Dubai. Though extend-
ing citizenship to non-Emiratis will probably not be on the horizon for 
a long time (the country has yet to find closure on 
the problem of the bidoun, stateless people who 
claim to be Emiratis but haven’t been considered 
citizens), progress on advancing civic rights, and 
creating a more equitable system can significant-
ly change social dynamics. How far these changes 
can go is difficult to ascertain at the moment, but 
in the meanwhile, more and more people seem 
to be willing to think of Dubai as a home city and 
identify with what it represents.
triates with modest income to live and do business. The old 
city is spatially delineated from its later extensions and other 
newer neighbourhoods (such as Garhoud, Jumeira, and Mir-
dif ) where wealthier nationals and comfortable expatriates 
tend to live. It is also worlds apart from the new Dubai, which 
is an amalgam of high rises and suburbia with luxury villas 
and modern apartments, rented or owned by mostly rich 
and middle class expatriates. Old Dubai is also popular with 
tourists seeking the experience of the ambience of Dubai as 
an Oriental city. As a result, this part of Dubai is a thriving 
cosmopolitan site. There is a much more frequent and genu-
ine interaction among people living there. These localities, 
for example Ghbeiba and Satwa, have a clear transnational 
connection evident in the languages spoken, the signs post-
ed, the ethnic restaurants, the many money-exchange and 
transfer offices, and the games or sports played there.4
Expatriates
The bulk of the expatriate population resides in districts 
outside the old city and in the new Dubai, often described 
as pretentious, lifeless, and bland cookie-cutter urban spac-
es. This is partially true, though it tends to romanticize old 
Dubai and exaggerate the fake urbanism of the new one. 
The new Dubai communities may have little to show in terms of lively 
social and cultural activities; but those who live there are real peo-
ple who come from all over the world, often with families, to make a 
living. They often live in gated or semi-gated communities, either in 
small walled compounds or mega developments, and without a clear 
national or ethnic pattern of residency. The daily interaction of this 
multi-national and transient population, via neighbourly relations or 
encounters at clubs, schools, pools, parks, and gyms, contributes to a 
growing sense of a harmonious cosmopolitan living.
Most recently, those with more invested interest in these communi-
ties, such as the long-term expatriate tenants and owners of apart-
ments and townhouses, have started to bind together to improve 
living conditions for them and their families through initiatives such 
as recycling programmes, committees tackling pressing issues, beach 
and desert cleaning campaigns, charity drives, and sports activities. 
What many of these people have in common, as neighbours, tenants, 
owners, and parents, is more than just accidentally sharing a space; 
they also share a growing sense of common interest that opens chan-
nels of communication and interaction. Such experiences cannot be 
dismissed as meaningless.
In addition to social contacts in villa compounds and apartment 
buildings, other private and public places can be identified as cosmo-
politan sites. These include businesses, government offices serving 
and tending to the needs of expatriates (police stations, immigration 
and naturalization, municipality), and public places such as shopping 
malls, clubs, bars, parks, and beaches. Shopping is perhaps the most 
frequent public activity for many of the Dubai international popula-
tion. The mix of people, styles, shops, goods, foods, and entertainment 
facilities and activities in almost all of the city’s mega malls is remark-
able. While the shopping mall is by definition a shallow and passing 
experience, in contrast private schools offer the most significant pub-
lic space for cosmopolitan encounters in Dubai. The bonds of friend-
ship and everyday living created between students (as well as teach-
ers and staff ) of these schools is one of the most enduring legacies of 
cosmopolitan Dubai.
Asian labourers
Asian labourers constitute the largest group of expatriates, but also 
are the most excluded from the cosmopolitan experience of Dubai. 
This is the class at the very bottom of the social pyramid and the most 
invisible and secluded in terms of residence and social life. The bulk 
of workers live in labour camps, often in squalid living conditions 
and far away from other residential areas. But this situation is also 
gradually changing: first, the national and ethnic mix of the labourers 
themselves is expanding, as Asian workers from more countries, such 
as China, join the labour force; second, the distance between labour 
camps and the built up residential and commercial areas is  fast disap-
pearing. Now more workers can be seen wandering in shopping malls 
or walking around residential districts. Living without their families 
(since they do not earn enough to do that), the workers’ everyday life 
Everyday Cosmopolitanism
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religious dialogue and peace building. 
Whether these performers are truly en-
joying their own cosmopolitan experi-
ence is of limited interest to us. In any 
event, what they do and sing on stage 
is understood as such by institutional 
sponsors and by many in the audience. 
In particular, it demystifies in practice 
pundits’ loud belief in conflict as the 
necessary point of arrival of cultural 
and religious diversity. 
Between cosmopolitanism and ethno-religious labels 
Artists, and migrant artists in particular, face distinctive socio-economic 
and legal challenges, exemplified in the routine struggle with the un-
forgiving machinery of travel, residence, and work permits. And yet it is 
obviously their ethnic, religious, and cultural membership that is in the 
spotlight. Noa becomes “the Jewish artist”; Nabil the “Muslim poet”; and 
Boban “the Gypsy trumpeter.” One of the drawbacks of the uncritical cele-
bration of the performing arts as automatically constituting dialogue and 
cosmopolitanism is precisely that socio-economic conditions and legal, 
political, and gender issues tend to disappear under the ethno-cultural or 
religious label on stage.
More generally, in intercultural practices in the performing arts, as else-
where, there is often a problem of ascribed identities, and in particular 
of ascribed single identities reflecting the world division in supposedly 
mutually exclusive nation-states, belongings, and religions. Complex, 
cosmopolitan life trajectories are usually reduced to one and only one 
cultural membership on the basis of name, place of birth, and performed 
music genre. In this sense, many artists face a double bind: on the one 
hand, they understandably need to play by the market rules of funding, 
diversity, roots, and multiculturalism by performing on stage their postu-
lated identity and representing whole ethnicities, continents, and even 
religions – Latin America, Judaism, the Middle East, and so forth. On the 
other, they refuse the captivity of simple labels, and emphasize their pro-
fessional and political memberships as well. 
A related problem specific to the performing arts is the exoticism as-
cribed to both the performers and their art, often defined as “ethnic.”  The 
ethnic categorization marks everything that seemingly does not fully be-
long, or belong anymore, to the mainstream of western European nation-
states. Thus, the artist filling the slot of the cultural and ethnic “Other” 
often experiences asymmetry and inequality with her unmarked peers. 
Roma musicians from south-eastern Europe, in particular, are acclaimed 
as showcasing seemingly distant and nowadays lost vitality, passion, and 
melancholia. They are made to fit a superficial representation of other-
ness, stereotypically appealing as distant in time and space. But Roma 
performances – while hyperbolically stemming from weddings, dances, 
and religious rituals – offer a masterful cultural event quite disengaged 
from its original social context. They do not offer an exotic peek into 
Roma everyday life. In short, the artist’s life offstage might very well be as 
anaemic, mainstream, and mundane as that of the audience and of other 
classically trained musicians. Life off stage might also bear pervasive dis-
crimination, including mobs torching Roma camps. 
Thus, multicultural and otherwise “diverse” festivals in Europe can 
strengthen the somewhat misleading impression of living in fairly in-
clusive societies. Simplistic emphasis on cultural and ethno-religious 
membership reinforces the classical liberal view of the public sphere as 
a genderless and classless arena of unrestricted multicultural encounter. 
In practice, it is worth examining whether the performance of dialogue 
and cosmopolitanism obliterates the death, detention, and deporta-
tion increasingly faced by many other agents of “diversity” and “cultural 
difference,” such as migrants and asylum seekers, and the religious and 
socio-economic marginalization faced by others. 
Finally, the rhetoric of intercultural and interreligious dialogue as cur-
rently phrased by many governments and organizations can take place 
only because salient differences have been established in the first place. 
What lies on the southern and eastern side of the Mediterranean – what 
Staging Cosmopolitanism
m A u r i Z i O  A l B A h A r i Artistic festivals featuring a diverse array 
of exhibits, concerts, cuisine, and dances 
are fortunately a well-attended feature 
of European public spaces. They are 
sponsored, under the agenda of inter-
cultural and interreligious dialogue, by 
NGOs, religious organizations, corpora-
tions, counties, and cities, often through 
EU and UNESCO funds. The European 
Commission solemnly declared 2008 the 
European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, 
clearly supporting such programmes. In 
this sense, dialogue and cosmopolitanism are increasingly becoming a 
focus of public policy, despite central governments’ burgeoning stingi-
ness. In the following paragraphs I analyze the performing arts – means 
of expression and communication – in their potential to exemplify and 
promote forms of cosmopolitanism and dialogue. After providing ex-
amples of cosmopolitan efforts on Italian stages, I point out some of the 
potential pitfalls of the practices and rhetorics of staged, engineered dia-
logue and cosmopolitanism. I am especially critical of the accompanying 
Euro-centrism and ethno-religious essentialism, while proposing a more 
experiential and wide-reaching cosmopolitan agenda.   
Performing cosmopolitanism 
Working and rehearsing toward common goals, artists create friend-
ships, knowledge, and contingent alliances. In this sense, artistic 
projects do not produce merely art and fruition, but new social rela-
tions as well. In addition, the performing arts might explicitly make of 
multiculturalism, peace, and social justice their own agenda, on and off 
stage. Astràgali Teatro, for example, is a theatre company founded in 
1981 in Lecce, southern Italy, and supported by the Ministry of Culture 
as an innovative company. Featuring an extremely diverse crew, and 
touring around the Mediterranean, Astràgali is also a member of the 
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between 
Cultures. Teatro di Nascosto, in Tuscany, draws directly on migrant and 
refugee experience, and works with Amnesty International and profes-
sionally trained refugee actors. In Maschere Nere, a theatre company in 
Milan, Senegalese, and Italians synthesize respective music and lyrics 
and perform scripts directly tackling immigration.
A very popular example of multicultural music is Radiodervish, an 
ensemble constituted in 1997 by Nabil Salameh, a native of Palestine, 
and southern Italian Michele Lobaccaro. Many of the songs are multi-
lingual – featuring Italian, Arabic, English, and French – and have been 
intended by the ensemble “as small laboratories where passages un-
veil themselves between East and West and between the symbols and 
myths of the Mediterranean, a border place that unites in the very mo-
ment it separates.”1 Radiodervish has recently toured a new poetry and 
music show, Amara Terra Mia (Bitter Land of Mine). Now also on CD, it is 
meant to narrate the precariousness of contemporary migrant experi-
ences in both the region of origin and destination, and puts forwards 
an open call to peace and interreligious understanding. In its title and 
substance, Amara Terra Mia references the 1973 song by “Mr Volare” Do-
menico Modugno, in which the popular singer evoked the bitterness of 
southern Italian emigrants. Radiodervish’s show debuted on 31 March 
2006 in Tricase, a small southern Italian town. The spartan scenery was 
limited to a dozen thin light poles, tenuously evoking migrants’ boats 
in the pitch-dark Mediterranean. Many in the audience appreciated the 
ensemble’s frank approach and its whispered reflections on migration, 
pain, terror, dialogue, and cosmopolitanism in times of alleged cultural 
clash. The show received a five-minute standing ovation by an audi-
ence initially prone to scepticism.
Radiodervish also performed the night of 24 December 2007, in the 
public square of Bethlehem, as part of Rassegna Negroamaro, an an-
nual travelling festival funded by the District of Lecce in southern Italy, 
which also sponsored the Italian tour of Palestinian musicians. And 
Radiodervish’s frequent Italian performances with Noa, the American-
Israeli singer, are routinely reported as an eminent example of inter-
Everyday Cosmopolitanism
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performing arts’ cosmopolitan potential, asking 
how hierarchies are challenged and recreated 
when majorities request minorities to engage 
in cosmopolitan dialogue, on and off stage. 
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and cosmopolitanism is certainly driven by good intentions, but it needs 
to be accompanied by experiential and less elitist opportunities – includ-
ing artistic ones – for diverse social relations.
While stages are amplifiers of carefully prepared scores, choreogra-
phies, and scripted agendas, some space is left to improvisation, to the 
impromptu construction of signs and meanings. Audiences have there-
fore an active role in the creation of these meanings; they do not merely 
receive them. Performances are often free, delivered in public spaces such 
as piazzas, ports, and parks, and are a social event of bodily and emotional 
participation in an informal and relaxed setting. Thus, diverse performing 
arts do have the potential to involve in forms of cosmopolitan transna-
tionalism not only artists and migrants, on occasion part of the public, 
but so-called locals as well, whom we cannot understand as stereotypi-
cally stuck and rooted in a spatially bounded culture.3 While they might 
not always enjoy the privilege of physical mobility, nor routinely partake 
in culturally and religiously diverse interactions, they are participating as 
engaged audiences in inclusively cosmopolitan sensibilities and dynam-
ics, to be potentially cultivated beyond the lure of the ephemeral.  
At any rate, we cannot expect the performing arts and their audiences 
to seamlessly solve the problems of asymmetrical relations of power in 
our diverse societies. In fact, many artists simply refuse to embrace a pri-
marily social-political role. And yet, we can say that the artistic need for 
harmony often conveys an “impulse to change things around,” to quote 
Eugenio Barba, the founder of innovatively multicultural Odin Teatret in 
Denmark.4 But for most artists this impulse does not imply a missionary 
idea, or the pretentious desire to merely unmask anything or anyone 
without an accompanying self-analysis. 
A self-scrutinizing standpoint is arguably integral to cosmopolitan-
ism. Almost by definition, dialogic and cosmopolitan experience implies 
something new, rather than merely an exchange involving two individu-
als – as a false etymology would suggest. Cosmopolitanism, in particu-
lar, features a flow of meaning, practices, and unforeseen conflicts and 
understandings that were not readily available to individual participants 
in the first place, prior to sincere dialogic and cosmopolitan mutual en-
gagement.5 Resisting the drive to shape and restore core values, roots, 
and identities vis-à-vis the alleged threats of immigration, Islam, and an-
archy, certain stages could be seen not as places 
where exceptional “performances are done,” but 
where unexpected meanings might emerge and 
transformations occur.6 Venues where cynic late-
capitalist obsessions with cost-effectiveness, im-
migration, civilizational clash, and blind loyalty to 
mother-fatherlands are routinely turned inside out, 
and de facto ridiculed in the name of critical, unpre-
tentious, cosmopolitan citizenship.
is usually lumped together as “the Balkans” and “the Middle East” – is 
often stereotypically relegated to a condition of backwardness and ar-
chetypical violence. It is worth examining whether by inviting “other” 
peoples, religions, and areas of the world to participate in dialogue, 
Italian and EU authorities morally legitimize their position as tolerant 
members of western civilization exempt from self-examination. In sum-
mary, whether existing international and interreligious asymmetries of 
power and hierarchy are challenged or reinforced needs to be asked for 
each specific exchange programme, invitation to dialogue, and cosmo-
politan policy agenda.
World music? Neighbourhood music
“Intercultural dialogue” increasingly carries the unintended as-
sumption that diversity needs to be artfully managed, convened, and 
sponsored. Hence, the question needs to be empirically investigated, 
whether socially and institutionally engineered cosmopolitan practices 
and discourses, including in the arts, paradoxically obliterate the un-
advertised, everyday communal lives of large and small towns where 
migrants settle?
Radiodervish, Teatro di Nascosto, Astràgali and other such formations 
in Europe do not embody anything extraordinary or exceptional. Ra-
diodervish members got acquainted as fellow college students in Bari, 
southern Italy. Even the now celebrated Orchestra di Piazza Vittorio – 
featuring musicians and composers from Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Ec-
uador, Hungary, India, Italy, Senegal, Tunisia, and the US – is the se-
lected offspring of the everyday diversity of Rome neighbourhoods. It 
emerged around the desire to raise funds and renovate a Rome theatre 
venue, rescuing it from its fate as a bingo hall. This does not suggest 
that the Orchestra was not in need of funding, interpersonal negotia-
tion, rehearsal space, and even intercultural dialogue within itself in 
order to become an ensemble, rather than a dozen individual musi-
cians on stage. The world fusion music performed by the Orchestra be-
comes a metaphor of the actual ensemble, where each person, by par-
ticipating into a larger dialogical project, has to negotiate facets of mu-
sicianship, behaviour, and everyday practice – from being on time for 
rehearsals, to learning a song in Italian, Hindi, or Arabic, to rearranging 
a traditional Tunisian song. And for some the ensemble even becomes 
a normative model of symmetrical inclusion for contemporary socie-
ties. But the Orchestra exemplifies Rome’s diverse music – unexpected 
harmonies, rearranged tunes emerging from its neighbourhood mar-
kets, subway stations, and cafes – as much as it is made to represent 
multiethnic, multicultural, and world music. If, instead, we perpetuate 
the understanding of diverse artists as essential representatives and 
ambassadors of their ethno-religious group of origin, then basic ques-
tions need to be asked about these “microphoned” ethnic representa-
tives, civilizational spokespersons, and religious entrepreneurs. Who 
elected them to such positions? From where does the legitimacy of 
such unbearable responsibility stem?
Venues of transformation 
There is little doubt that political institutions “could gain great insight 
from the performing arts sector into the value of body language and 
visual, musical, and other non-verbal forms of expression in addition to 
discursive communication.”2 Indeed, the flourishing of brochures, news-
letters, and other forms of engineered efforts to foster diversity, dialogue, 
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Notes
1. At http://www.Radiodervish.com. 
2. Jude Bloomfield, Crossing the Rainbow. 
National Differences and International 
Convergences in Multicultural Performing Arts 
in Europe, IETM (Informal European Theatre 
Meeting), 2003, 9. 
3. Ulf Hannerz, “Cosmopolitans and Locals 
in World Culture,” in Global Culture: 
Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. 
M. Featherstone (London: SAGE Publications, 
1990), 237–51.
4. Eugenio Barba, Beyond the Floating Islands 
(New York: PAJ Publications, 1986), 15.
5. David Bohm, On Dialogue, ed. L. Nichol 
(London: Routledge, 1996).
6. Ferdinando Taviani, “The Odin Story,” in 
Barba, Beyond the Floating Islands, 236–74.
1 4  I S I M  R E V I E W  2 2  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 8
ship can be summarized as having to 
do with 1) historiography; 2) concepts 
and forms; 3) audience cultivation; and 
4) institutional support and funding. 
Strategic histories
Much of the material authenticat-
ing past art-making as “Arab” comes 
from writings by predecessor artists 
who sought to situate themselves as 
nationalists or social pioneers. Too fre-
quently, contemporary histories take 
these as factual starting points. An inclination to promote oneself as 
distinctive (“the first artist”) or to relate to validating models (the tor-
tured, the misunderstood, or the visionary artist), is thus easily and 
often taken to represent actual conditions of production in the past 
rather than previous strategies for laying claim to institutional sup-
port and social influence. Artists’ struggle to create something that 
could motivate nationalist Arab patrons in the past century involved 
declaring Arab society as currently art-less, but it also involved declar-
ing “art” as a special activity that could rectify that society’s problems. 
Ignoring the strategic impact of such histories has led to overlooking 
how meanings of both “Arab” and “artistic” were formulated in tandem 
by artists who thought of themselves as social pioneers. This oversight 
has had the ironic effect of forwarding the same claims today – for 
example, the set of younger artists who are today promoted abroad 
are often hailed as having overcome an environment that previously 
“lacked art” or appreciative audiences. The little history that circulates 
asserts that this description of Arab society is simply true.
A return to history through period publications, sales records, 
diaries, exhibition registries would foreground the contingencies 
that produced art-making in certain forms at specific moments and 
relate artists’ concerns to those of their publics. It would help us 
understand how contemporary artists have found themselves in 
particular dilemmas with a defined set of tools available to them. 
One tool was recognizable connections to Ottoman, Hapsburgian, 
and Persian art realms. When was this tool forgotten at the bottom 
of the toolkit? Another tool is the vocabulary of art-making. In the 
early twentieth-century Lebanon, it was the musawwar (picturer) 
who made images in oil or light-rays, until he was gradually replaced 
by the fannan (artist) and rassam (usually, painter). Then there is the 
tool of polylingualism: which elements of art-making have found 
Arabic terminologies and why? In Beirut today, one does a barmeh 
(turn) at the vernissage (opening night) and compliments the artist 
by exclaiming, “shu helu hal-strokes (what beautiful strokes), yislamu 
dayyatak (may He bless your hands).” This was not always the case. 
The changing usefulness of the artist’s various tools tell us about 
the public debates that have impacted the structural conditions of 
Arab artists today. Addressing such issues would provide a sound 
basis for examining critically the genealogies that are and are not 
activated in today’s art world.
Questioning concepts and confronting forms  
Good genealogies make for good maps of present relationships. Trac-
ing a term back to its plethora of parentages, through time and space, 
can reveal in a positive light the deviations of Arab art world paradigms 
from their putative European ancestors. This means we do not need to 
k i r S t e n  S C h e i d All signs suggest an imminent flour-
ishing in the study of contemporary 
Arab art.1 In her 1989 review of “zones” 
of scholarly interest in the Arab world, 
Lila Abu-Lughod pointed to two quan-
daries relevant for our topic: the lack 
of interest in “creative” and “expres-
sive” components of Arab society and 
the squandering of opportunities for 
contributing to social theory.2 Today 
scholarships are granted by the SSRC 
and Fulbright for studies of art in Jor-
dan, Tunis, and Iraq. Rich monographs about contemporary Egyptian 
and Amazigh art worlds and colonial art education, among others, 
have appeared from prominent American and European presses.3 This 
publishing boom accompanies an increased interest in seeing Arabs 
through the lens of art. Against the horrors of September 11, of the 
wars on Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, and of an apparent “civilizational 
clash,” new institutional supports allow Arab and Muslim artists to be 
exhibited and fêted in diverse venues as never before. Beyond jour-
nalistic and curatorial applause for Arabs as art-makers, however, lies 
an unprecedented opportunity to consider theoretical issues raised by 
this swell of concern. 
Scholars in this field have the potential to revolutionize our under-
standings of subjectivity, cultural expression, modernism, secularism, 
among others. When artists wilfully converge on artistic practices with 
lineages distinct from their own cultural and national ones, what does 
this indicate about national and transnational subjectivities? What 
structures inform imagination and subjectivity without binding them 
to spatial and temporal borders? How does “art” 
as an allegedly universal category of human pro-
duction get taken up to prove membership in 
humanity? Such questions are important to coun-
teract any repetitions of narratives from the rep-
ertoire of colonial travellers who revelled in the 
discovery of “aesthetic impulses” among “heathen 
Arabs.” Treating art as a bridge to humanity’s com-
mon ground, in contradistinction to other activi-
ties by Arabs, threatens to strip the historical and 
cultural context from a notion of art that devel-
oped as part of the formation of Europe after the 
Renaissance, and especially with industrialism 
and capitalism.4 
Lest a culturally specific model be imposed 
uncritically, and a scholarly opportunity lost, it is 
important at this stage to remember what we do 
not know about contemporary Arab art. Naming 
the unknowns will help us ask why that which gets promoted as “Arab 
art” is being made, circulated, and lauded, and not simply how. Studies 
engaging Arab art-making should bring insights from this field back to 
the field of critical art studies, rather than simply importing notions of 
art-making and applauding people for applying them in “unexpected” 
places. Stemming from an attempt to grapple with the limitations of 
my own work, this essay seeks to contribute to future scholarship by 
delineating a set of areas whose content is yet unknown.5 The focus is 
on visual art but the questions are pertinent to other activities that tend 
to fall under the rubric of “expressive arts.” The gaps in current scholar-
What We do not know
Questions for a Study of 
Contemporary Arab Art
Arts & Culture
Contemporary Arab art increasingly 
attracts attention from both art institutions 
and scholars. By drawing on a variety of 
approaches, scholars in this field can put 
questions to major theoretical paradigms. Lest 
a scholarly opportunity be lost, we must remind 
ourselves at this stage what we do not know 
about contemporary Arab art, particularly 
in relation to historiography, concepts of 
artistry, audience cultivation, and the role of 
institutional support and funding.
Is an artist “Arab” 
or “female” or 
“resistant” in 
the same way to 
different funders?
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and why? How is “taste” conceived? How is liking connected to buying? 
When do purchasers call it “art” and not “décor,” “wedding gifts,” or “self-
expression”? Is there overlap between art reception and family forma-
tion, hospitality, grief, piety, or prosperity? We need to understand the 
efforts that audiences take upon themselves to interact with “art,” in gal-
leries, books, television studios, doctors’ offices, and streets filled with 
three-metre high acrylic Ayatollahs. One way to address these ques-
tions is through art education programmes. For example, the apprecia-
tion courses offered by many elite Beiruti schools for students’ parents 
are not secondary to the “look” of art and do differ significantly accord-
ing to the gender or political outlook of the enrollees. Thinking more 
about the audience will help us understand how it comes to be seen, 
in some art discourse, as polluting of creative expression.  Viewers’ de-
mands for artwork that is affordable, intelligible, non-objectionable, or 
matches the living-room are said by some self-described “art-lovers” to 
overwhelm creative production, and yet they could be seen as essen-
tial to it.  By scrutinizing in tandem audience efforts and those made by 
artists to reach various publics we may grapple with how these artists 
conceive and fashion their own and communal identity. 
Funding for “Arab” art
The study of Arab art poses most elegantly questions about the rela-
tionship between audience formation, identity, and visual forms. Asking 
them, we can examine a newly visible set of relationships between art 
as productive of audiences, funding as productive of art, and thus fund-
ing as productive of audiences. First, however, we must first know what 
constraints and opportunities associated with different types of funding 
have been available to Arab artists. We know there are there differences 
between banks, ministries, embassies and private patronage, between 
“local” and “foreign” funders, but how does their impact differ?7 Is an art-
ist “Arab” or “female” or “resistant” in the same way to different funders? 
How is a funder “outside” or “inside” an art community? We must look at 
the relationship between a funder’s social agenda – e.g., overcoming so-
cial trauma or promoting tolerance – and the notion of art forwarded by 
their patronage. We should explore how artists realize, if not accept, that 
some sorts of politics are more likely to be funded. How indeed, does the 
sparsity of funds create people’s experiences of art and understandings of 
institutional support? After all, funding affects the elements with which 
art-makers must engage and the circuits through which art objects must 
travel to produce a valid, impacting presence. It is 
only logical that changes will result in the art pro-
duced when the class, national, and geographical 
distribution of funding shifts. 
In sum, there is an exciting opportunity present 
in the encounter between Euro-American schol-
arship and contemporary Arab art. The above 
are questions that will help us understand not 
only the politics of art-making but the forms of 
art themselves.  The political interest and institu-
tional support newly available have made it pos-
sible to explore in-depth issues that were never 
considered relevant before. The complex intercul-
tural encounters and political urgencies involved 
in this art could stimulate the advancement of art 
theory. But these issues will not be recognized, 
let alone the opportunities they pose grasped, 
if we do not consider the conditions of our own 
disciplinary and historical production as scholars 
of this field.
push at Arab productions to see them as “art” but can rather push at para-
digms to see their historical formation.6 Does “creativity” mean the same 
thing in different social settings? Is creativity itself always an important 
criterion for comprehending contemporary Arab artistry? Communal or 
individual authenticity? Figure versus abstract? Secular versus religious? 
If yes, what histories have resulted in their relevance? I say “histories” to 
avoid positing a single local narrative by which specific art practices must 
be counted authentic or inauthentic. When posited a priori intellectual 
paradigms make certain art works uninteresting (“parochial” or “locally 
irrelevant”) or even deformed (“romantic” or “influenced”). Questioning 
those paradigms enables us to consider how competitions between art-
ists for audiences and funds have resulted in interventions that differ in 
visually measurable ways, rather than in better or worse ways. How is 
value ascribed and why does art need to be evaluated at all? Indeed, why 
is art used to evaluate Arabs’ lives, politics, and projects? Rather than see-
ing debates about art as reflecting realities of communities involved in 
nation-building and decolonization, we could look for how art became 
a means to press into “the future” or connect with “the past.” Studying art 
in a way that does not assume intellectual or communal boundaries can 
have the advantage of highlighting the contests that revolved around no-
tions of art as well as the ambitions and actions that sought to mobilize 
certain associations embodied by it. 
This set of questions points to another that is more focused on the 
object: why do art forms literally have to look a certain way to gain 
presence, validity, or impact in different historical and contemporary 
moments? The fact that much Arab art-making has strong, identifi-
able relations with non-Arab art worlds, especially former colonial 
metropoles, provides an opportunity to examine the relationship 
between understandings of art, their material instantiation, and the 
establishment of intimacies that cross boundaries at the geographic, 
class, or historical level. These visual borrowings embarrass a model of 
art that prizes creativity and authenticity. Yet, that model assumes the 
existence of fully formed communal identities upon which authenticity 
can be based. Rather, in what ways can Arab art works be understood 
as “first-hand” documents of socio-cultural processes? 
Audience appreciation or pollution?
One phenomenon art may document first-hand is the matter of audi-
ence cultivation. In my own fieldwork, I once found myself arguing with 
a gallerist to get my name on her mailing list. This alerted me to the role 
audiences have in coming into existence. Although a few authors have 
looked at audiences, more research needs to be done. Who likes what, 
Arts & Culture
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His recent sculptural work clearly reso-
nates with Sufi philosophy, most mark-
edly that of mystical numerology and at-
tention to text and script, even though 
not necessarily intended by the artist. In 
9A Letters, a series of nine sculptures ex-
ploring the first letter of nine regionally 
relevant alphabets (Hieroglyphic, Hierat-
ic, Demotic, Coptic, Old Roman, Old Ath-
ens, Kufic, Neskh, and Modern), the artist 
investigates the multiple facets of script 
and three-dimensional form along with 
this mystically significant number. He cites such intensive attention to a 
single form – in this case, the letter “A” – as an “expression of singular de-
votion.” The notion of scripted knowledge and text takes on new meaning 
when abstracted and subsumed by the ensemble of nine sculptural com-
ponents. It becomes infused into the mystical configuration of the whole, 
and the artist’s conceptual framework overrides the letters’ function as 
text. Indeed, the three dimensional form of each individual letter derives 
from an architectural style concurrent with the use and/or introduction of 
that alphabet into the Egyptian region, and these deliberate architectural 
references evoke the changing built environment of this urban setting 
evolving over millennia. Literal text is subsumed by the artist’s conceptual 
framework. Scripted knowledge, then, is submitted to El Mestikawy’s me-
ticulous creative process, thoughtfully synthesized and reinserted into his 
deeply personal meditation that moves beyond conventional language, 
definitions, and architectural convention.
Because of the streamlined form and monochromatic surface of the 
work, each piece looks deceptively simple: though the geometric forms 
may seem straightforward at a glance, their careful juxtaposition and pre-
cise interrelationship belies a precise and profoundly complex process. 
This treatment of positive and negative space – presence and absence – 
within each installation suggests the complementarity of masculine and 
feminine; of the human and divine, all inherent in Sufi philosophy. In 9A 
Letters, the history of knowledge and passage of time are deeply embed-
ded, as represented by the varied alphabets; some current, others relegat-
ed to relative obscurity, as are the correlate architectural manifestations.
Huda Lutfi
Unlike El Mestikawy, in whose work Sufism is a subtle influence that 
is more a matter of interpretation than intention, for Huda Lutfi Sufism 
is a deliberate point of departure. Having already established a long, 
distinguished, and ongoing career as a cultural historian whose schol-
arship focuses on medieval Islam and Sufism, Lutfi turned to visual arts 
in 1992, and her research interests in culture, history, and identity in-
form her creative work. Viewing the world as “a series of signs to be 
deciphered and interpreted,” she makes paintings, collages, and instal-
lations that focus on themes of memory, gender, spirituality, and me-
diation. Lutfi considers the creative process as “an attempt at seeing, 
of seeing oneself, the effort to understand oneself.”5 Commenting on 
her renovation work on her second home in Fayyum, she notes that 
the intention is “to take you to a special place of feeling and knowing, 
to some special consciousness, some sense of connection with the uni-
k i n S e y  k At C h k A Throughout the world’s urban centres, 
one finds dynamic creative communi-
ties where artists create work informed 
by the visual landscape around them. 
For many, this means capturing the 
density of stimuli and challenges of 
city life in a manner that resonates with 
the built environment and frenetic en-
ergy that constitute urban landscapes, 
and with the “visual overload of every-
day life.1 In Cairo, a city characterized 
by overpopulation, economic hard-
ship, and widespread disparity, Islam is visibly and audibly manifested 
through its mosques, dress, and calls to prayer, and as such contributes 
to the city’s multi-sensorial cacophony. 
If Islam contributes to the dense sensory landscape of Cairene life 
in many respects, the more personal, contemplative aspects of Sufi 
practice permeate a more private sphere. Sufism, “the Science of the 
Heart,” is widely considered “the inner dimension of Islam.”2 Sufi prac-
tice with its distinctly meditative, reflective dimension has, through the 
centuries, taken form in the pursuit of knowledge and its expression 
in poetry, text and script, and mystical numerology. Themes of dual-
ity, complementarity, tolerance, meditation, and repetition3– whether 
of images, words, or movement, as in mantras and movements of the 
dhikr ceremonies  – recurring in Sufi thought and practice often take 
visual form in the work of artists whose work is influenced by Sufism 
whether intended or not. Regardless, historically Sufism has had a 
strong aesthetic component in which the moral dimensions of human-
ity, morality, and mutual obligation are inscribed.  
A synthesis of these two paradoxical realms – the ultra-saturated 
urban cityscape and the introspective nature of Sufi spirituality – takes 
clear form in the artwork of Hazem El Mestikawy and Huda Lutfi. 
Hazem El Mestikawy
Hazem El Mestikawy lives and works between Cairo and Vienna. 
The artist’s sculptural installations are distinctly architectural forms, 
carefully and artfully constructed. In many of El Mestikawy’s sculp-
tures, each component is designed to fit into another, with no gaps 
between and no space for approximation. Throughout his body of 
work, positive and negative space carry equal weight and are mu-
tually constitutive. El Mestikawy uses raw material from the urban 
environment, thus designing each installation to be practical as well 
as environmentally sound: the individual components can be packed 
for easy storage and economy of design, and most of the materials 
are recycled and recyclable. The artist builds flexibility into the de-
sign, and each work can be configured in any number of ways, so 
that each is characterized by both precision and flexibility. Made of 
cardboard understructure overlaid with small pieces of torn paper, 
this technique reinforces and strengthens the work’s physical struc-
ture. He frequently uses recycled paper from everyday urban life such 
as newspaper and other discards. When torn apart, any text loses its 
literal meaning and legibility. Using text this way, El Mestikawy points 
out, the density of script determines the tonal range of the surface.4
the Art of urban 
introspection
Arts & Culture
This article discusses the work of two 
Egyptian artists who are inspired by the 
urban environment as well as by Sufism. Their 
art reflects two aspects of Cairene life: the 
frenetic activity and density of communication 
that characterize cosmopolitan centres, and 
the more contemplative aspects of Sufism. 
The author argues that Sufi philosophies 
and practice mediate between the personal 
nature of spirituality and the realities of 
urban life in the present day.
Hazem El 
Mestikawy, 
9A Letters
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Huda Lutfi, 
The Secret of 
Repetition
In these, as well as Labyrinth, Lutfi drew on the meditative atmos-
phere of the nightly Sufi gatherings which Cairenes attend “as if to 
get away from the noise and colours of Cairo.” The Secret of Repeti-
tion and Circle of Remembrance refer to an aspect of Cairo that few 
people see, the Sufi aspect. Lutfi’s intention was to find a way to 
visually convey “an intangible state of being, of silence or mediation, 
the moving away from noise and forms to quietness.” To do so, she 
assembled numerous wooden shoe moulds that she found in large 
numbers at a downtown shoe factory. For The Secret of Repetition, 
each was cleaned, scraped, painted in silver, and inscribed with the 
old Sufi adage, “I am the companion of the one who remembers me.” 
Assembled en masse, they give the sense of repetition to reinforce 
the meaning. Lutfi explains that she “use[s] one sentence over and 
over again so it becomes like a mantra.  That ties to Sufism too, the 
idea of repetition of one or two or three words, so it quiets you down 
… That’s the purpose of the mantra, to make the mind empty and 
quiet” so one can achieve greater insight. 
Urban introspection
In their creative work, Hazem El Mestikawy and Huda Lutfi each 
evoke a reflective, peaceful domain that stands in stark contrast to 
the frenetic activity and density of communication that characterize 
Cairo’s public spaces (as well as those of other major cosmopolitan 
centres), even as the artists’ materials and forms create an indelible 
connection to that space – for El Mestikawy, in his deliberate inspira-
tion by the built environment; for Lutfi, the city as an endless resource 
of materials and recycled imagery. Sufi philosophies and practice in-
form their work, and mediate between the deeply personal nature of 
spirituality and the realities of urban life in the present day.
verse, some enlightenment or extra awareness,” and this applies to her 
artwork more broadly. This sense of special space and knowing emerg-
es in her artwork, and resonates with El Mestikawy’s more overtly ar-
chitectural sculptures.
Also like El Mestikawy, an element of recycling inheres in Lutfi’s work, 
perhaps most explicitly in her “Found in Cairo” and related “'Alayis 
(Dolls)” series. For two years she embarked upon “a sort of archaeologi-
cal venture,” carefully collecting objects from the city’s varied repositor-
ies such as flea markets, junk shops, and antique stores. Lutfi manipu-
lated and assembled those objects in such a way as to induce reflection 
on common day-to-day experiences. Both series deliberately contest 
rigid notions of identity by including images or photos of faces which 
are not strictly defined as “Egyptian” but which have been found in the 
city’s old book stalls and second-hand shops.
In Labyrinth of Masha Dolls, Lutfi assembles tongs found at a vendor 
of sheeshah (water pipes) and related accessories. Normally, one sees 
plain tongs with no figurative shape or even surface decoration. Here, 
the functional implement takes on a voluptuous female form, while the 
chains that attach the tongs to the pipe, in this context, suggest the 
constraints women face in society, both in Egypt and elsewhere. The 
voluptuous metal tongs – over 100 of them here – are configured atop 
a delicate labyrinthine structure and are illuminated by a single light in 
an otherwise dark room. Rather than placing the installation on a sta-
bilizing platform or table, she constructed a fragile wooden frame that 
is tenuously assembled, “so if you touch it one place, the whole thing 
moves and is affected” echoing the degree to which people and society 
are interconnected, as well as suggesting the fragile infrastructure of 
life in Cairo. Lutfi draws on the image of a labyrinth because she “want-
ed something with strong meaning to bring these together. A labyrinth 
is a fragile structure; a labyrinth is life”; appropriate, Lutfi notes, given 
that “life seems always to be fragile at [this] moment in Egypt and in 
the world,” politically, economically, and existentially. This is very much 
attached to the Sufi tradition, which teaches one “not to become too 
attached to things that can be lost so easily … and therefore if you’re 
not so attached, then you are better able to deal with such situations of 
loss”; here, the chains constitute a metaphor for attachment. 
Also like El Mestikawy, the notion of repetition as meditation is 
very apparent in Lutfi’s “Found in Cairo” and “'Alayis (Dolls)” series, 
particularly in The Secret of Repetition and Circle of Remembrance. 
the Art of urban 
introspection
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Huda Lutfi, Labyrinth of Masha Dolls (detail)
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Still from 
Poster by Samir 
Barkawi
ly documentary in character, address-
ing socio-political and socio-cultural 
issues of contemporary Syrian society. 
Syria has an impressive intellectual and 
artistic tradition with writers, caricatur-
ists, and filmmakers offering critical in-
vestigations of the rigidity of Syrian so-
ciety and its paralyzing effects on peo-
ple’s lives. Young artists who engage in 
social and political projects can place 
themselves in this tradition of engaged 
artistic production in their endeavour to pin out the paradoxes, weak-
nesses, and injustices of contemporary Syrian society.
By focusing on two works of two young artists as representatives 
of this tendency in contemporary artistic praxis in Syria – one an art 
video, “Poster” by Samir Barkawi (2004) and the other an experimen-
tal documentary, “The Pot” by Diana El-Jeiroudi (2005) – I will attempt 
to show how contemporary artists in Syria position themselves in cur-
rent debates and how they seek to influence the future of their society 
through their work. Both videos investigate the duality of traditional 
values presented by piety, morals, and family versus contemporary in-
dividualism in respect to female existence.
Social criticism 
Both Barkawi and El-Jeiroudi represent a minority within the Syrian 
art scene. But it is exactly this minority that is the most visible on the in-
ternational art scene. As mentioned above, the restrictive character of 
the Syrian art scene leads most artists to work in traditional techniques 
and produce work of a kind that leaves aside all conflicts and secures 
them opportunities to exhibit their work and their existence. Syrian 
artists who investigate political and social issues in their work place 
find themselves in a difficult, even potentially dangerous position. Art-
ists are frequently put under pressure to either change the character 
of their work or refrain from showing it altogether if it is deemed too 
controversial. Pressure comes from both official authorities and private 
event organizers.1
Notwithstanding these obstacles, many young artists feel a strong 
need to address current issues of Syrian society, a society that has wit-
nessed massive changes since Bashar Al-Assad took over as president 
from his father in 2000, especially in the field of mass communication. 
This has brought contemporary visual culture to the country together 
with ideas of individualized lifestyles and raised hopes for change, 
especially among the young generation. Young Syrians often express 
feelings of being caught between the expectations and traditions of 
their parents and own wishes for individual development. Their society 
leaves little room for individualism in social and political terms, mean-
ing that every attempt of self-assertion needs to take place within the 
restricted frame of family, state institutions, and religion and makes it 
a difficult balancing act. 
Through addressing issues of importance within their own genera-
tion using an international and contemporary artistic language, artists 
like El-Jeiroudi and Barkawi are seeking to renew the Syrian art scene 
and place Syria on the map of the international art community. 
Modesty and display
Barkawi’s short video Poster deals with the conflict between contem-
porary individualism and traditional notions of female modesty. The 
video shows three girls having fun taking photos of each other. What 
makes the private photo sessions of these three girls so amusing and 
slightly absurd is that their heavy veiling prevents us from recognizing 
who is in the picture. As soon as one girl has finished taking a picture 
of her two friends, she hands the camera to another girl who takes over 
Europe is witnessing an increased in-
terest in contemporary art from the 
Arab world with almost every Euro-
pean country having had its own show 
of works of young artists from the re-
gion. However, Syria has been largely 
absent from these events. To a large 
extent, this is due to the conservative 
character of the Syrian art scene as well 
as lack of institutional support for con-
temporary techniques. Nevertheless, 
young Syrian artists experiment with new artistic techniques and while 
using an international visual language reflect on the state of contem-
porary Syrian society. 
Syrian artists suffer from a general lack of visibility both inside and 
outside the country. It is rare to see works of contemporary Syrian art-
ists on international art events and exhibition spaces in Syria showing 
the works of these artists are largely missing. Due to the lack of an in-
stitutional network of organizations supporting contemporary art, fi-
nancial aspects of art production tend to stand in the foreground in 
Syria. Artists are forced to produce sellable work, which in Syria mainly 
means art of a purely decorative character.
Most artists in Syria work in traditional techniques like painting and 
sculpture; contemporary artistic forms of expression like video, digital 
photography, and installation are rare. Art academies are highly scepti-
cal of new techniques and offer very limited space for them in their 
curricula. This lack of training means that artists wishing to work in 
contemporary techniques are to a large extent left to themselves to ex-
periment and since Syrian artists are only little exposed to international 
contemporary art, they are left strangely isolated from international 
visual codes and modes of expression.
Video art
Despite these obstacles, a number of young Syrian artists have begun 
to work in contemporary techniques and seek a presence on the inter-
national art scene. This is especially the case with artists working with 
video and experimental film. One advantage of this medium is its com-
parative affordability, its easy distribution, and the fact that no large 
and costly studio space is needed for the production of works. These 
factors have made video one of the major artistic media in the entire 
Middle Eastern region over the past ten years.
As is the case with other artists from the Arab world working with ex-
perimental film and video, works of Syrian film/video artists are strong-
Veiled Visuality
Video Art in Syria
C h A r l O t t e  B A n k
Arts & Culture
Although the Syrian art scene is by and large 
characterized by artists working in traditional 
techniques like painting and sculpture, young 
artists are discovering new forms of expression 
such as video art. Building upon a long 
tradition of artists offering social criticism, 
these artists comment in their work on present-
day Syrian society. This article analyzes videos 
of two artists, locating their art in the context 
of current social and political debate.
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Still from Diana 
El-Jeiroudi’s 
film The Pot
Charlotte Bank is currently preparing a Ph.D. thesis at the Free 
University of Berlin on contemporary art and visual culture in 
the Arab World.
Email: charlotte_bank@yahoo.de
The Syrian art scene
The two videos question traditional notions on female existence. By 
addressing this controversial issue both El-Jeiroudi and Barkawi de-
clare a will to engage in a debate to achieve change in Syrian society. 
However, their work is hardly ever shown in the country itself. It is one 
of the great paradoxes of contemporary Syrian artistic production that 
venues for showing and screening experimental contemporary art and 
films and videos are so few, both in Damascus and the rest of the coun-
try. This means that works like the two videos above, produced with 
the aim of addressing problems of Syrian society are better known to 
international audiences than to Syrians. Likewise, the works of Syrian 
filmmakers, whose highly artistic and much admired work is better 
known to international festival goers than the Syrian public.3 Syria has 
only recently begun to develop an art scene with artists, galleries, an 
interested and knowledgeable public and critics.
This lack of a genuine art scene is strongly felt by Syrian artists and 
gallerists alike, many place much hope for improvement in a greater 
international visibility, both in the West and the more affluent Arab 
countries in the Gulf region. They hope that for-
eign interest can increase interest in the works of 
Syrian artists in the country itself and so facilitate 
the creation of a larger space for contemporary 
art in Syrian urban society. 
And while artists engaged in social critique rare-
ly expect to gain interest from financially strong 
collectors, they hope that more opportunities to 
produce, display, and sell art in general will also 
give more space for non-commercial art, art pro-
duced with the aim of provoking thought and en-
courage reflection on current issues among the public. While Syrian art 
is often criticized for being backward minded and outdated, the works 
of artists like Diana El-Jeiroudi and Samir Barkawi bear witness to the 
potential of Syrian art in producing just this kind of thought-provoking 
work. It is still new for the Syrian public to witness art other than paint-
ing and sculpture – video as an artistic medium has only appeared in 
the past few years. And it is newer still for the Syrian public to regard 
visual arts as other than decorative. 
Syrian artists are producing meaningful work that gains international 
interest; however only if they are enabled to both produce and exhibit 
more work, a true contemporary art scene can de-
velop in the country. More institutional support 
could be one clue to ensure the continuing pro-
duction of art of high quality in Syria.
the role of the portraitist. The sound of the girl’s high heeled shoes, 
their giggling laughter, the birds singing in the background form to-
gether with the distinctive click of the camera the soundscape of the 
film and convey an atmosphere of light hearted joy. The situation and 
the setting of the film seem at first sight idyllic and rather banal, we 
expect something easy to consume. Only the veils turn the situation 
into parody.
In less than a minute, Barkawi succeeds in laying bare the contradic-
tions between traditional values and contemporary individualism. The 
ritual of the girls taking pictures of each other becomes pointless since 
no two girls are distinguishable from one another. We, the spectators, 
only see two figures covered by black veils looking completely alike, 
yet for the girls it seems of great importance that each of them has 
her picture taken. While they seemingly adhere to tradition, symbol-
ized through their full cover, this does not prevent them from wishing 
to display themselves. They play with their camera, an object of vanity 
and self-indulgence, the exact vices traditional religious leaders are po-
lemicizing against, seemingly without any sense of the contradictory 
character of their behaviour and the absurdity of the situation and thus 
show a complete lack of reflective thought. 
By using a subjective camera angle, letting the spectator identify 
with the photographer searching for the best focus before pressing the 
button, Barkawi invites the spectators into the action of the film and 
asks us to reflect on whether or not a full cover makes sense in contem-
porary society. Poster is successful in asking this question because of 
its subtlety and freedom from moralizing and dogma. The spectator is 
invited to smile, laugh, and reflect.
The blessings of motherhood
El-Jeiroudi’s The Pot looks at women’s experiences as child bearers 
and mothers. El-Jeiroudi’s own feminist position is reflected in the pro-
vocative title of the film and informs the entire work. Her work is highly 
critical of traditional notions on motherhood as the fulfilment of fe-
male existence. While women’s presence on the job market was long 
encouraged, an increasing emphasis on women’s traditional roles as 
mothers and wives has been observed in official 
discourse since the 1990s.2 In a number of vide-
otaped interviews El-Jeiroudi presents a genera-
tion of women who were directly affected by this 
change in attitude. They are women of her own 
generation, in their twenties and thirties from dif-
ferent backgrounds, caught between their own 
individual wishes and society’s expectations.
The interviews are rare in their openness, es-
pecially in a society where women are expected 
to keep their self-control and not discuss their 
emotions openly and in public. They voice a variety of views, from the 
openly regretful example of one women telling of her sadness when 
leaving her job to the more stoic acceptance of a situation seen as 
unavoidable and necessary. It is not so much a personal choice in fa-
vour of motherhood which leads the women to adopt this role that 
stands out but rather the pressure from their surroundings. Once they 
accept these roles, society’s perception of them changes; they experi-
ence greater respect towards them as persons. For some women, this 
respect might even represent a sort of redemption for the loss of their 
individual dreams.
The Pot is in many ways a raw work, spectacular effects are avoided, 
camera work is kept calm and a style reminiscent of home videos with 
sharp cuts between the sequences is kept throughout the work, giving 
it a personal, intimate quality. This style is common in the contempo-
rary wave of experimental video documentary of the Middle East. Tech-
nical simplicity is often used to bring the subject of a film closer to the 
public, to make it accessible through absence of sophistication.
El-Jeiroudi chose to film her interview partners without showing their 
faces. While this may have been necessary to ensure a climate of confi-
dentiality and privacy at first, she hereby also succeeds in lending the 
statements a representative character and adding an emotional dis-
tance, thus stressing her own critical view on the subject. Intercepted 
images function as dividers between the interviews and present subtle, 
ironic comments. An advertisement board displaying a smiling, young 
woman together with the slogan “always at your disposal” gets an en-
tirely new meaning in the context of El-Jeiroudi’s film, as do wedding 
gowns displayed at store fronts to swing in the wind. 
Artists are 
forced to produce 
sellable work …
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2. Sara Lei Sparre, “Educated Women in Syria: 
Servants of the State, or Nurturers of the 
Family?” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern 
Studies 17, no. 1 (2008): 3–20.
3. The paradoxes surrounding Syrian film 
production are the subject of Rasha Salti, 
ed., Insights Into Syrian Cinema: Essays and 
Conversations with Contemporary Filmmakers 
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Islamically right or wrong in the con-
text of contemporary politics as clearly 
perceptible in the scene when Fahri 
defends Aisha’s decision to give up her 
seat in a train for an elderly American 
woman. While some other passengers 
condemn Aisha for her kindness to the 
“enemies of Islam,” Fahri defends her by 
referring to the Sunnah teachings of 
the Prophet Muhammad.
Islam and popular culture
The production of Ayat Ayat Cinta is an example of a recent trend 
in Indonesia of Islamic teachings becoming part of popular culture 
through films, books, and songs. Soon after its release it became one of 
the biggest blockbuster hits in Indonesia. In the first few weeks alone 
more than three million people, including President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and top government officials, crammed cinemas to watch 
it. Most spectators, including the President were so touched by the film 
that they shed tears. Many expressed the view that it is the most suc-
cessful film to combine Islam and popular culture so far. Earlier Islamic 
films such as Deddy Mizwar’s Kiamat Sudah Dekat (Judgment Day Is 
Nigh, 2003) and Garin Nugroho’s Rindu Kami Padamu (English title: Of 
Love and Eggs, 2004) had not attracted that many viewers. Communica-
tions expert Ade Armando hailed the film, and said its success showed 
that to be profitable, a film did not have to contain sex and ghosts.3 Fur-
thermore, President Yudhoyono lauded the film as a piece of art which 
both represents Indonesian culture and gives a truthful representation 
of Islam as a religion of harmony, tolerance, and justice. Additionally, a 
spokesperson for the President called the film an “antithesis” to Fitna, 
a video produced by Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders and 
released on the Internet in March accusing the Holy Quran of inciting 
violence.4 However, not only in western media, but also in Indonesia, 
Islam had often been featured in the context of cruelty and violence. 
In fact, Armando’s juxtaposition of the religious Ayat Ayat Cinta 
with lucrative films which contain sex and ghosts points to two issues 
touching on media representations and Islam. On the one hand, it ex-
presses a view of audio-visual media more generally held by religious 
groups and leaders, not only in Indonesia, and not only by Muslims. 
Worldwide, films which feature scantily dressed women, contain im-
ages hinting at or showing sex, or show horror or supernatural occur-
rences, have incited complaints on the basis of religious morality. Like-
wise, Indonesian religious leaders often have voiced their objections to 
popular film productions that contain sex and ghosts calling them film 
maksiat (immoral films). On the other hand, Armando’s comment also 
touches on the paradoxical history of representations of Islam in the 
majority of domestic media. Apart from melodramatic soaps screened 
for the month of Ramadan which use Islamic paraphernalia (Muslim 
attire, salat performances, and iconic jargon such as assalamu’aleikum, 
alhamdullilah, and astagafirullah), Islam in Indonesian mainstream film 
and television series had mainly appeared in the context of the horror 
or supernatural genre. These films were the very same to feature the 
issues that Indonesian leaders find so problematic: ghosts or other su-
pernatural occurrences, and scantily dressed women. 
Several Muslim groups have not supported the mixture of horror and 
Islam shown in Indonesian film. Their objections were first and foremost 
based on the fear that a belief in supernatural beings and occurrences 
other than those acknowledged in the Quran would lead people astray 
from religious teachings. Ironically, it is partly to get programmes through 
censorship (either from the state or to shun protests in the name of re-
ligious morality), that there has been a long-standing emphasis on the 
combination of horror and Islam in Indonesian audio-visual media.
In February this year, Ayat Ayat Cinta 
(Verses of Love) was released in Indo-
nesian cinemas. The film, based on a 
best-selling novel by Indonesian nov-
elist Habiburrahman El Shirazy is a de-
parture from the usual production of 
horror and teen films of the recently 
resurging film industry in Indonesia. 
It seeks to overcome western media 
stereotypes of Islam and aims to show 
the compassionate face of the religion. 
Hanung Bramantyo, the film’s director, says he chose to turn the novel 
into a film because it presents the teachings of Islam in a positive way 
and where “Muslims are not associated with terrorism and fanaticism, 
but portrayed as a people who practice tolerance, patience, sincerity 
and honesty.”1 Ayat Ayat Cinta neither portrays Islam as the source of 
violence, cruelty, and horror  – as in many western media – nor as the 
saviour – as in Indonesian lower class horror films, reality shows, and 
religious soaps. It shows, in the words of its di-
rector “… Muslims who are hip, fashionable and 
capable of socializing, but at the same time do 
things in an Islamic way.”2
Ayat Ayat Cinta is basically a love story present-
ed in an Islamic wrapping. The setting is at the 
famous Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, which 
is to many Indonesians the centre of Islamic 
knowledge; the protagonists are devout Muslims 
or, like the Coptic Maria, at the end, a convert to 
Islam; and throughout the film the uses and ben-
efits of Islamic teachings in daily life are mani-
fest. The main character is Fahri an Indonesian 
overseas student at Al-Azhar. He is a handsome, 
chaste, and serious young man. Besides deepen-
ing his understanding of religion one of Fahri’s 
main goals is to find a wife and establish a family 
in line with Islamic teachings. While he is pursu-
ing his studies in Egypt, four different attractive 
women fall in love with him, each one of whom 
tries to win his heart. Fahri eventually marries the 
veiled Turkish-German girl Aisha breaking the 
heart of the Coptic girl-next-door Maria. Incon-
solable, Maria falls into a coma. But when Fahri 
is jailed and facing death by hanging after being 
falsely accused of rape by Noura, another girl 
who is disappointed not to have been the chosen 
one, comatose Maria appears to be the only one 
who can prove his innocence. Aisha begs Fahri 
to take Maria as a second wife so that he can re-
vive her and have her testify in his favour. After 
Fahri marries the unconscious Maria she indeed 
awakes, and without much delay saves her newly 
wed husband from the death penalty. The three 
do not live happily ever after though. Suffering from a severe heart-
condition Maria soon dies after her marriage. But not before Fahri has 
taught her how to perform the salat prayer; and just when the three 
spouses perform sholat berjamaah (pray together) Maria peacefully 
passes away. 
A major theme running through the film is how to apply Islamic teach-
ings in the context of modern daily life and contemporary manners of 
conduct. Fahri, for example, advocates women’s rights by reciting from 
the Quran. But he also takes a second wife, once more in accordance with 
Islamic teachings. Furthermore, the film addresses concepts of what is 
Islamic novels, films, and songs are becoming 
increasingly popular in Indonesia. One 
exceptionally well-liked film is the love story 
Ayat Ayat Cinta released in 2008. Even though 
to some the film is as trivializing religions as 
The Da Vinci Code, Ayat Ayat Cinta puts forward 
a representation of Islam which is different 
from both western stereotypes and prevalent 
representations of Islam in popular Indonesian 
film and television productions. 
Cruelty, Ghosts, 
and Verses of love
k At i n k A  V A n  h e e r e n
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… most of 
the religious soaps 
deteriorated into 
campy horror 
shows which served 
Islamic teachings 
in a mixture of 
gruesome blood 
and eaten-by-
maggots images.
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Shooting Ayat 
Ayat Cinta
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A mixture of Islam and horror
To begin with, already under Soeharto’s New Order, horror 
films which showed sexy women, violence, evil supernatural 
beings, and everything else that "God has forbidden," used 
a deus-ex-machina appearance of a kyai (a traditionalist Is-
lamic teacher), or other religious symbol, to restore order at 
the end of the film. While witches and other evil creatures 
torture and kill people, and spread fear and bloodshed 
among a community throughout the film at the end they 
are defeated by some Islamic authority figure. Sometimes 
quoting verses from the Quran would do to make the wick-
ed creature perish. At other times, the heroic kyai also pos-
sesses supernatural powers to fight and defy the evil beings. 
Filmmakers inserted the Islamic authority figure to ensure 
that the film would pass the Film Censor Board. The unso-
licited result, however, was that the general public of these 
films perceived the horror genre as identical to film dakwah 
(propagation films).
After the resignation of President Soeharto several horror 
films were produced that did not use any religious symbols. 
But by 2002 Islamic religious leaders reappeared in Indone-
sian audio-visual media, taking on a role in the newly cre-
ated horror reality shows on television. These programmes 
supposedly show the live images of supernatural occurrences and 
ghostly beings. The role of the Islamic religious leaders is not only to 
restore order, but also to explain how to interpret the supernatural oc-
currences in the context of Islamic teachings. The producers of horror 
reality shows used Islam both to add to the programmes’ popularity 
as well as to pre-empt censorship. Islamic features like clothes and ex-
pressions were used to sell the television series. The appearance on the 
show of trustworthy Islamic leaders who emphasized that all what was 
happening in the programmes was real, and not merely camera tricks, 
added much to the appeal of the shows. And so the Islamic hero com-
ing to the rescue either to contain supernatural beings or to defeat the 
evil ones was restored a second time. Yet this time, in the context of 
pre-empting film censorship, producers did not so much bear in mind 
censorship from the state, but rather from the street: read fear of Mus-
lim protests. Muslim protests were feared most because some groups 
like the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front) did not shun the 
use of violence to make their point that they would uphold the morals 
of the nation.5 The fear of FPI and other such groups was realistic since 
there was a history of violence by the groups attacking nightclubs, bars, 
and cultural centres. Moreover, as the government and police forces 
only half-heartedly countered these actions, many people were unsure 
about whether they would be sufficiently protected if they drew the ire 
of radical Muslims. 
In 2004, the lucrative and safe combination of showing supernatural 
occurrences under the guidance of Islamic leaders was extended to a 
new television formula called sinetron religi (religious soaps). The soaps 
were based on true stories of people who had experienced the mira-
cles of God which were published in such popular Islamic magazines 
as Hidayah (God’s guidance) and Allah Maha Besar (God is Great), or 
which were based on stories such as hadith-lore from Bukhari and Mus-
lim. However, in due course most of the religious soaps deteriorated 
into campy horror shows which served Islamic teachings in a mixture 
of gruesome blood and eaten-by-maggots images. In the words of the 
journalist Taufiqurrahman, the religious soaps were nothing but “regu-
lar soap operas with God’s name attached to their title [that] carry a 
formulaic story line in which sinners of all kinds, from corrupt state offi-
cials and gamblers to a misbehaving son, will be punished by God with 
a very painful death, ranging from literally being burnt in hell, eaten by 
flesh-eating worms, to being swallowed alive by the earth.”6 For a third 
time Indonesian media featured Islam mainly in the context of grue-
some images of cruelty and torture. Until Ramadan 2007 Indonesian 
television was swamped by all kinds of variations on this formula. 
Islamic films and Verses of Love
In comparison to the horror films and religious soap productions 
Ayat Ayat Cinta indeed was an odd one out in the way in which popular 
film and television productions positioned Islam mainly in the context 
of horror, the supernatural, violence and torture from hell. This is not to 
say that any of the horror films, religious soaps, or Ayat Ayat Cinta for 
that matter, was readily seen as Islamic film or television productions. 
Arts & Culture
To those with the strictest Islamic backgrounds the medium film itself 
was perceived as incompatible with Islamic teachings. To other Muslim 
groups it depended on how the films with Islamic themes were com-
posed. Many Indonesian Islamic groups discarded horror films as dumb 
entertainment for the lower classes who believed in the supernatural, 
and who, merely because of their lack in education, regarded horror 
films as dakwah.
The religious soaps were not much discussed as constituting a prob-
lematic representation of Islam. Particularly since some stories were 
based on hadith and nearly all programmes involved the participation 
of famous Indonesian Islamic leaders, there were few comments about 
their religious value. However, if any, there were hardly pious Muslims 
who regretted the end of the increasingly horrific religious soaps after 
Ramadan 2007. Finally, the romance Ayat Ayat Cinta was, as Nauval 
Yasid wrote, as trivializing an Islamic film as The Da Vinci Code was a 
Roman Catholic one.7 Moreover, because the film was mainly a melo-
dramatic love story, and, according to some Muslim groups, contained 
misrepresentations of the correct Islam and its teachings – such as how 
to socialize with non-Muslims –, some Muslims believed Ayat Ayat Cinta 
to be even more harmful to Islam than the sex and horror maksiat films. 
Nevertheless, despite the heated debate whether or not Ayat Ayat Cinta 
really is Islamic it clearly is a film that tries to convey Islamic teachings, 
and differs from general representations of Islam found in both domes-
tic and transnational media. Bramantyo believed that it was important 
to make this film in order to show Indonesians and the West alike that 
Muslims can be proud of their religion. Hence, Ayat Ayat Cinta does not 
portray Islam in the context of violence, cruelty, and horror as in many 
media productions from both the West and Indonesia. It shows modern 
Muslims who are tolerant and strive to adjust themselves to current 
times while leading their lives an Islamic way.8 That is just the way In-
donesia’s President wishes to see it.
Notes
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had performed Hajj. Also, the wearing 
of face-veils was by and large limited 
to the adherents of the Darul Arqam, 
a Malaysian-based Islamic movement. 
It was only in the 1980s that face-veils 
became more visible with the spread of 
the Tablighi Jamaat whose female ad-
herents mostly wore this style of dress. 
The face-veil has become more wide-
spread since 2000 with the growth in 
popularity of some Salafi groups.
There have often been tensions about 
the issue of veiling. In the early phase of the New Order regime, wear-
ing Islamic clothing was considered a form of resistance to the state 
authorities. In 1982, the Department of Education and Culture even 
decided to prevent female students of secondary educational institu-
tions from wearing a head covering at school, on the grounds that this 
practice was seen as a violation of the basic code of school uniform. By 
the late 1980s rumours had spread that veiled women were spreading 
poison – jilbab beracun/poison jilbab – under the folds of their cloth-
ing. It was only in 1991, that the state, in an effort to co-opt the Muslim 
community, allowed Muslim women again to wear head coverings at 
schools and government offices. 
From the 1990s on there has been an upsurge in wearing fashionable 
styles of Islamic dress and motivations to wear these styles of dress 
and their meanings have multiplied. This greater popularity ties in with 
the more general greater prominence of Islam in Indonesia. This is, for 
instance, evident in the growth of women’s pengajian (prayer groups) 
led by young da‘i, Islamic teachers. Some of these 
charismatic religious teachers, such as Abdul-
lah Gymnastiar, Jefry al-Buchori, and Ahmad al-
Habsy, wear fashionable Muslim dress and have 
inspired Muslim women to adopt not only Islamic 
clothing but the more fashionable types. Some 
of these young teachers have even been hired as 
icon figures for Muslim men’s clothing by Indone-
sian Muslim fashion designers.
Yet, wearing Islamic dress is not only a sign of 
personal piety, but may also reflect individual and 
communal identities. For some it is part of a life-
style, while in some settings like in Islamic pesant-
ren it has been imposed from above. Since 2001 
the Indonesian government also has implement-
ed a programme of regional autonomy, which 
has resulted in some provinces such as Aceh and 
Bukulumba (South Sulawesi) adopting or prepar-
ing to adopt Shariah law, including the obligation 
to wear Islamic dress.
Influences from abroad
The history of the advent of Islam to Indonesia 
has significantly influenced the particular styles 
of dress worn in Indonesia. When ulama and trad-
ers from abroad came to Indonesia they not only 
brought with them ideas and goods, but also the 
fashion styles from their countries. Styles from 
Saudi Arabia as well as from Yemen became pop-
ular, especially when the men from those coun-
tries started to marry Indonesian women. Still 
the use of the Arabian abaya, a head-to-toe wrap 
covering the whole body, in early Indonesia was 
not as popular as the use of shalwar qamiz, a tunic 
Until a few decades ago Islamic cloth-
ing was not very common in Indone-
sia, but more recently it has become a 
trend, not only amongst those wearing 
it, but also as a production sector. Bu-
sana Muslima, the term used for female 
Muslim dress in Indonesian, denotes 
any outfit including a head cover-
ing. With this trend of wearing Islamic 
clothing, various styles have emerged 
making Muslim fashion one of the hot-
test topics to be discussed by wearers 
and non-wearers of fashionable Islamic clothing alike. What have been 
the impulses leading to the growth and dissemination of Muslim fash-
ions in Indonesia? Where do these fashionable styles of Islamic dress 
come from? And how are Indonesian designers themselves involved in 
this complicated circuit of the dissemination of Muslim fashions? 
Terms used for Islamic styles of dress in Indonesia are sometimes 
confusing for those more familiar with terms used in the Middle East. 
Kerudung and jilbab both refer to women’s head coverings. They may 
be used interchangeably, but kerudung usually refers to a long trans-
parent shawl which covers a woman’s hair. The jilbab is a longer piece 
of cloth that almost completely covers a woman’s body except for her 
face and hands. The term cadar is used for the face-veil. 
In specific settings, such as Islamic madrasas and Islamic pesantren 
(boarding schools), Islamic styles of dress, such as head coverings, have 
a long history, but the public display of head coverings remained lim-
ited; in fact, until the 1980s it was mainly worn by those women who 
e V A  f.  A m r u l l A h With the growing popularity of Islamic clothing 
in Indonesia in recent decades, Muslim fashion 
has become an increasingly hot topic among 
wearers of Islamic clothing. Indonesian 
Muslim fashion consists of various styles and 
trends, influenced by transnational factors 
yet maintaining a local flavour. This article 
traces the development of Muslim fashion 
in Indonesia and explores how Indonesian 
designers are involved in the production of 
sophisticated Islamic clothing designs.  
indonesian muslim fashion
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In Indonesia it is mostly worn by male members of the Tablighi Jamaat. 
The jubba, finally, is an ankle-length garment worn by Indonesians of 
Arab descent, Salafis, and Indonesians who recently returned from the 
pilgrimage to Mecca.
With Indonesian Muslim fashion designers becoming active produc-
ers in this transnational flow of commodity, they have also been invited 
to export their styles and to even launch boutiques in other countries 
like the early example of Anne Rufaidah who exported her designs to 
Saudi Arabia from 1984 to 1985 and Tuty Adib in Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Brunei. The popularity of Indonesian Muslim fashions has been 
greatly enhanced through fashion shows held abroad such as those by 
Anne Rufaidah in Malaysia, Algeria, Dubai, India, and those by Shafira in 
London and neighbouring countries. In January 2008, Shafira launched 
its new theme “Unity in Diversity” which aimed to design fashionable 
clothing suitable for Muslim communities from highly diverse back-
grounds. Shafira is also planning to open showrooms in Middle Eastern 
countries and Southeast Asia. 
The media have been crucial in popularizing the work of Indonesian 
Muslim fashion designers. Muslim women’s magazines are full of ad-
vertisements promoting Islamic fashion and selling beauty products. 
The three big magazines focusing on Islamic fashion are Noor, Paras, 
and Alia, which promote a moderate use of body coverage, such as the 
use of kerudung gaul (street kerudung) which consists of a simple veil 
worn with pants, such as blue jeans, and a tight long-sleeved T-shirt. 
Two other Islamic magazines that had already emerged earlier are 
Ummi and Annida. They promote a more body-covering type of Islamic 
fashion, which mainly consists of a full cloak or a loose tunic with long 
skirt and a large veil or even unadorned face veil. These journals are 
strictly against street kerudung because it does not cover most parts 
of a woman’s body. Since the turn of the century the Muslim fashion 
industry has made ample use of websites to propagate its products. 
Indonesian designers have also created what has come to be known 
as kerudung instan (instant veil) and cadar instan (instant face-veil). They 
are called instant because they are ready to wear and are designed to 
fit perfectly so that the wearers do not need accessories such as pins 
and /or a bandana to tighten their grip. Furthermore, not only have 
they fashioned new styles, but Indonesian Muslim designers have de-
veloped their own fabrics. In 2008, for example, the new trends in Mus-
lim dress use fabrics made of traditional Indonesian tenun (traditional 
weave) while in 2007 batik was very popular. These materials, includ-
ing also silk, are mostly used for long blouses with pants or skirts and 
complemented with trendy veils. Even the most conservative styles of 
Islamic dress, such as the abaya and the face-veil have an “Indonesian 
touch,” as can be seen in typically Indonesian colourful abayas and col-
ourful embroidery and beads on the face-veil.
To sum up, whereas Indonesia has imported styles and designs 
from abroad, Indonesian designers have turned these into local styles. 
Whereas it is true that in the past external influences contributed to 
the introduction of Islamic dress, busana Muslima itself is the creation 
of Indonesian Muslim fashions’ designers. They are not only confident 
of their design skills, but also prefer to use Indonesian cultural products 
like batik, tenun, embroidery, and silk. They have become producers 
and even propagators of fashionable styles of Muslim dress in these 
transnational fashion industry circuits.
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worn over long pants, from the Indian Peninsula. This is because, first, 
shalwar qamiz resembles local styles such as baju kurung from West 
Sumatra or kebaya panjang (long kebaya) from Central Java with the 
difference that shalwar qamiz is combined with pants while the lat-
ter two are usually combined with skirts or sarung. Secondly, shalwar 
qamiz with its combination of tunic and long pants used to be pre-
ferred by Indonesian women active in the public sphere who felt they 
could move more freely by wearing pants. Lastly, for early designers 
themselves, like Ida Royani and Ida Leman, they feel that it is easier to 
modify shalwar qamiz than abaya. It has been mainly the very strict 
and conservative groups that have adopted Arabian styles such as the 
Tablighi Jamaat and some Salafi groups. 
Indonesian women graduates from Middle Eastern Islamic universi-
ties, in particular from al-Azhar University in Egypt, also play a signifi-
cant role in the flow of Muslim fashions to Indonesia. When these fe-
male students return home, they bring with them the Islamic dressing 
styles popular at the time. In the late 1990s, for example, many al-Azhar 
graduates brought a new type of material for veils which was colourful 
and transparent. They also introduced ways of tying and arranging the 
veil that were in style where they had been studying.  
Indonesian designers
Starting around the late 1990s and early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed 
the birth of sophisticated Islamic clothing designs. In 1993, an asso-
ciation of Indonesian fashion designers called APPMI (the Associa-
tion of Indonesian Fashion Designing Entrepreneurs) was established 
which paid much attention to Islamic styles of dress and stimulated 
their development into modern commodities. In 1996, APPMI created 
a division specializing in Muslim dress which provided a conducive 
atmosphere for the growth of Muslim fashions’ industry in Indonesia. 
The designers who are active in this division are mostly female. These 
female designers do not only design clothing for Muslim women but 
also for men, teenagers, and children. However, Muslim dress especial-
ly designed for men in Indonesia is not as popular as Muslim dress for 
women. Male Muslim dress is usually worn only on special occasions 
such as in Islamic festivals. One of the most common styles of Muslim 
dress for men is the koko style which resembles male Chinese clothes. 
The kurta style includes a loose shirt with loose shalwar pants, origi-
nally worn in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. 
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the Sound of islam
Southeast Asian Boy Bands
enough pop to a religious message to 
capture the mind of a young and often 
restless audience while maintaining its 
spiritual integrity.
The sound of a new Islamic chic
Since the 1980s a new Islamic middle 
class has been emerging throughout 
Southeast Asia, most notably in Ma-
laysia and Indonesia, and in the latter 
country especially the Islamic resur-
gence has gained real momentum after more freedom was allowed 
for staging public manifestations of Islam after 1998. The rise of the 
new Islamic chic and its claim to a publicly visible Islam has shown that 
religion and capitalism are by no means incompatible. Taking nasyid 
as the soundtrack of this emergent Islamic middle class, it is probably 
the Malaysian group Raihan which should be regarded as one of the 
most successful brands in today’s nasyid industry. Whereas there is a 
long tradition of Islamic pop music in the Southeast Asian region, both 
dangdut singer Rhoma Irama and the female qasidah groups of the 
1980s spring to mind, Raihan is the first Muslim pop group to gain truly 
transnational celebrity status, a fame which even stretches far beyond 
Southeast Asia.2 Their 1996 Puji-Pujian (Songs of Praise) was Malaysia’s 
best selling album ever, and not long after the group signed a major 
record deal with Warner, they were doing international tours and co-
operated with such renowned artists as Yusuf Islam and lately the UK-
based hip hop group Mecca 2 Medina.
 Although some seem to take Raihan’s popularity as proof of the on-
going Islamization of Malay society, many have praised the group for 
the casual attitude they have adopted towards Islam. Illustrative of this 
stance is their experimenting with gospel and hip-hop; Raihan is al-
most solely reinventing the nasyid genre by continually adding new 
musical flavours to its sound (listen to their 2002 Gema Alam album 
or 2005’s Ameen for a good introduction to their music). Raihan is also 
the group which starred in the 2001 movie Syukur 2001 (Blessings for 
the Twenty-first Century), a film which was simultaneously released on 
multiple Asian markets, and was dubbed the world’s first-ever Islamic 
science fiction epic. Islamic pop music is central to much of the film and 
the main theme, I’tiraf (Confession), has since taken its place among the 
major nasyid anthems.3 Indirectly Raihan’s music has many nasyid afi-
cionados wondering what an Islamic future should sound like and this 
question still remains unanswered as the nasyid scene is still seeking 
to expand and makes use of virtually any sort of music around. From 
all male, female to children’s ensembles, ethnic and (pseudo) Chinese 
nasyid, and from poetry, hip hop, to militant and romantic (wedding) 
nasyid, everything has been tried. Simultaneously, this extension of the 
term nasyid has many left asking where religion ends and pop begins.
SNada’s campus Islam
The group SNada is the Indonesian answer to Raihan.  As do so many 
of its counterparts, this group has its roots in campus life, and started out 
against the background of the 1998 mass rallies against the Soeharto 
regime. The group has since spoken out in support of the Prosperous 
Justice Party (PKS), a fundamentalist group which is extremely popular 
among student activists and urban Islamic youth more generally. SNada 
(derived from Senandung Nada dan Dakwah, literally humming a song 
while spreading the message of faith) joined with other ensembles to 
record the cassette-album Keadilan (Justice) which was sold for the 2004 
elections with the official PKS campaign video.  SNada has also shown its 
political engagement through its other releases, for instance in the album 
Air Mata Bosnia (The Tears of Bosnia). However, SNada is best known for 
its 2003 hit song Jagalah Hati, (Take to the heart) which was written by 
The term nasyid from the Arabic nashid 
refers to the raising of one’s voice and 
is the generic term for sung poetry 
traditionally found in such countries 
as Egypt or Yemen.1 In modern times 
nasyid has often been linked to the 
Palestinian Intifadah and the Egyptian 
Da‘wa movement, both of which prop-
agate Islam as a social ideology fight-
ing colonization and the perceived 
ongoing political and economic op-
pression by the West. Southeast Asian nasyid groups eagerly identify 
with these traditions from the Islamic heartland and use the verbal art 
in a similar fashion to comment on the actual situation in the Muslim 
world, the glory of Allah, and the teachings of His Prophet. Although an 
art form of long standing, nasyid has only become a best seller in Mus-
lim Southeast Asia since Iranian militant cassettes were offered for sale 
outside mosques in Malaysia in the 1980s. Similar genres were soon 
imported by Malaysian students who brought cassettes with engaging 
yet spiritual protest music back home after their studies in countries 
such as Yemen, Jordan, or Kuwait.
However, the popularity of nasyid in Southeast Asian countries can 
be attributed not simply to its explicit use of religious dogma or mili-
tant themes; unquestionably it also touches upon such social issues 
such as drugs, dropping out of school, and other youth related issues 
recognizable to younger audiences. Importantly, Southeast Asian 
nasyid has been able to take off with extreme success as the lyrics are 
sung in the indigenous Malay language, making the contents of the 
songs more intimate and intelligible to a teenage audience than other 
religious genres such as salawat with their ostentatious use of the Ara-
bic language. Since the mid-1990s nasyid has also become popular in 
Indonesia, achieving great popularity in such cities with large student 
communities as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and especially Bandung, where 
soon scores of nasyid ensembles blossomed. As in Malaysia, Indone-
sian campus life, humming with its student ensembles, inter-university 
contests, and student activism, was instrumental in promoting nasyid 
music among a generation which was fed up with corrupt politicians 
and who were insisting on political reforms and a return to old-style 
moral values through their music and other popular art forms. 
Nasyid: the best of East and West?
Whereas proponents of this Campus Islam eagerly trace nasyid to 
its Middle Eastern roots, even as far back as the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad (some claim that what was supposedly the first nasyid 
song, tala‘a ’l badru ‘alaina, was sung by women who welcomed the 
Prophet when he arrived in Medina from Mecca), the popularity of 
Southeast Asian nasyid groups can also by explained by another 
rather more mundane factor: namely the huge success in Asia of such 
western boy bands as Boyz II Men, Backstreet Boys, or Westlife; bands 
which all emerged in the same 1990s. As is the case with their west-
ern counterparts, an often largely female audience worships nasyid 
singers and the close harmony singing of western boy bands in many 
instances seems to have served as an additional role model in the mu-
sical styling and casual appearance of most of today’s nasyid groups. 
Hence nasyid music combines the best from the East and West and is 
very much in tune with a more fashionable and commercial Islamic 
pop culture which has been branded either Islam Lite, Market Islam, 
or within the Indonesian context, “15 minute Islam”: a combination of 
life-style politics, youth culture, and yet conveying a very self-assured 
religious message. It is this “15 minute Islam,” with its obvious reference 
to a Warholian short-lived claim to fame, which reveals the delicacies 
of re-inventing religion for twenty-first-century public life: how to add 
Since the early 1990s nasyid music has become 
widely popular among the Islamic youth of 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Imported from the 
Middle East, the verbal art attracts proponents 
particularly in universities, above all among 
student activists. However, the Middle East is 
not the sole role model; present-day nasyid 
music reveals the careful and often delicate mix 
of religion and pop that is currently so much 
debated throughout the Islamic world.
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The use of the Malay language in a tremendously popular genre as 
nasyid has proven not only that young people are in need of a more di-
rect and intimate way of expressing their religious thoughts, it has also 
added questions about the future of the Islamic world as such. Because 
of the ongoing popularity of such groups as Raihan and SNada, nasyid 
is slowly globalizing and finding its way into Muslim communities eve-
rywhere in the world. Interestingly, it is the Southeast Asian version of 
nasyid which among many is becoming a role model in this process, 
showing that Muslims are increasingly growing aware that Islam is no 
longer synonymous with the Arab world. Nasyid aficionados from the 
UK and the Netherlands to Morocco and South Africa increasingly are 
inspired by their Southeast Asian counterparts, and indirectly getting 
into touch with other trends and currents within Southeast Asian Islam. 
Southeast Asian Nasyid presents us with a young, urban, and very fast 
changing version of present-day Islam. It is the 
everyday Islam of stickers, novels, blogs, and new 
media which many have recently begun to com-
ment upon. As nasyid music illustrates, Islam has 
increasingly become both ideology and fashion 
to Muslim youths throughout the world. Whereas 
the period 2002 to 2005 may have been the hey-
day of Southeast Asian nasyid, at least in terms of 
output, new nasyid music is still being released 
confronting us with the search for a satisfying 
compromise between religion and pop in the 
twenty-first century. Let us keep listening to what 
this compromise will sound like.
the then famed media Muslim preacher Aa Gym (Abdullah Gymnastiar). 
In the same vein as Raihan, SNada demonstrates a more casual and com-
mercial approach to Islam, having recorded several advertisements (e.g., 
for the Islamic Banking operations of Bank Mandiri and for travel agencies 
which organize annual pilgrimages to Mecca). 
As have other Indonesian nasyid ensembles, SNada has also profited 
from the lucrative business which has sprung up in nasyid ringtones 
and the many Malay language websites, homepages, and weblogs de-
voted to nasyid music in general. The latter not only reflect the commer-
cial success of the genre up to now, but also its extensive transnational 
aspirations. The countries of Muslim Southeast Asia are no longer re-
garded separate markets when it comes to Islamic pop music. It was no 
coincidence that SNada’s 2003 album was called “From Jakarta to Kuala 
Lumpur” (Dari Jakarta ke Kuala Lumpur). Nasyid’s new transnational-
ity is reflected in pan-Southeast Asian song contests, and also in the 
composition of some of the ensembles which consist of multinational 
members. It somehow shows the awareness of a new geography of the 
Muslim world in which in many aspects (Muslim entertainment, the use 
of ICTs and new media, and more generally progressive Muslim think-
ing) Southeast Asia seems to have become a role model for its Muslim 
compatriots around the world and the ummah at large. 
Discussing the “Sound of Islam”
The market Islam of SNada and Raihan stands in stark contrast to the 
approaches of such other ensembles as the Indonesian group Izzatul 
Islam (nicknamed Iziz). Whereas the former ensembles experiment 
with hip hop and other forms of popular music, the members of Iziz 
state that the human voice is the sole instrument allowed for religious 
entertainment, with an exception being made for the frame drum on 
account of its overt religious associations. Other performers have also 
wondered how to emphasize religion rather than pop. The Indonesian-
born Arab singer Haddad Alwi, for example, has extensively made use 
of his own roots in Hadrami music adding Arab language and Middle 
Eastern orchestration to his nasyid songs, but other performers explic-
itly deny the simple relationship between Arab (performing) culture 
and Islam as a world religion.  The group Raihan is even quoted as re-
fraining from employing traditional Arab tunes, instead stressing that 
its music foremost must be contemporary. One way out of this dilemma 
has been to claim that not so much nasyid or any religious pop music in 
particular is being performed; the sound they produce is merely world 
music with a spiritual twist, such as is the case with Malaysian singer 
Waheeda, the 2003 “nasyid sensation.” 
In short, there is considerable debate about which direction the by 
now thriving nasyid industry should take next. Discussions are not 
confined to the musical accompaniment, they also focus on the sta-
tus of female groups or nasyid song contests modelled on American 
Idols. In early 2004, the Forum Nasyid Indonesia (FNI) organized the first 
all-Indonesian nasyid festival which was broadcast on national televi-
sion during the fasting month. The festival has led to a fierce debate 
among nasyid enthusiasts, many of them condemning the sheer com-
mercialism of the show and claiming there is only one human being 
who deserves adoration as an idol, and that is the Prophet Muhammad. 
Many regretted the absence of nasyid performers and true religious 
experts in the contest jury, with national television companies appar-
ently paying more attention to attitude and outward appearance than 
spiritual content. Other elements of "15 minute Islam" have similarly 
come under scrutiny from more orthodox groups. Among such com-
mercial enterprises are religious ring and ring-back tones which are 
mostly the adapted melodies of nasyid songs. Such Indonesian groups 
as SNada, the Fikr or their Malaysian counterparts Raihan, Brothers, or 
Rabbani today presumably earn more by selling ring tones than from 
the regular sale of albums. Taken in conjunction with the rise of such 
new “poster preachers” as Jefri Al-Buchori and the pop singer turned 
religious teacher Opick, ring tones and other religious commercialism 
have prompted many young Muslims to ask if nowadays God is for 
sale? There is clearly a limit to how pop religion can be.
The future of Islam in a nutshell
The questions of what Islamic music should sound like, the participa-
tion of female singers in public, and if God’s message should be for sale 
are just a few points in the ongoing discussion about nasyid today. In 
fact, in a nutshell nasyid music deals with most of the challenges with 
which modern Southeast Asian Muslims see themselves confronted. 
Notes
1. Arabic nashīd (pl.: anāshīd) is “song, hymn.” 
The verb stem nashada means “to implore, 
to recite, to sing.” Nasyid is the standard 
Indonesian spelling of this term.
2. The Indonesian dangdut genre makes use 
of western instrumentation and when 
first emerging in the 1970s was extremely 
amenable to conveying Islamic messages. 
Qasidah was a hybrid genre that was 
especially popular in the 1980s. It was 
mainly performed by young women and 
targeted, like nasyid, at Indonesian and 
Malaysian Muslim youth.
3. On You Tube clips of many of the nasyid 
ensembles and artists discussed here 
may be easily found. Watch and listen for 
example to:
– Raihan’s I’tiraf (http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=s5NdwWgVC4U); 
– SNada’s Jagalah hati (http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=x3tyus2W3iA); 
– Hadad Alwi’s Tholama Asyku (http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=z-_x8PmntyI); 
– Waheeda’s Wassini (http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=QbpVAW3mH6U ); 
– and Izzatul Islam’s Jalan Juang (http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=EX6siW7Qa9Y). 
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The popular 
Malaysian 
nasyid group 
Raihan
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Maghreb, when a girl is called bint el-
bled, it is a compliment. The term stands 
for a female who does not forget her 
roots, people, and homeland and who 
shows respect for and conforms to her 
origins, culture, and traditions, through 
a particular way of talking, dressing, 
acting, and behaving. The concept of 
bint el-bled is often used in opposition 
to the stereotypical concept of the 
“westernized, immoral woman.”3 Addi-
tionally, bint el-bled supposedly comes 
from a family of good standing and is 
supported by her family. For Chadia 
this is also the case; her father is her manager, her mother her stylist, 
and her brothers her biggest fans. Without their support, it would be 
far more difficult to pursue a career as a singer, as Chadia admits. 
Her identification with bint el-bled is reflected in how she shapes her 
musical repertoire, including lyrics most of which are in English or Ara-
bic-Moroccan. Chadia stresses the importance of the suitability of the 
lyrics with her personality. In due time, Chadia has grown to be very 
critical of her song lyrics. 
“I just try to take it easy, and finish every thing [the songs] in my own 
pace … Because, I have noticed how, every time someone else writes 
a song for me, it is every time just not IT… And yeah, that’s why I pre-
fer to write my own lyrics. The lyrics they [producers] write … they are 
just not that good … That is not my style … Then I think: well I should 
just stick to my own style. I won’t pretend to be someone I am not. It 
[the lyrics] should represent me.”
Thus, Chadia refuses to sing lyrics, which are not “appropriate” for her; 
she does not drink alcohol, so consequently she will not sing about 
it – or any other taboo topic – not even when it is used as a metaphor 
for something else. 
Chadia reaffirms her image as bint el-bled through her dress style. She 
dresses “neatly” (not too revealing or sexy) and wears little make-up. 
She is nevertheless dressed in the latest fashion, often wearing jeans 
and tops revealing her neck, shoulders, and part of her chest. Her pref-
erences for artists like Alicia Keys and Asala, a contemporary female 
pop singer from Syria, stem not only from their musical qualities, but 
also, or even more so, from their images as decent artists: 
“Alicia Keys is really one of my great idols. And Asala as well, because 
I like simplicity … It doesn’t have to be all glamorous and open and 
revealing [the clothes]. I don’t like that at all and Keys is a great ex-
ample of that. For her it is all about the voice and the music. A nice 
look is great, but in the end it is the music that counts. With Asala it 
is the same thing …” 
Keeping up appearances and maintaining a good reputation is equally 
important for Chadia as the suitability of her song lyrics. In response to 
whether she would perform to, or sing, rai music, she says: 
“… rai, I would never sing rai. Every music genre has its own label, its 
own reputation. People who sing rai, they are in a totally different 
world than the world I live in. Such people are totally different from 
me.”
So, singing rai is out of the question because of the bad reputation of 
the genre and its association with alcohol (ab)use. Not surprisingly, she 
considers her nice-girl image a sufficient compensation for her being 
a singer:
“You know what it is? I don’t spread any negative vibes. And I don’t 
say that I will be singing the rest of my life. It is so diverse, I don’t do 
anything bad … I mean, I don’t drink, I am not performing on stage 
half naked, I try to portray a positive image of us, so then they have 
to understand it a little bit, actually, I think.” 
Significantly, Chadia does not intend to go on singing for the rest of 
her life. Dutch-Moroccan youth, when justifying their visits to dance 
parties, often talk about “becoming serious when they are older.” This 
notion of “becoming serious”4 refers to the idea that, even though one 
might not perform all Islamic duties when one is still young, but one is 
Whether music and performance are 
permissible in Islam remains a legally 
and theologically controversial topic. 
Many Islamic scholars do not claim 
that music, singing, and performance 
are forbidden per se, but put restric-
tions on the kind of music, its lyrics, the 
audience, and the social environment. 
These restrictions often stem from 
associations that are envisioned be-
tween music and all kinds of immoral, 
un-Islamic qualities, such as infidel-
ity, adultery, and idolatry. Additionally, 
social contexts in which music is per-
formed are often associated with gender mixing, flirtatious behaviour 
between the sexes, alcohol, and drug abuse. What determines if music 
and performance are to be considered haram or halal is whether there 
is a tangible danger of Islamic norms – regarding gender segregation, 
the respectability of the performers and their audience, and the occur-
rence of illicit activities – being transgressed. 
The position of female artists in many Muslim communities is ambiv-
alent and often controversial. Whereas male performers are considered 
to make a living for their family, women performers are often put in the 
same category as prostitutes because they use their sexual bodies to 
seduce audiences and make money. My fieldwork research shows the 
prevalence of these ideas among the Dutch-Mo-
roccan community and that even parents do not 
approve of such career choices for their daugh-
ters. The stories of two female Dutch-Moroccan 
performers, Chadia and Farida,1 demonstrate that 
the discourse that considers female performers as 
immoral and un-Islamic greatly impacts the way 
they present themselves to their audiences. 
Coping strategies
Chadia and Farida manage their female, Mus-
lim, Moroccan, and artistic identities each in her 
own specific way. They adopt different strategies 
to harmonize these identities and their, some-
times, contradictory significances. Both strive for 
acceptance by the Dutch Moroccan community 
and their social environment and to gain respect-
ability as female artists. 
Chadia, born in the Netherlands, has been per-
forming since the age of twelve. Her music is a 
mix of Arab and western styles, which she herself 
calls “oriental R&B.” Farida, a youth worker in her thirties, was born in a 
small town in Morocco but has lived in the Netherlands since age three. 
She is a semi-professional lead vocalist in an ethnically mixed band. 
Both Chadia and Farida do not wear headscarves. 
Both of these talented artists have to find ways, albeit different, to 
deal with the negative image of female singers among the Dutch Mo-
roccan community: their morality and authenticity as Muslima is put to 
question in discussion forums on the Internet or in random conversa-
tions and rumours. 
Chadia, bint el-bled
Chadia is pre-occupied with her self-portrayal as a decent, proper, 
and respectable artist. She tries to carry over as a “nice girl,” i.e. does not 
drink alcohol, wear revealing clothes, or socialize with men and people 
who are associated with alcohol or drugs. Chadia refers to this image as 
being a bint el-bled, literally “country girl.” 
Chadia: “I hear it a lot, people telling me that I am normal and that I’ve 
just got what Morocco needs. They often say: bint el-bled, that’s what 
they always say. And that is really nice to hear. And it doesn’t have to 
be all revealing and open, for all to see [i.e. sexy clothes].”2
The expression bint el-bled is commonly used in North Africa. In the 
In a Dutch-Moroccan community which often 
casts music as immoral, illicit, or inappropriate, 
female musicians in particular struggle to 
legitimize their morality and authenticity as 
Muslims. This article explores the divergent 
strategies through which two female Dutch-
Moroccan artists negotiate their identities as 
Moroccan, Muslim artists, whether by seeking 
acceptance or by flagrantly transgressing 
norms. Whatever the case, the private and 
public lives of the artists are best understood 
in light of a normative public discourse which 
disapproves of their work.
Good Girls & rebels
m i r i A m  G A Z Z A h
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Chadia is pre-
occupied with her 
self-portrayal as 
a decent, proper, 
and respectable 
artist.
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expected to start doing so as one gets older, often meaning 
from the moment one gets married. Youth is then considered 
a stage of life in which you are suspended from certain social 
and religious duties. As social-cultural norms are inherently 
linked to religious norms, conforming to social expectations 
also enhances ones religious status. Being a “good Moroc-
can,” also implicitly implies “being a good Muslim.” Hence, 
the two cannot be truly separated. 
Chadia’s story corresponds to this holding off of religious 
duties, in particular the postponement of marriage and the 
starting of a family, which is expected from a woman in her 
twenties. Chadia, however, plans to fulfil this duty in the fu-
ture, when she is finished with her musical career which, she 
admits, is seen by many of her community as a reprehensible 
vocation. 
Identifying with Islam is important for Chadia, in so far as 
Islam provides her with some moral guidelines as to whom 
she can talk to, what to wear, and what to sing about. Her 
Muslim identity seems to be based not so much on an Is-
lamic spirituality, but on socio-cultural Moroccan-Islamic 
rules and norms, in which Moroccanness and Muslimness 
are intimately linked. 
Farida, the rebel
Farida is not afraid to be different from other Dutch Moroccans and 
cross boundaries. Her story shows how she tries to maintain her Mo-
roccan and Islamic identities, while at the same time putting forward 
a very strong individual, artistic, female identity disconnected from so-
cial, cultural, and religious boundaries. Farida deals with issues of social 
control, maintaining a good reputation, and gender ideology in a very 
different way from Chadia. Farida is not at all concerned with the kind 
of reputation she has among the Dutch-Moroccan community:  
“The Moroccans over here, in the Netherlands, really, I find them so 
strange. In Morocco, it is just normal, much more relaxed; the whole 
family asking me when the CD will be finished and when I will be 
performing again …”
MG: “What about the reactions you get here in the Netherlands?”
Farida: “Oh, we’ve got so many reactions: one of them was that peo-
ple said that we were possessed [by demons]. Yes, really! So many 
gossip stories, yeah, the rumour mill … I am just infamous here in my 
town … But I have always done what I wanted to do, and you guys, 
you just do what you wanna do.”5 
Accordingly, Farida is not bothered by other people’s opinions and 
does not succumb to the pressure to measure up to Dutch-Moroccan 
cultural norms. Her family‘s non-involvement in her musical career also 
enables Farida to maintain this individual approach. One that becomes 
particularly clear when she speaks about the future plans of the band: 
“Well, I would like to do this for the rest of my life. When I talk about 
this to my mother she says: ‘Well you cannot do this your whole life, 
because then you will never find a partner.’ Then I say: ‘Well, then that 
is just bad luck!’… I would never stop [singing] because of a man! 
My mom says that I pay the price for that now, because I am still by 
myself … But she is just concerned for me … I mean, you should just 
have the freedom, also within a relationship, to do what you like, to 
be creative.” 
Evidently, Farida’s mother prefers her daughter to get married and end 
her musical career. However, by saying that Farida will not get married 
as long as she makes music, her mother is not judging the religious per-
missibility of her status as an artist, but is simply acknowledging that 
female artists are looked down upon. Her mother fears that the Dutch-
Moroccan community would consider Farida a “bad Moroccan and a 
bad Muslima.” Nevertheless, Farida is not planning to comply with her 
mothers’ expectations.  
Thus, like Chadia, Farida has to deal with the bad reputation of female 
performers. Whereas Chadia tries to keep these associations away from 
her by literally distancing herself from people and spaces linked to 
these associations (alcohol, drugs, and sex), Farida is not afraid to con-
front these issues. 
“People can get the wrong impression when they see you perform. 
It is my passion [performing], but in real life I don’t like the nightlife 
at all. I’d rather go to the theatre or to the movies, instead of spend-
ing an evening in a sweaty, smoky space, with people bumping into 
you, throwing beer over you, and making stupid remarks: ‘Wesh inti 
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maghrebiyya? [Are you Moroccan?]. In the beginning, I used to an-
swer them politely, but after a while it really started to get on my 
nerves … I used to go to rai parties, but once you’ve been there, then 
you immediately get labelled ‘a whore.’ It gave boys the right to come 
up to you and talk to you, while I just wanted to enjoy the artist’s 
performance …” 
Farida is not afraid to attend these socially reprehensible occasions, 
even though she has been through some bad experiences. Although 
Farida totally rejects the dominant discourse that frowns upon female 
performers and all of its negative associations, she cannot escape being 
confronted by it or dealing with it. 
Dutch-Moroccan female singers are constantly subjected to a dis-
course stating or at least suggesting their low status and questioning 
their integrity as Muslimas. This discourse is based on religious image-
ry, which is in turn intrinsically linked to socio-cultural norms of the 
Dutch-Moroccan community that brackets “Moroccanness” together 
with “Muslimness.” This leads to alternative ways to achieve legitimacy 
and respectability by Dutch-Moroccan female singers. They use strate-
gies such as conformism or individualism in order to overcome the ob-
stacles and ambivalences with which they are confronted. The choices 
they make in their professional and private lives in order to justify their 
career and to strive for acceptance as singers need to be understood 
within the context of the normative discourse that disapproves of fe-
male singers.
Notes
1. These are fictive names.
2. Quotations are taken from my interview 
with Chadia, 23 November 2004. 
3. The expression Bint el-bled has a prominent 
place in the rai music subculture and its 
song lyric repertoire as well. In many songs 
the male rai singer expresses his preference 
for a bint el-bled over a gaouria (female 
foreigner), because of her “authenticity and 
respectfulness.”
4. Dutch: serieus worden.
5. Quotations are taken from my interview 
with Farida, 7 June 2005.
Not available online
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Prophet Muhammad to show that God 
is the source of all art and beauty, that 
the Prophet valued the arts, and that 
the arts – including the visual image, 
poetry, and music – have been among 
the most effective tools of spreading Is-
lam’s message.  This, he says, is because 
Islam, through the Quran, “cultivates 
the sense of beauty” in human hearts. 
Masoud makes similar points by rely-
ing on a hadith that has been used for centuries to give credence to art: 
“God is beautiful and loves beauty.”  Masoud defines art as the “ability 
to express a particular beauty that God makes visible in our hearts; a 
specific beauty that our Lord showed us and with which He has guided 
us.”  Thus, both preachers argue that because God is the original Crea-
tor of all things beautiful in the universe, and because beauty has the 
power to move the heart, then engaging with art not only shows ap-
preciation for God’s work, but, in Masoud’s words, helps us “remember 
God.”  Art, then, is conceptually likened to dhikr, that important act of 
remembering God in Islam.  This relationship between beauty, art, the 
heart, and remembrance of God has been a key element of Sufi phi-
losophy for centuries.
Masoud also makes the very significant claim that art is a fard (obliga-
tion) for Muslims.  In his view, to deny art is to deny God, because art 
is a reflection of God.  Furthermore, God endowed some humans with 
artistic talent, and therefore to reject art-making is to deny God’s gift. 
Not only that, he says, but artists are compelled to use that talent to 
remind others of God.  Art is an adah (tool) that artists can use to move 
hearts in the right direction, especially in these times.  Herein lies an-
other central reason for Masoud’s insistence on art that again has roots 
within the Islamic discursive tradition.  Because art has a special capac-
ity to enter the heart and move it, immoral things made today that “are 
called art” can also enter the heart and move it toward illicit shahawat 
(desires).  Therefore, beautiful art is needed now to help people reject 
these dangerous, impostor forms of art, and to remind people of God’s 
beauty.  
State actors draw on some of the same Islamic texts as the preach-
ers, but also highlight European Enlightenment and Nasserist/socialist 
discursive sources.  In so doing, they seek to create different kinds of 
subjects and communities.  The hadith quoted by Masoud has been 
especially favoured in modern Egyptian state contexts.  For example, 
it is frequently used by state visual art college imams and professors 
trying to set concerned Muslim students at ease so that they can learn 
art in order to build the nation; and it is quoted by graduates and prac-
ticing artists when trying to convince religious sceptics of their artistic 
practice.  Sufi philosophy is also the main source of Islamic inspiration 
for artistic practice, though there are non-religious sources which are 
more prominent.  But in state contexts, art is only rarely presented as a 
way to come closer to and remember God, or to move the heart away 
from illicit desires.  Rather, it is presented as a way to express individu-
ality and Egyptian identity.  Khaled and Masoud seek to create proper 
Muslim artists, while the state seeks to create secular-national artists. 
Art to build community
The preachers do share with state actors the view that art is an es-
pecially helpful tool for building a cultured community.  Yet although 
both preachers speak positively of national communities – Masoud 
Purposeful Art 
Between Television Preachers
and the State
J e S S i C A  W i n e G A r In the early 1990s, the Egyptian gov-
ernment began allotting millions of 
pounds to art projects in the cultural 
sector whose goals included creating 
a modern national culture, uplifting 
Egyptians’ cultural level, and counter-
ing what many officials viewed as a 
rising threat to state secularism com-
ing from both Islamism and the Is-
lamic Revival in general. In the 2000s, 
two popular new television preachers, Amr Khaled and Moez Masoud, 
began encouraging the production of al-fann al-hadif (purposeful art) 
to bring Muslims closer to God, build the ummah, raise its cultural level, 
and counter the threat of immorality and identity loss seen to come 
from globalization and secularization.1 This coinciding interest in art as 
a tool to achieve certain ends suggests an overlapping of state and re-
ligious projects that warrants closer scrutiny.  On 
the one hand, both the preachers and some state 
actors are reinvigorating ideas about art from the 
Islamic discursive tradition, but often to different 
ends. On the other hand, the similarities between 
these two groups suggest an overlap of the civi-
lizing impulses of both state secularism and Islam. 
To lay groundwork for future research in this vein, 
more direct attention needs to be paid to the 
preachers’ actual lectures on art.2   
Art as vital to Islam
Khaled and Masoud have been at the forefront 
of changing the dominant discourse on art in the 
Islamic Revival, which previously focused on art’s 
negative aspects and effects.  Khaled targets art as 
a central field for revival in his popular Life Makers 
project, begun in 2004, to spur Muslims to under-
take development works to revitalize Islam and 
their communities.  As a result, Internet “teams” 
have formed devoted to developing aspects of 
the arts in different countries.  Meanwhile, Moez 
Masoud lectured extensively on art in his 2007 
Ramadan programme The Right Path and is build-
ing an “Artistic Corner” on his website.  Khaled and 
Masoud not only provide audiences with a means 
to reconcile religious belief with certain kinds of 
art (e.g., painting, sculpture, music, film, literature); they also urge them 
to see art as central to their religious practice.  Both start by arguing 
that there is no contradiction between art and Islam.  Here they are ad-
dressing potential audience concerns, drawn from parts of the Islamic 
discursive tradition, especially as disseminated by other prominent re-
ligious figures such as the late Shaykh Shaarawi, that certain forms of 
art might encourage immoral behaviour, idolatry, or the vain imitation 
of God’s creation.  Yet they draw on other parts of that same tradition 
to do so; they argue that art constitutes a longstanding means within 
Islam to come closer to God and to build the ummah.
Both Khaled and Masoud tell their audiences that art is vital to Islam – 
not only because God’s creation is art, but also because it is through ex-
periencing art (an earthly reflection of God’s beauty) that humans get 
closer to God.  Khaled invokes Quranic verses and various deeds of the 
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… the preachers 
…, like the 
secularist state 
elites, also seek to 
correct a population 
considered to be 
largely “ignorant” of 
the value of art.
For two of the most popular Egyptian television 
preachers, Amr Khaled and Moez Masoud, art 
is central to the project of Islamic Revival. For 
them, art is a special means of bringing people 
closer to God, making them more cultured, and 
building the ummah. The author argues that, 
intriguingly, their focus on art overlaps with 
that of the Egyptian state’s nation-building 
and civilizing art projects.
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museums and exhibitions of fine art 
and paintings?!” and then offers Lon-
don’s Hyde Park as an exemplar of high 
art for the public, he uses a rhetorical 
strategy that has characterized state 
press calls for raising the cultural level 
of the nation for two decades.  For both 
preachers and state arts officials, west-
ern art and institutions are something 
whose level (when ethical) should be 
emulated in building community, but 
whose features should not be imitat-
ed.  Yet for state actors, art must avoid 
western imitation in order for it to give 
a distinctive identity to the Egyptian 
nation; whereas for the preachers, art 
must do so in order to give defining 
characteristics to the ummah.
A new art and culture?
The preachers’ positive approach to 
art should not be understood as entire-
ly new, then, but rather as a reinvigora-
tion of earlier Islamic discourses on art, 
including those from the turn-of-the-
century Nahda movement in Egypt, 
and perhaps also as a recurrence of 
some Nasser-era developmentalist ap-
proaches to art and culture.  Yet the fact 
that both the Egyptian government’s 
and lay preachers’ interests in the arts 
coincide today demands that we con-
sider the significance of the relation-
ship between the two.  The appear-
ance of a positive preacher focus on art 
some ten years after the beginning of 
a concerted government effort to sup-
port art and culture projects suggests 
some areas of influence, particularly 
since these preachers and their core 
constituency of fans are from the same 
urban, educated, upper middle classes 
as those who visit arts institutions and 
attend state-sponsored arts events.  On 
the one hand, the preachers’ projects 
could be understood as a specific attempt to counteract the Mubarak 
government’s project to secularize society in large measure through 
the arts, by opening a space to define artists as “Muslim,” and culture as 
“Islamic,” rather than (or instead of ) just “Egyptian.”  On the other hand, 
the preachers could be understood as operating in tandem with the 
state’s civilizing mission through art. It is clear that the preachers see a 
need for Islamic “high” art and culture, yet the category of art as they 
have defined it thus far differs little from that promoted by state pro-
grammes.  Furthermore, they, like state elites, call for art at the same 
time that they denounce violent acts perpetrated 
by Muslims as “misunderstandings” of Islam.  Both 
groups’ notions of progress rest on a cultural hier-
archy that privileges the styles and knowledges 
of their shared social backgrounds.  And although 
the preachers seek primarily to edify the ummah, 
they, like the secularist state elites, also seek to 
correct a population considered to be largely “ig-
norant” of the value of art. 
argues that Muslims need not give up love for the watan 
(nation) when they come closer to God, and Khaled’s Life 
Makers’ projects are also oriented to fixing situations in in-
dividual countries – it is more the Islamic ummah to which 
they refer. Khaled develops this idea the most.  He makes 
the significant claim that art is the most dangerous field of 
the twenty three he targets for al-Nahda (revival), but not 
for the commonly expected reason.  Spending little time 
on the question of immorality, he tells them that it is “igno-
rant” to think that art is shameful.  He then goes on at length 
defining culture as that related to (1) education and high/
literate arts (“books, theatre, cinema, poetry, novels, muse-
ums, monuments, old manuscripts, painting, sculpture, plas-
tic arts, acting, and songs”); and (2) “the malamih (defining 
features) of the ummah.”  He links both by arguing that art 
is a primary means for giving the ummah defining features 
of quality, instead of cheap importations of western artis-
tic features (e.g., western images in video clips, Turkish and 
western musical forms).  
Several times he returns to his central point: the Nahda 
cannot proceed without first having art “pave the way.” 
In sum, if a central goal of the awakening is to build the 
ummah, then to succeed the ummah needs to have defining features, 
or art that gives the Islamic community its unique visual, aural, and lit-
erary identity.  Only artists can provide this, but currently many are imi-
tating western art.  By reminding them of the potential consequences 
of their actions on Judgment Day, Khaled intends to draw all artists 
closer to Islam, as well as to implore them to use their God-given talent 
for a larger cause.  He is also asking his audience to help him reach art-
ists, telling them: “We will not be able to carry out the Nahda” without 
art.  Similarly, Masoud makes the eradication of western imitation and 
building an Islamic identity one of the three core goals of his television 
show The Right Path.
The way that these preachers, especially Khaled, discuss art as a tool 
of progress and ummah-building bears similarities to that of Islamic 
scholars of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century al-Nahda move-
ment (e.g., Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh). Like these 
scholars, the preachers seek to revitalize Islam for a modern project 
and rely on the Islamic discursive tradition to do so.  Their ultimate goal 
is to create a modern and cultured Islamic ummah, filled with art-ap-
preciating Muslims.  Yet Khaled’s positive reference to arts and culture 
in 1950s Egypt compels us to consider the influence on preachers of 
Nasser-era cultural development discourses, which still proliferate in 
the state cultural sectors today.  Indeed, Khaled’s emphases on build-
ing institutions of high art and culture, on combating the “ignorance” 
of those with low cultural levels who do not understand the benefits 
of art, and on preserving and defining identity in the face of western 
influence are exactly those emphases of state elites today, with the im-
portant exception that the main identity with which he is concerned 
is an Islamic one.  Furthermore, when Khaled exclaims, “where are the 
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Notes
1. For more on the art and artists influenced 
by this phenomenon, see the articles by 
Patricia Kubala and Karin van Nieuwkerk in 
ISIM Review, no. 20 (Fall 2007), and Karim 
Tartoussieh, “Pious Stardom: Cinema and the 
Islamic Revival in Egypt,” Arab Studies Journal 
15, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 30–43.
2. For more on state arts projects as discussed 
here see Jessica Winegar, Creative 
Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture 
in Contemporary Egypt  (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2006).
[The] ultimate 
goal is to create 
a modern and 
cultured Islamic 
ummah, filled with 
art-appreciating 
Muslims.
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Between two fires
These two groups of critics level 
charges at Al-Huda and Hashmi that 
seem to be mirror opposites of each 
other. The ulama find her lacking in 
qualifications that would equip her to 
interpret core religious texts and re-
ject her innovative pedagogical style 
on the basis of its rupture with tradi-
tional modes of learning. They are also 
horrified by the elevation of women 
to visible public roles as teachers and 
preachers of Islam. By casting doubts on the education Hashmi herself 
has received in the West, they go so far as to portray her as an agent 
of vested interests rooted in a western secular liberal ideology and her 
movement as a conspiracy to distort Islam so as to lure true believers 
away from religion. In their evaluation of the group’s practices, views 
and aims, the traditionalist ulama find it to be too modern. 
On the other hand, the second group of critics claims that Al-Hu-
da’s “brand of Islam is as retrogressive as the mullahs, but because 
she [i.e. Hashmi] is educated, speaks out against the religious right 
and is a woman, other women find her teachings more acceptable 
and legitimate.”1 In the English-language media and in conversations 
amongst the Pakistani intelligentsia, the movement is regularly de-
scribed using epithets like “reactionary,” “dogmatic,” “fundamentalist,” 
“conservative,” “anti-feminist,” and lambasted for being out of tune 
with the needs of contemporary women. In other words, they find 
it to be not modern enough. They have their own version of a con-
spiracy theory to explain Al-Huda’s rise, claiming that Hashmi “epito-
mizes hard-core, doctrinaire orthodoxy – a worldview which appears 
to be gaining strength as a result of ambitious funding from certain 
quasi-governmental organizations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.”2 
These contradictory evaluations of Al-Huda by different groups of out-
siders speak of a more general ambivalence about how the group ought 
to be categorized. The familiar dichotomies between the traditional vs. 
the modern, conservative vs. progressive, and above all between fun-
damentalist/ religious vs. secular/liberal are unsettled when applied to 
this particular women’s movement. This confusion is visible in such re-
ports: “Now at social gatherings, women wearing the hijab are increas-
ingly seen alongside those in sleeveless dresses. With religion the new 
’in’ thing, it is questionable who is now the modern woman.”3 
Religious expertise and contested credentials
The ulama in Pakistan have been vociferous in their attacks on Farhat 
Hashmi and her credentials, as well as on the credibility of the entire 
enterprise she has launched. They argue that she has not been through 
the eight-year course of education that a religious scholar traditionally 
has to go through in South Asian Islam. Further, her higher education 
credentials are of doubtful merit in the eyes of the ulama for having 
been acquired in a western university under the supervision of non-
Muslims who themselves are not qualified for Quranic interpretation. 
For the ulama, she clearly does not have the authority or capability to 
interpret and comment on the canonical religious texts of Islam. Her 
students, having received one or two years of Islamic education at Al-
Huda, are not seen as being equipped to teach the Quran either. 
Many ulama from prominent Islamic schools in Pakistan have issued 
fatwas (formal opinions) on the work being carried out at Al-Huda, in 
Al-huda & its Critics
Religious Education
for Pakistani Women
f A i Z A  m u S h t A q The Al-Huda International Institute of 
Islamic Education for Women started as 
a small religious academy for women 
in Islamabad in 1994. Since then it has 
mushroomed into a well-organized 
movement with branches in large and 
small cities all across Pakistan, and 
now abroad as well. Dr. Farhat Hashmi, 
its founder and leader, has become a 
household name through her lecture 
tours, radio show, books, and cassettes. 
The primary activity Al-Huda offers is 
education in religious subjects that is intended to supplement rather 
than replace secular academic credentials, and by now thousands of 
Pakistani women have passed through these training courses. Hashmi 
herself is not a traditionally trained scholar but has a Ph.D. in Islamic 
Studies from Glasgow University.
The women of Al-Huda belong to the urban educated classes in Pa-
kistan and span all age ranges. Many graduates from the school go on 
to serve as teachers and organizers of new branches, as well as con-
ducting informal gatherings at private residences where women can 
be present in large numbers. The opportunities for congregation and 
leadership roles that are provided to women are new for many, as is the 
chance to study the Quran collectively and not just alone at home. Ear-
lier initiatives at offering religious instruction for Pakistani women have 
either tended to remain informal and localized, or have been subsidi-
ary units of larger male-run madrasas catering mostly to lower socio-
economic classes. Al-Huda’s education is distinctive in this context as it 
gives women the tools to approach, understand, and actively engage 
with the religious texts and also puts this learning at the service of a 
broader moral vision of character training and social reform. 
This education takes the form of rigorous one-and-a-half year diplo-
ma courses, less intensive certificate courses, programmes for children 
and for teenagers, short courses during summer, and in the special 
months of the Islamic calendar. All of them share a basic format and 
teaching philosophy. The main emphasis is on study of the Quran in 
three ways: a) Arabic recitation and listening; b) literal, word for word 
translation to memorize the basic vocabulary; and c) in-depth con-
textual explanation of each verse that also relates it to contemporary, 
practical concerns. Different courses include a mix of other subjects 
that supplement this core of Quranic study.
Hashmi’s followers explain her appeal by referring to her prowess as 
a teacher, her ability to communicate fluently in English, Urdu, and Ara-
bic, her logical building of arguments where she identifies the source of 
each opinion rather than invoking blind trust, and her devotion to her 
work. However she has attracted much criticism and controversy that 
has snowballed alongside her fame and the increasing visibility of her 
followers. Her critics come in various stripes but can be grouped into two 
categories. One is centred around the male scholars of Islam, or ulama, 
who have traditionally been the interpreters of religion and who perceive 
Hashmi and her brand of religious education as posing an alternative 
power structure and a challenge to their own authority. The other is a 
looser grouping of men and women who identify themselves as belong-
ing to the secular, liberal, educated segments of Pakistani society which 
include feminist and human rights activists, professionals, and members 
of the intelligentsia, who see the increasing presence of religion in public 
life as a threat to their progressive worldview and lifestyles.  
Organizations & Activism
In the past decade Pakistan has witnessed the 
emergence of Al-Huda, an institute offering 
religious education to women. Its popularity 
is greeted with hostile scepticism by many in 
Pakistan. Male religious scholars, feminists, and 
the mainstream media are amongst those who 
disagree with the practices of these women 
and their vision of moral reform. The author 
argues that by introducing women in new roles 
Al-Huda disrupts traditional structures for 
transmitting religious learning.
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obligations and restrictive practices for women, leaving some scope 
for flexibility and contextual understanding, but does not offer a thor-
oughgoing critique of existing gender relations or contentious Quranic 
verses in her lectures. She does, however, keep repeating a passion-
ate call for women to gain a well-rounded education, while many of 
her students and alumni pursue educational and professional careers. 
Al-Huda participants do not necessarily see themselves as making a 
choice between their spiritual and moral awakening, on the one hand, 
and their participation in the public sphere, on the other. Hashmi her-
self says: “Although I believe that the woman is in charge of the do-
mestic arena, I don’t think it should limit you as a productive member 
of society … For example, every human being has the responsibility 
to educate themselves and others … We don’t have time to spend in 
trivial pastimes.”8
Hashmi occasionally refers to herself as an “Islamic feminist,” and both 
terms in the label are contested by outsiders. Al-Huda is positioned to 
offer an alternative to the two extremes that flourished during the re-
gime of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980’s – the state-sanctioned, male-
dominated, and orthodox version of Islam and the stridently secular 
feminism of its opponents in the women’s movement – while selec-
tively utilizing elements of both. Hashmi and her followers emerged 
against the backdrop of improved access to higher education, mobility, 
and employment for urban women, and the absence of opportunities 
for women in mainstream Islamic institutions in Pakistan. The activism 
of Al-Huda participants is driven by moral concerns, and their enter-
prise of Islamic education reflexively links the goals of personal and so-
cial transformation. The most significant impact 
of the movement, however, might lie in its disrup-
tion of traditional structures and authorities for 
transmitting religious learning, by the introduc-
tion of women in these new roles.
response to questions and concerns raised by members of 
the public. In rejecting Hashmi’s authority they explicitly in-
voke the weight of their own qualifications and the historical 
evolution of their own role as guardians of the sacred knowl-
edge. Moreover, they see themselves as being comparable to 
specialists in other fields such as lawyers and doctors. They 
claim her approach assumes that the text of the Quran can 
be understood and interpreted only through translation, as 
if there is a direct correspondence of meaning to words, and 
dismisses the technicalities involved in Islamic law and the-
ology, and ignores the depth of issues and the evolution of 
scholarly opinions, debates, and consensus. By chucking out 
1400 years of intellectual history, she wants to turn religion 
into a matter of convenience and expediency. On the other 
hand, her lay critics argue that Hashmi’s “interpretation is 
dogmatic, fails to recognize the essential flexibility of Islam 
and that she is engaged more in developing a cult than en-
couraging a true understanding of religion.”4
Most of those who have been involved with the group grew 
up having read the Quran and being exposed to the basic 
teachings of Islam, and few of them doubt the religiosity of 
their mothers and grandmothers. Yet all agree that they have 
been introduced to something new through Al-Huda classes, 
i.e. a better, more powerful way of understanding the Quran. Instead 
of rote memorization, they learn to appreciate the Arabic language of 
the text, the significance of each verse and its relation to history and 
context, and what relevant personal meaning to extract from it. Simi-
larly, in her own statements, all Hashmi takes credit for is unlocking the 
power of the text for her students. She emphasizes the need to make 
the Quran approachable and relevant to all lives, and not let it remain 
only the subject of specialized discourses. The difference between her 
approach and that of the ulama is noted by enthusiastic participants: “I 
always wanted to study Islam in greater depth but balked when hearing 
the mullahs talk of heaven and hell and the purdah (veil)… It [Al-Huda’s] 
is a very practical, very precise version of Islam.”5 
Class and gender concerns
One of the most frequent criticisms of Al-Huda is that it targets 
women from the well-to-do urban upper and middle classes, and con-
sequently the newfound religiosity of these women can be suspected 
and brushed aside as a short-lived fad. One of the ulama scornfully 
points out that “they book expensive halls in the hotels and clubs of the 
big cities, where fashionable women congregate in the name of attend-
ing a dars-e-Quran.”6 Media reports are full of comments like: “These 
women spend hours at these religious sermons and could well spend 
that time doing some positive social work” … “It is also a cleansing 
issue. Many amongst our elite are corrupt to the bone. So the women 
of these houses now want to cleanse themselves.”7 This assumption 
blinds the critics to the full array of activities and membership that in 
fact characterize the group and limits the scope of public attention to 
their most visible, high-profile converts and events. Wealthy elites con-
tinue to be important in the organization’s expansion but a lot of the 
growth has come from middle-class urban neighbourhoods, and regu-
lar courses attract a diverse composition of enrolled students.
The ulama in Pakistan disagree especially strongly with Hashmi’s in-
terpretation of Islamic custom which states that women are allowed 
to go and pray at a mosque rather than in the privacy of their homes, 
and condemn her for not displaying appropriate modesty herself by 
appearing on the media and travelling internationally. On the other 
hand, the feminist and secular-liberal critics are disturbed by her and 
her followers’ conservatism, especially their practice of veiling them-
selves, and of not questioning unequal gender roles within the fam-
ily and community. They decry the conservative interpretations of the 
Quran and the unquestioning acceptance of the group leader’s views 
that these classes offer, as well as the confinement of these women to 
their roles as compliant housewives. 
Activism
Al-Huda’s innovations as a religious movement lie more in its or-
ganizational practices and teaching methods than in its interpretive 
strategies, and much of Hashmi’s intellectual output is based on con-
ventional sources and reformist critiques of Islam. She challenges the 
more orthodox teachings of male Pakistani scholars on issues like ritual 
Organizations & Activism
Inside an 
Al-Huda 
classroom
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Women's 
meeting at 
Ettaouhid
applying that to day-to-day activities 
as well. The spiritual equality of men 
and women, central to this true Islam, 
forms the basis on which the women 
proclaim equal worthiness of men and 
women, Muslims and non-Muslims 
within Dutch society. Through activi-
ties in which they link up religious ideas 
and ideals with actual, social matters, 
they strive for equal treatment of Mus-
lim women by their husbands, families, 
and the Dutch Muslim community, and 
press for more knowledge and a more 
positive image of Islam and (Moroc-
can) Muslims within society as a whole. Faizah, trainer with SMACCV, a 
cultural centre for Dutch-Moroccan women on women’s rights and the 
Quran, claims that: 
“Muslim women should not stop working or studying when they get 
married, because they are expected to take care of the children … I 
want these women to participate … Knowledge and development, 
and striving for an objective in life, these are obligations in Islam! 
Muslim women in the Netherlands should first of all realise the im-
portance of language, study and education.”
Self-development
These women experienced certain personal developments upon be-
coming practising Muslims. Notably, their outlook on the hijab, which 
most of them only recently started wearing. Badiah started to wear a 
headscarf, after she had been married for quite a while, and stresses 
that this had nothing to do with the views of her parents or her hus-
band. Zaineb just started wearing Islamic clothing and the hijab from 
one day to the next. Like Halima, she remarks she always paid a lot of 
attention to how she looked and was particularly proud of her hair; 
one night, however, she dreamed she was standing before God, woke 
up sweating, and decided that veiling was her individual spiritual re-
sponsibility and necessity. Some of the women describe these devel-
opments as a gradual, step-by-step and greatly unconscious transition. 
Others, like Zaineb, seem to have made a very conscious and radical 
change.
Fundamental to their decisions, these women explain, is the devel-
opment of a new spiritual consciousness. They say they had “missed 
something” in their lives, had not felt “completely themselves” and were 
more like “roaming.” Selma and Leila explain their attitude to veiling: 
“you have to wear the hijab but only if you personally want to do so and 
feel the need in your heart; you have to have the right intention other-
wise your wearing it will have no meaning”; while Raouda adds, “many 
Moroccan women wear this on cultural grounds nowadays, without re-
alizing the spiritual and religious purpose of getting close to God, and 
this is wrong.” Contrary to many Dutch Muslims who proclaim belief in 
or with their heart, those women state that “to practice completely and 
be a good and true Muslim you have to show your belief to the world 
around you and act accordingly.”
These women volunteer for good deeds to obtain extra religious 
merit and gain spiritual closeness. A few years ago, around the time 
Leila started wearing the hijab, both she and Selma decided not to 
shake hands with men any more. Selma even considers discontinu-
ing her studies, because she feels uncomfortable working as a Muslim 
religious Conviction 
& Social Activism
Muslim Women in Rotterdam
h A n n A h  l e y e r Z A P f Leila by now knows more about Islam 
than her parents. Together with Selma 
she studies classical Arabic, so that they 
can read the Quran for themselves. 
Selma has a Turkish background and 
is the only woman in her family who 
goes to the mosque for prayer. A few 
years back, Halima took a radical deci-
sion. She “gave up her job and house,” 
and broke off her engagement, started 
anew and became a conscious and 
practising Muslim. On Sundays, these 
three students – Halima studies social 
welfare, Selma architecture, and Leila 
education – attend the sermons in the mosque Dar al-Hijra given by 
imam Adil, a young history student, whose voice 
is so “beautiful and gripping.” Four other women, 
Faizah, Hafsa, Badiah, and Raouda, recently started 
studying again as well, wanting to set an example 
for other Muslim women. They had married, had 
children, and then started doing voluntary work. 
Now they form the women’s commission of the 
“social-cultural organization Ettaouhid” and want 
to make Muslim women conscious of their abili-
ties to develop themselves within Islam.  
Their life stories illustrate the choices and views 
of several Dutch-Moroccan women, who are ac-
tive in Rotterdam as teachers and organizers in 
local associations and whose inner religious conviction, self-develop-
ment, social responsibility, and engagement seemed to be connected. 
They are consciously participating as Muslim women in society as an 
expression of their true belief in personal responsibility and Islamic du-
ties and virtues, and as ways of getting closer to God. For them, being 
a good Muslim not only comprises a true and just inner conviction, but 
Organizations & Activism
This article considers the connections between 
internal religious commitment and social 
activism through the life stories of Dutch-
Moroccan women vigorously promoting 
gender equality in their communities. For 
these women, religious commitment spills 
outwards from personal conviction into 
physical demonstrations of religiosity, personal 
development, and consciousness raising. 
It is their individual identity as Muslims, 
and not their Moroccan or Dutch heritage, 
which determines the ways these women 
participate in Dutch public life.
“We want 
emancipation and 
development from 
within Islam.”
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difficulty finding jobs because of their religion and 
background. Zaineb, teacher in Rotterdam, tells 
about her recurring problems arranging intern-
ships for her students; companies admit to her 
over the telephone, not to accept someone with 
a Moroccan name and wearing the headscarf, not 
realizing that Zaineb, who has an explicit Rotter-
dam accent, was born in Morocco and wears hijab 
too. According to the women, non-acceptance by 
Dutch non-Muslim society has slowly increased 
after September 11 and the murder of Theo van 
Gogh. Moreover, Badiah remarks it especially af-
fects the younger generation of migrants, “ironi-
cally those who just don’t know better than to be 
Dutch.” Emotionally she adds: 
“In the last years you feel it [being discriminat-
ed against] very explicitly and then you think: 
should I go back? I never felt it but my children, 
they feel it now … and that’s bizarre!… where 
does this lead to? Because we try to integrate as much as possible 
and to my feeling we are  – while keeping our own identity! … And 
still you have to prove yourself every time, do your children have to 
prove themselves every time?”
Feeling neither fully included within Dutch national identity nor a Mo-
roccan one, these women say they feel “first and foremost” Muslim. 
Indeed, being practising Muslims is the only way they can be “truly 
themselves.” It forms an alternative to being Dutch and native (autoch-
tonous), or Moroccan and foreign (allochtonous); identities all of which 
do not fit or suffice them. Badiah explains: “because we don’t feel we 
are ór Dutch ór Moroccan … but we just don’t belong with anything 
… So those youths went looking for themselves – I don’t belong here, 
I don’t belong there. Where can I hold on to?! – To being a Muslim, be-
cause that’s an identity, because then I can say that is truly mine …”
For these women, being a good Muslim involves both an internal, 
spiritual conviction and a publicly visible commitment to social action. 
This action, directed at improving the lives of Muslim women in the 
Netherlands, is inspired by the strength and nature of their internal 
commitment to a “true“ Islam. They expand their spiritual conscious-
ness beyond an internal faith and into physical demonstrations of re-
ligiosity, personal development, social action among Muslim women, 
and consciousness raising among the broader Dutch public. In each of 
these cases the women return to their religious belief as the inspiration 
for their social action and as their justification for the claims they make 
to women’s rights. It is no wonder that women such as these identify 
themselves as Muslim before Dutch or Moroccan, when the social ac-
tivism that characterizes their daily life is connected so wholeheartedly 
to their personal religious convictions. 
woman in such a “men’s world.” Like the women from Dar al-Hijra and 
Ettaouhid, Zaineb started to study again and switched from finance to 
teaching. Married mothers like Zaineb seem to see their voluntary work 
and studying as marking a new phase for them, consciously expand-
ing their role as wife and mother, by committing to others in society. 
As such, practising true Islam gives them a sense of inner peace and 
strengthened self-worth.
Striving for equality
Besides their personal development, many of these women target the 
development of Dutch Muslim women, and the Dutch Muslim commu-
nity in general. In this context Badiah, Hafsa, and Raouda, like Faizah, 
claim that many Muslim women lack an understanding of the central 
duties of Islam and therefore hold on to women-unfriendly conceptions 
and practices, which are generally supported within Dutch Moroccan 
and Muslim communities. Independently Hafsa and Halima point to 
the mental health problems many Muslim women in Rotterdam are 
suffering from, due to social and economical pressures that they face 
as Moroccan and Muslim women migrants. Hafsa, who studies to be a 
spiritual caretaker, states: “especially through my work and contacts at 
Ettaouhid, I noticed that there are so many women with mental prob-
lems. Yes, perhaps it has to do with alienation from society … another 
culture, a completely different life  – it’s a big step and you get so much 
fear and doubt in society … Also if you have a real traditional Moroc-
can husband at home: you can’t do this, you can’t do that. It plays a big 
part in pressuring women and causing these mental problems.” Besides 
organizing activities within the mosque, Halima acts as a social worker 
for the female visitors. She relates: “I provide guidance to women who 
really need it. Women come here with a lot of problems. The threshold 
is low here … I refer them to the physician, for instance … and it helps, 
so … my objective is being fulfilled here.” Leila and Selma mention the 
overall passivity of Dutch-Moroccan women and criticize the fact that 
Islam is often used to legitimize women staying at home, although this 
is not right according to “true Islam.” 
Ettaouhid, Dar al-Arqam, and SPIOR regularly organize meetings 
where Islam and the position and rights of women within their “own” 
community are discussed. With projects like the one coordinated by 
Rajaa, concerning the issue of forced marriages, the women strive to 
address the community as their collective responsibility to denounce 
gender inequality. The project on forced marriages thus tries to involve 
not only young Muslim women themselves, but also their parents and 
the young Muslim men, because as Rajaa says: “… a lot of the parents 
think that this is the way it should be done according to Islam, but in the 
Quran it is written exactly the other way round! The rights of the Mus-
lim woman are obscured by culture. We want emancipation and devel-
opment from within Islam.” Emina, a former teacher of empowerment 
trainings, believes that giving Islamic guidance is a logical undertaking, 
because Islam stimulates women to think critically. “Muslim women,” 
Emina states, “… have to use the traditions to empower women.”
Social engagement
The women are seriously committed to Dutch society. Although they 
do not participate physically in public or political debates – in fact they 
made clear they do not aspire to be on national television or to become 
political figures – they do actively discuss the position of Islam, Muslim 
women, and Dutch Moroccan citizens in society. They try to include 
non-Muslims as well. Through informational and discussion meetings, 
they concentrate on “distinguishing true and just Islam, from nega-
tive culture and cultural traditions,” distancing themselves from the 
women-unfriendly, violent and undemocratic, image of Islam as it is 
represented in media, politics, and public discourse in the Netherlands. 
Basing their religious practices and belief first of all on the Quran, as 
the literal word of God, they describe Islam as entailing love, tolerance, 
personal freedom, individual responsibility, and equal worthiness. In 
this light Halima, Selma, Leila, and other women from their mosque 
formed a women’s group called Seal of Prophecy. They invited Muslims 
and non-Muslims from the neighbourhood to spend an afternoon of 
dialogue across religions. While leaving, everybody received a rose as 
token of intercultural understanding, respect, and tolerance.
While the women want to reach out to Dutch society, they feel it 
does not appreciate them. They make clear they continuously feel dis-
criminated against and excluded as Dutch-Moroccan Muslim women. 
Former students Saïma, Farhat, and Bushra from Dar al-Arqam, all had 
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For these women, 
being a good 
Muslim involves … 
a publicly visible 
commitment to 
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organized Muslim community in good 
relations with the state.
The Muslim League
Poland’s Muslim League, by contrast, 
is a relatively new organization, which 
despite its lack of experience has 
proved enormously popular among 
Polish Muslims especially recent immi-
grants, refugees, and Polish converts. 
There are already eight local centres in 
the main cities in Poland and, although 
formal membership is limited, it ap-
pears likely that many other Muslims are engaged, at some level, in 
their activities. Arabs seem to play a vital role among its active mem-
bers. From an international perspective, the Muslim League pushes for 
the development of contacts with Western European Muslim organiza-
tions, such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Most 
importantly, the Muslim League is the main proponent of Wasatiyya. 
Despite their success in Polish society, the newcomers have so far 
distanced themselves from the Tatars. This has led to an air of competi-
tion between the two groups. In 2004, the Muslim League gained the 
status of an Islamic religious association, a status previously limited to 
the Muslim Religious Association founded by the Tatars. In riposte, two 
months later, the Tatars appointed a young Tatar, Tomasz Miskiewicz, 
as Mufti of Poland. 
Paradoxically, instead of trying to help each other out, the two com-
parably moderate organizations now struggle for leadership over Po-
land’s Muslim communities. Both present an Islamic solution compat-
ible with the values of liberal democracy to radicalism. Likewise, both 
groups make an effort to present Islam to Catholic Poles; and to com-
bat the damaging stereotypes that have arisen since 2001. The Tatars 
emphasize their patriotism, referring to historical ties with Polish soci-
ety. Conversely, the League’s newcomers prefer ideological arguments 
and the reinterpretation of Islamic concepts to argue their cause. Tatar 
intellectuals, such as Selim Chazbijewicz describe Tatar religious ideas 
as “Euro-Islam”; while Muslim League scholars, such as Samir Ismail, 
highlight the importance of Wasatiyya.2 Thus, in different ways, both 
groups work at the same task. 
The nature of the relationship between Tatar and non-Tatar Muslims 
is complex. Many members of the Tatar community, especially the 
older generation, stress cultural differences between their group and 
the Arabs (the largest percentage of Muslim immigrants in Poland). 
The newcomers point to elements in the Tatar tradition that contradict 
“pure Islam” (e.g. the buying of Christmas trees) and criticize Tatars for 
their insufficient religious knowledge and lackadaisical habits in wor-
ship. Pressure from Arab activists has made some Tatars avoid further 
contacts. Aware of the risk of being marginalized, other Tatars see po-
tential advantages to cooperation. Moreover, such relationships can 
contribute to a revival of religious feeling among Tatars. In Bialystok, 
for instance, an important Muslim centre in northeastern Poland, in-
coming students from Muslim countries organize religious lessons and 
other activities for the Tatar youth. 
Transforming Islamic traditions
The Tatars have managed to assimilate into Polish society while main-
taining their Muslim identities. It has been a gradual process through 
which aspects of Muslim tradition have been Europeanized. The same 
process has been supported by privileges granted to Tatar communi-
ties, and eased by the key role played historically by Tatars in the Polish 
army. “Polish Islam” acquired many elements from Polish Christian cul-
ture. The Tatar understanding of Islam stresses similarities with Chris-
In November 2006, the Muslim League 
of Poland co-organized a conference 
entitled “Integrating Muslims in Cen-
tral-Eastern Europe.” The aim was to 
broadcast positive examples of social 
and cultural integration by Muslims, 
and to promote the concept of Wasa-
tiyya (from Ar. wasat, middle), or what 
has become known as “Islamic Cen-
trism.” Forged in response to interac-
tions between Muslim countries and 
the West, the proponents of Wasatiyya 
seek to construct a positive European-
Muslim identity. In so doing, they reconsider the relevance and ap-
plication of Sharia to modern Muslim environments.1  
Though Muslims from Russia, Arab countries, and Iran first arrived in 
Poland in the nineteenth century and subsequent waves of Arab, Irani-
an, and Afghani Muslims blended into Polish society during the 1970’s 
and 80’s, the country’s Muslim population only started to increase sig-
nificantly from 1989, when the Soviet Union began to lose its grip on 
the surrounding provinces. While there is no official data, researchers 
and Muslim leaders estimate that there are now around twenty to thir-
ty thousand Muslims in Poland. Some of the reasons why foreign Mus-
lims come to Poland include: benefiting from business opportunities, 
studying, reconnecting with family, and escaping conflict in their own 
countries. The majority of Poland’s Muslims come from Arabic speaking 
countries: Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia. But Muslims 
from Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, post-Soviet states, 
and Africa (mainly Somalia) have also recently taken up residence in 
the country. Likewise, large numbers of Muslims have arrived from the 
North Caucasus as a result of the second Chechen war which started in 
1999. (Indeed, over 80 percent of all refugees in Poland are currently 
Chechens.) From a different perspective, a growing number of ethnic 
Poles are converting to Islam. Among these are Orientalists, Arabists, 
artists, young people searching for spiritual meaning, and those em-
bracing Islam to marry. Members of these groups tend to join such or-
ganizations as the Association of Muslim Students, and, since its estab-
lishment in 2001, the Muslim League in Poland.
The Tatar community
Islam in Poland is diversely expressed; there are even small Shiite 
and Ahmadiyya communities, though their influence is relatively in-
significant. By far the most populous group, Sunni Muslims, is divided 
between two main sub-groups: the historically well established Polish 
Tatars; and members of the aforementioned Muslim League. Poland’s 
“indigenous” Muslims, the Polish Tatars, have been living in Poland 
since the fourteenth century. They are often presented as a model ex-
ample of successful integration. While undergoing profound accultura-
tion – their social and economic situation does not differ from that of 
other ethnic Poles – they nevertheless manage to retain their Muslim 
faith. The Tatars emphasize their attachment to Poland and their contri-
bution to its development. Many Tatars identify themselves as Poles of 
Tatar origin. Under the communist regime, a decline in Islamic practice 
and knowledge among the Tatars was observed, but nowadays a cul-
tural and religious revival is taking place within the same circles. 
Before the outbreak of the WWII, Tatar leaders set up muftiat (Islamic 
council) headed by a mufti, which provided for the imams’ education, 
and for the religious needs of the community. In 1925, the Muslim Re-
ligious Association was established; thereafter, the Tatars managed 
to pass the Act on the Relations between the Polish State and the as-
sociation. Because of their industriousness, those Muslims arriving in 
Poland during the last decades of the twentieth century found a well-
Poland’s Muslim population is comprised of 
two distinct communities: Polish Tatars and 
Muslim immigrants. Despite demographic 
and ethnic differences, the groups resemble 
one another in their insistence that Muslims 
in Poland are not impervious to assimilation 
and modernization. Through the approaches 
of Euro-Islam, as adopted by the Polish 
Tatars, and Wasatiyya, promoted by Muslim 
immigrants, these Muslims grapple to find 
a response to radicalism and to present 
a moderate face to their fellow Poles.
muslim Organizations
in Poland
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Tatar mosque 
in Kruszyniany, 
northeastern 
Poland
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In terms of ‘aqidah (creed), the Wasatiyya relies not only on the Quran 
and Sunna, it also recommends “discernment in Sharia matters, inde-
pendent of what is literally prescribed in Islamic scripture.”5 Indeed, a 
well-known imam in Poland, Abi Ali Issa, who heads the Muslim Reli-
gious and Cultural Centre in Wroclaw, has preached that it is the literal 
interpretation of the Quran, without due consideration of the ulama’s 
opinions, that has contributed to the stereotyping of Muslims and 
Islam. In his opinion, classic terms in Islamic thought, such as dar al-
islam (land of peace) and dar al-harb (land of war), can now properly 
be understood only in terms of safety. Thus, for instance, when there 
is a war going on, even a Muslim country may be classified as dar al-
harb; while, as long as Muslims are still able to practice their religion, 
there should be no objection to regarding European countries as dar 
al-islam. Not surprisingly, the ongoing debate on these matters over-
laps with another related debate on jihad; a concept which, Ali Abi Issa 
argues, may only be understood along defensive lines. 
Muslim leaders in Poland, whether from the Tatar community or the 
Muslim League, universally praise the Sharia as superior to any human 
law code. At the same time, they accentuate such meanings and prac-
tices within the Sharia that may coexist comfortably alongside Europe-
an values. Muslims linked to the League focus particularly on the moral 
connotations underpinning Islamic law. Values such as equality, nobil-
ity, and moral excellence are thus presented as intrinsically Islamic. In 
this way, moderate Islam is shown to oppose fundamentalist calls to 
rebel against the West.
The Tatar place similar emphasis on moral values embedded in the 
Sharia. Chazbijewicz speaks of a universal and lib-
eral approach to the Sharia that is already wide-
spread among members of his Tatar community.6 
Largely, Tatars emphasize that the notions, norms, 
and ideas underpinning Islamic law exactly re-
semble those held by moderate Christian Poles.
Both styles of approach in Poland, Wasatiyya 
(Muslim League) and Euro-Islam (Tatars) consti-
tute alternatives to prevailing representations of 
the Muslim world as anti-western and incapable 
of modernization. Clearly, neither approach erad-
icates all economic, social, or cultural problems. 
Many Muslims, especially those who have just ar-
rived in Poland, feel culturally alienated and con-
sequently reject what they feel to be the West’s 
individualism and materialism. Nevertheless, as 
long as they can find suitable conditions in which 
to live, work, and worship in Polish society, mod-
erate ideas will continue to flourish among the 
country’s Muslim communities.
tianity; notably, it accepts the separation of religion from 
state. An important point of reference in contemporary Tatar 
thought are Muslim reformist movements, especially the 
modernization trends, such as Jadidism, that developed in 
Russian Islam in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, while 
Polish Tatars lived separate from the rest of the Muslim world 
for most of their history, the emergence of moderate Islam 
among Tatars resulted from their daily interactions with 
people from different faiths, rather than through theologi-
cal debate.
More problematic is the situation of Muslim newcomers 
who often find life in European societies inconsistent with 
Islamic rulings. In this regard, the League claims to speak for 
all Sunni Muslim immigrants and proposes Wasatiyya as a 
way to avoid the growth of parallel societies. Further, it plac-
es special responsibility on the shoulders of local imams to 
ensure that this does not happen. 
The imams that uphold the need for Wasatiyya also em-
phasize the need for ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) 
in modern Polish settings. For these imams, ijtihad acts as 
a means of strengthening their authority in such settings. 
Many issues, such as keeping a dog in a house, in vitro 
fertilization, the holding of bank accounts, and chang-
ing of the prayer times to accommodate working hours, may cause 
problems within immigrant Muslim communities. Exercising ijtihad, 
imams tend to tolerate such matters on the grounds of a ruling by 
the chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, the 
exiled Egyptian Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi which states that a Mus-
lim should strive to obey the basic sources of Islam, but be flexible 
in secondary matters. 
In recent years, such pragmatic solutions seem to have been gain-
ing ground in Poland. This ijtihad-friendly approach allows religiously 
oriented Muslims to legitimize changes in their lifestyles that suit life in 
the modern western world. “We want to live practically, not like slaves,” 
a young Muslim woman told me. 
Interestingly, immigrant Muslims can even serve to moderate the 
opinions of local Polish converts. A young Muslim convert wanted to 
break with his Christian background and duly announced that Christ-
mas was haram. Quoting from the Sunna to show how Islam encour-
ages respect for one’s parents, his Arab friends convinced him that he 
should not boycott a family gathering as important as Christmas.3
Contributing to the spread of moderate ideas is the fact that, to date, 
there have been no serious outbreaks of conflict between Muslims 
and the state. In fact, in Poland, leading Islamic organizations coop-
erate with public authorities and representatives of other religions. 
Since 1997, for instance, the Joint Council of Catholics and Muslims has 
worked on developing inter-religious dialogue. Despite the sudden in-
flux of Muslims into Poland over the last decade, there are no Muslim 
ghettoes. Rather, the immigrants learn Polish, and many of them work 
as doctors, businessmen, or scientists. 
Of course, there have been instances of negative reactions to Mus-
lims, verbal aggression, comments on the Muslim headscarf, or opposi-
tion to the idea of building a mosque in the centre of Kraków. Yet, such 
instances are comparatively rare. More worrying is the fact that the av-
erage Pole seems to know very little about Islam. Further, what people 
do know tends to be shaped by the media, which invariably focuses 
on the “Islamic threat.” The lack of information available to the public is 
underlined by League activists, who regard the dissemination of “cor-
rect” material on Islam as a vital aspect of their mission. In Wroclaw, 
for example, the Wroclaw Muslim Centre of Culture and Education has 
been organizing special lessons about Islam for Polish youth. Accord-
ing to the organizers, these have been a great success.
Questions of interpretation
Characterized by attempts to form moderate western-Islamic forums 
and attitudes, the rise of the Wasatiyya movement marks the decline 
of Islamism. The leader of Poland’s Muslim League, drawing on Qarad-
awi’s concepts, defines Wasatiyya as a style that upholds main Islamic 
principles, while also permitting adaptation to modernity.4 The League 
claims that one of its aims is integration with wider Polish society 
without the sacrificing of Muslim identity. It therefore encourages its 
members to engage in positive cooperation with citizens of different 
religious backgrounds.
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the totality of all matters.1 Together, 
these twenty principles induced for 
the Muslim Brothers a holistic vision 
of the world that contains a political 
ideology and a social doctrine. On this 
wise, al-Banna sought to construct an 
Islamic orthodoxy to go beyond the 
differences that divided Muslims in 
order to reinforce Islam and the power 
of Muslims world-wide as well as to 
counter foreign ideologies that might 
weaken Muslims.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe
Members and sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood have migrat-
ed from Arab countries to Europe as political exiles or students since 
the end of the 1950s. At first, they organized inward-facing groups. But 
since the 1980s, they became a powerful force acting within the com-
munity as a whole: they established mosques, Muslim student organi-
zations, Islamic charities and centres, national bodies, etc. aiming at a 
full representation of Muslims within the European countries.
Today, the movement is mostly composed of a variety of secretive 
informal networks with low membership count (around a thousand for 
United Kingdom, France, and Belgium together). Nevertheless, they are 
quite influential: through inner circle education and open conferences, 
they continue to transmit an ethos of living as Muslims.
In Europe, the organization still considers the ten pillars as unalter-
able and the Brothers continue to endorse these principles. The most 
important of which is shumuliyyat al-islam. It is mainly understood as a 
complete way of life that can solve all human problems and as a world-
wide message addressed to all people because it is inclusive of all di-
vine messages that are relevant for all times and places. A second con-
cept, fikr al-jihad, calls for exerting one’s effort so as to change oneself. 
Altogether, they remind Muslims of the importance of devotion to God 
and perseverance and of getting involved in “Islamic work,” to bring 
about a “gradual reform” of society. These themes represent milestones 
that define the contours of behaviour that is supposedly authentically 
Islamic. 
The European Muslim Brotherhood thus advocates the principle of 
the universal nature of Islam, but without fleshing out the principle in 
detail. Despite the fact that European societies are mainly composed of 
non-Muslims it still aspires to an Islam that could inform every single 
aspect of life, even collective life. It seems as if it takes the context into 
consideration, but not when it invokes such traditional concepts. The 
concept is neither explicitly stated in the discourses, precisely defined, 
nor are its implications clearly expounded.2 It is usually contextualized 
in references to those abstract concepts of i‘tidal (principle of right 
behaviour) and wasatiyya (principle of moderation): The principles of 
Islam supposedly are all comprehensive of every aspect of life but they 
also have to be understood in a moderate way – the paradox can hardly 
be resolved. 
This constant reference to the universal nature of the message of 
Islam tells us something about how and why the ideology of the or-
ganization usually succeeds to survive beyond the shifting context 
in Europe: it is precisely the fluidity of the discourse that allows its 
persistence. The organization’s concrete activities are nevertheless 
nowadays limited; whereas previously its members had joined politi-
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encom-
passing every aspect of life) is the first 
of twenty principles laid out by the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement, Hassan al-Banna, to teach 
his followers the proper understand-
ing of Islam. Even though this princi-
ple, usually translated as the “compre-
hensive way of life,” still remains inte-
gral to the teachings of the members 
of the Brotherhood, both in Egypt 
and in Europe, it is strangely enough 
neither commented upon in scholarly 
references nor by the wider public. When the Federation of Islamic 
Organizations in Europe (FIOE, representing the Muslim Brotherhood 
movement at the European level) presented the European Muslim 
Charter to the international press in January 2008, none pinpointed 
this “universal dimension” of their understanding of Islam despite 
the potential tensions or even incompatibilities, both political and 
legal, that this concept might have on a discourse on integration and 
citizenship. What do the Muslim Brothers traditionally say about this 
concept and how do they justify their call for it? What are its con-
stituents and the scope of its application? Are there any significant 
modifications to the concept in attempting to contextualize it within 
a pluralist Europe? 
Muslim Brotherhood’s principles 
The Muslim Brotherhood offers its members a basic Islamic edu-
cation informed by the teachings of its founder that promote both 
a personal and communal sense of Islamic identity that is proud of 
itself, strong, and capable of the revitalization of the ummah. One’s 
affiliation to the movement is built around the proper understanding 
of the Islamic message contained in the first of ten pillars. That pillar 
is itself comprised of obedience to twenty principles that, together, 
constitute a real practical method for grasping Islam and the spirit 
of its message: it is an all-encompassing framework of attitudes to 
be adopted with regard to individual practices 
all leading to escaping the “pathways of hell.” For 
example, while the sources of legislation are the 
Quran and the Sunna the principles warn that 
the use of intuition is not allowed unless it does 
not contradict Quran and Sunna. 
The very first of these twenty principles con-
cerns the comprehensiveness of the message 
of Islam. It suggests that Islam should be un-
derstood as a complete system that concerns 
state and nation, beliefs and legislation, cult 
and behaviour, and the social, political, and the 
historical. According to the Muslim Brotherhood 
scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-Banna derived this 
notion from examining the early history of Islam: 
the Prophet was both a spiritual guide and a 
head of State. It is also based on the interpreta-
tion of Quranic verses, notably S. 16, V. 89: “And 
we reveal the Scripture unto you as an exposition of all things, and 
a guidance and a mercy and good tidings for those who have sur-
rendered (to Allah)” as meaning that Islam takes into consideration 
… it is precisely 
the fluidity of 
the discourse 
that allows its 
persistence.
universal Aspirations
The Muslim Brotherhood 
in Europe
B r i G i t t e  m A r é C h A l 
Organizations & Activism
Since its foundation in 1928, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has advocated a holistic vision 
of Islam as being both a political ideology 
and a social doctrine. This vision is now also 
propagated in Europe, where members and 
sympathizers of the Brotherhood form a largely 
informal but nevertheless quite influential 
movement. The author argues that the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Europe, while encouraging 
citizenship and integration within European 
societies, still promotes the totalizing discourse 
of the days of Hassan al-Banna.
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Some innovations are nevertheless 
noticed in France even if the claims 
expressed might finally be understood 
as radical stances as in Great-Britain. A 
first example refers to the public dis-
course of Mohsen N’Gazou a member 
of the Union of Islamic Organizations 
in France (UOIF), who is also a mem-
ber of the FIOE. At the annual meet-
ing of the UOIF, in Paris in 2003, he 
emphasizes the universal dimension 
of Islam as completely correlated to 
the modern context. After presenting 
spirituality as a fundamental dimen-
sion, he affirms that humanism is not 
sufficient in order to make human be-
ings fully human. Faith, according to 
him, gives meaning to existence and 
is an irreducible universal imperative. 
Moreover because the world is global 
nowadays it is important that Muslims 
should undertake action on a global 
scale as well. Therefore, it is the context 
that “justifies” the global responsibilities that have been placed upon 
Muslims, that concern even non-Muslims. A new form of argument, of 
a contextual type, is thus applied by this speaker to the claim of the 
universal nature of Islam, initially only derived from the sacred texts, in 
order to reinforce its relevance. 
A second example shows a paradigmatic change in the way to con-
ceive the imperatives of the divine law, the Sharia, presented as not 
questioning the western system at first sight although it does so radi-
cally: when Abdallah Benmansour, influent member of the UOIF, af-
firms in 2005 that “Islam is involved in almost every insignificant thing,” 
he implies that Islamic prescriptions are ever-present for any person 
who pays attention to them. The divine hegemony is all the more in ev-
idence, inasmuch as each action offers us the possibility of conforming 
to the Islamic way, whatever its importance may be. Instead of exhort-
ing the faithful to modify current laws or to push for the adoption of 
political amendments that would make current laws and policies more 
compatible with the spirit of Islam, rather he challenges his listeners to 
realize that every human activity already presents, in and of itself, an 
occasion for action in conformity with Sharia. Implicitly, he lets it be un-
derstood that the perspectives of a utopian Islamic system should still 
be part of the present, and easily accessible for any individual. Every 
aspect of life, be it work, marriage, or finances is an opportunity to in-
troduce Islam into life. 
Old slogans in a new context
The differences in the concept of shumuliyya in the United Kingdom 
and in France are very relative however. In both countries the European 
Muslim Brotherhood adopts an unquestioning and totalizing discourse 
which maintains its long-term vision. Islam is still affirmed as a whole 
alternative system, probably under fear that any restriction to it would 
end up destroying the whole ideology. The tradition is kept alive, so 
is its utopia, even if its realization remains quite limited and their new 
modalities of action prove that they take changing circumstances into 
consideration.
The Muslim Brotherhood actively promotes citizenship and integra-
tion within the European societies (such as in their European Muslim 
Charter) but far from accepting the marginalization of their ideology 
after all its past failures in achieving their goals anywhere, some of the 
members are still also fully promoting their old slogans in quite a sim-
ple way. In doing so, they show the limits of their will and abilities to 
really develop a renewal of their ideology that would be adapted to the 
modern European pluralist context.
cal parties and created a secret military apparatus to defend their or-
ganizations, today they shun political parties and hardly invest them-
selves in social actions, although they are involved in representative 
organizations for Muslims. However, they reinforce the concept of 
Islamic norms via the establishment and promotion of the European 
Council for Fatwas and Research, which tries to legally advise Muslims 
on sensitive issues. As such, they keep alive this idea of an Islamic law 
that might still be relevant for any aspect of contemporary life for all 
European Muslims. 
Universal aspirations in two countries
The emphasis on the principle of the universality of Islam differs ac-
cording to each country. In the United Kingdom, home office policies 
promote multiculturalism and a wide autonomy for ethnic and reli-
gious communities. Accordingly, some claims are explicitly referring to 
the sphere of politics and to the juridical dimension of Islam, carried 
on by a few Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals. In France, where gov-
ernment policies are focused on the integration of individuals and not 
collective groups, the claims are usually less explicit and provocative as 
they seem to be limited to the social sphere. Nonetheless, at the end 
of the day, the actual understanding and use of the term shumuliyyat 
al-islam does not really differ that much.
In Great Britain, the discourses refer to historical slogans includ-
ing, explicitly, some political and juridical dimensions: at the 2004 
annual conference of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), Jamal 
Badawi took up the slogan “Islam is the solution” (to all problems). 
He based this proposition on rabbanniya (the majesty of God, that 
imposes God’s will in and of itself, upon everyone) and the fact that 
Islam gives fundamental guidance to human beings and offers prac-
tical advice. It is also common to hear Islam spoken of as a societal 
alternative, especially with regard to the application of Islamic law 
in family matters. And the British approach is not limited to this as-
pect either. For example, a partisan of the MAB expressed the view 
that Islam offers solutions to each of our contemporary social evils; 
he recommended assigning a higher value to individual piety and 
a complementary approach to the social alternatives most often 
proposed. He recognized the two-sided nature of this universalist 
project, concerning the this-world and the beyond. When he claimed 
that this is not antagonistic to existing societies, he went against the 
views of Zahid Parvez who presented Islam as an alternative to both 
socialism and capitalism at a seminar of the MAB in Glasgow in De-
cember 2002.
In France, such ideas are usually not expressed in the same way and 
the claims seem to be more limited. In a mosque near Lille, in 2005, 
the imam Ahmed Miktar intones the same incantatory formula, but 
he adopts a slightly different tone of discourse: he does not claim that 
Islam is the solution for everything but only claims that Islam is the so-
lution to many social problems, that it produces good citizens who act 
for the common good, and that it is a positive force in society without 
going any further. 
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Notes
1. Hassan al-Banna, 20 principes pour 
comprendre l’islam [explained by shaykh 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi] (Paris: Médiacom, 2004).
2. Tariq Ramadan, in his book Western Muslims 
and the Future of Islam, could only dare to 
express that this idea could be confusing.
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In the rise of Muslim associations in 
Spain four events have been crucial.1 
First, the legal enactment of freedom of 
religion in 1967 coincided with the ap-
pearance of Muslim associations main-
ly founded by the Muslim population 
from Ceuta and Melilla and students 
coming from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and 
Palestine. In 1970 and 1971 the Jamaat 
Ahmadia of Islam in Spain and the Muslim Association in Spain were 
registered in the Muslim Communities Register. Following this, in 1979, 
Spanish converts to Islam created the Muslim Community of Spain. 
The second event was the recognition in 1989 of Islam as a deeply 
rooted and clearly established religion in Spain because of its evident 
integration into Spanish society. The current structure of the Comisión 
Islámica de España (CIE) – an umbrella organization representing Mus-
lims – was created with the formation of the Spanish Federation of Is-
lamic Religious Entities (FEERI) and the Spanish Islamic Communities 
Union (UCIDE). Ever since, Muslim associations have had to register 
within one of these federations.
Thirdly, the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between the 
Spanish State and the Spanish Islamic Committee in 1992 enabled 
Muslims to practice their faith, at least in theory. The fourth event was 
the increase in numbers of Muslim migrants, since the early 1970s, and 
the settlement of their families mainly in the 1990s, thanks to the 1985 
Immigration Law.2 
During these years, the majority of Muslims registered their associa-
tions in registers for minority religious groups with a few registered as 
social and cultural groups. In general, associations were created on the 
basis of origin (Spanish converts to Islam or migrants) and their status 
in Spain (workers or students). Three different groups represented the 
members of Muslim associations: Muslim migrants settled before the 
Spanish current democracy, Spanish converts to Islam, and different 
migrant groups arriving in the 1980s and 1990s.3 
This changed after the March 11 train bombings when the offspring 
of migrants, young Spanish converts, and young migrants living in 
Madrid decided to create new organizations and to revitalize others. 
While old Muslim associations used religious registers, these new as-
sociations appeared in social and cultural ones, outside the two Muslim 
federations. Their members do not speak as migrants but as natives 
who simply practice another religion. Also they prefer to participate 
in society as young Muslims regardless of where they were born, what 
their family origin or their social status is; and ask that their participa-
tion not be limited to religious activities.
They are mostly between twenty and thirty five 
years old, male and female, highly educated and 
interested in reflecting on the meaning of being a 
Muslim and ways to express that meaning to non-
Muslims. While in the past Muslim associations 
worked to achieve the institutionalization of Islam 
in Spain, these new associations take advantage of 
that legal recognition in order to show who they 
are. This concern determines their activities, as well 
as points to a new social situation. On the one hand 
it shows the increase of Spanish Muslims in soci-
ety and their effort to combine Islamic belief with 
Spanish nationality. On the other hand, it shows 
a global tendency among Muslims living in non-
Muslim countries to distinguish between “good” 
(peaceful) and “bad” (terrorist) Muslims. This is re-
lated to the wish to be accepted as good citizens, 
irrespective of their beliefs, and to be recognized 
as integrated people able to manage 
between civil rights and religious belief. 
To this end they organize seminars and 
meetings. Apart from reflecting on the 
concept of Muslim identity, they devel-
op common social projects and show 
what Islam means through their deeds. 
Two such organizations are Tayba and 
Jóvenes Musulmanes de Madrid, both 
in Madrid. Both have the same goal, i.e. to show non-Muslims that they 
do not support violence and terrorism in the name of their religion, 
but choose peaceful and tolerant methods to promote their beliefs. 
Tayba started as a group of da’wa addressing both the Muslim and 
non-Muslim population of Madrid. They aimed at deepening their own 
knowledge of Islam by organizing meetings and seminars, and through 
reading the Quran and hadith. They also collaborated in social projects 
such as visiting and helping sick people, and collecting money for their 
treatment. While these actions were directed at Muslims, they wanted 
to do something positive to non-Muslims as well. Therefore they pro-
moted a blood donation campaign and engaged in a social voluntary 
programme to collaborate with non-religious NGOs. 
Members of Jóvenes Musulmanes de Madrid, on the other hand, are 
more interested in addressing broader issues related to the social posi-
tion of Muslims in Spanish society. This was mainly achieved by arrang-
ing debate meetings rather than by offering social services. In these 
meetings they would discuss topics such as the clash of civilizations, 
Orientalism, unemployment among Muslims, stereotypes, marriage, 
and so on. Although these two organizations thus focus on two differ-
ent kinds of activities, they both aim to be recognized as embodying 
good Muslims.
The search for the meaning of being a Muslim started after 9/11 
among some Muslims in Spain, but became urgent after the attacks of 
11 March 2004. Muslims in Madrid went through that event as Madri-
diens, but at the same time were confused when the train bombings 
were connected with terrorists who claimed their acts in the name of 
Islam. That claim motivated Spanish Muslims to know more about their 
religion, especially young Muslims who, for the first time, organized 
themselves outside the existing Muslim federations, taking an active 
social and political role after that unforeseen event. But this also re-
flects the global desire of Muslim groups all over the world to change 
the stereotypes non-Muslims have about them. This is another impor-
tant feature of the new Muslim associations: they are part of and par-
ticipate in global debates, which shape their concerns, activities, and 
goals. The new associations are still few, but their participation, as we 
have seen, means a change in Spanish Muslim associational life.
new muslim youth 
Associations in Spain
V i r t u d e S  t é l l e Z  d e l G A d O
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Ever since the legal recognition of Islam 
in Spain Muslim associations have been 
increasing in number. The March 11 bombing 
attacks of 2004 brought to the fore a new 
group consisting largely of young Muslims 
born in Spain who are engaged in social 
participation through the creation of social 
and cultural associations. 
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islamic religious Practice 
in Outer Space
The National Space Agency of Malaysia 
(ANGKASA)  was founded by the Ma-
laysian Ministry of Science, Technology, 
and Innovation in 2002. In August 2003, 
then-prime minister Mahathir bin Mo-
hamad announced that Malaysia would 
send an astronaut to the International 
Space Station (ISS) within the framework 
of a joint programme with Russia. This 
programme stipulated the purchase of 
18 Russian Sukhoi SU-30MKM fighter 
jets amounting to approximately 700 
million Euros by the Malaysian Ministry 
of Defence. In return Russia agreed to train two Malaysian astronauts of 
whom one would be sent from the Cosmodrome in Baikonur, Kazakhstan 
in a Soyuz TMA-11 spacecraft to the ISS. Malaysia expects from its space 
project an increased international reputation, and is planning an expedi-
tion to the moon for the year 2020. Also anticipated are impulses for the 
country’s science and economy in regard to the development of space 
technology and the establishment of space research.
The Department of Islamic Development of Malaysia (JAKIM) empha-
sized in a Friday sermon distributed to the mosques that space explo-
ration helps in understanding the mysteries of the universe. Islam is the 
state religion in Malaysia and sixty percent of the twenty six million Ma-
laysians are Muslims; this made it necessary for the ANGKASA to prepare 
for the case that a Muslim would be chosen. Therefore the ANGKASA in 
cooperation with the JAKIM organized a two-day “Seminar on Islam and 
Life in Outer Space” in April 2006. Although Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor 
was not the first Muslim to be in outer space, the seminar was the first 
occasion during which the issue of Islam in outer space was discussed. At 
the end of the seminar a guideline was adopted.
Islamic scholars face several problems when they deal with journeys 
to outer space. Would prayer be conducted after world time, meaning 
five prayers within twenty four hours, or after ISS-time, meaning eighty 
prayers as the ISS circuits the earth sixteen times in twenty four hours? 
Given that ablution is not possible due to water conservation at the ISS, 
would the prayer be legally valid? How would the direction of prayer be 
determined? Furthermore, the required prayer motion would be difficult 
to perform because of weightlessness and shortage of space at the ISS. 
Another complication involved how to perform the Muslim fast since 
Shukor’s ISS-mission was taking place during Ramadan.
The “Guideline for Performing Islamic Rites at the ISS” gives answers to 
the most pressing of these questions.  Prayer times, it points out, should 
be measured after world time, which means five prayers every 24 hours 
while the exact times for prayer should follow the prayer times of the 
point of departure, in this case Baikonur. To lift the state of ritual impurity 
ablution should be practiced by performing tayammum. This is originally 
a symbolical ablution which uses sand instead of water, but since even 
sand is not available at the ISS the hands should be stroked on a wall, 
mirror, or similar surfaces.
Facing the Kaaba is also required for prayer in outer space but if this 
causes difficulties the earth should be used as orientation, and in cases 
where even this is impossible the Muslim astronaut is free to perform his 
prayer in any direction. The course of movement of the Islamic prayer 
is confined to the situation at the ISS. The astronaut is allowed to make 
symbolic movement or even perform these movements mentally. He can 
perform the Islamic fasting during the month of Ramadan but he is free to 
suspend it and continue it when he returns to earth. If he decides to fast 
he should follow the fasting times of his point of departure.
The Muslim astronaut should adhere to the Islamic diet and prefer 
food with halal-status. But if there is no such food, he is allowed to eat 
just enough to alleviate his hunger. The Islamic dress code also ap-
plies to Muslim astronauts: the male 
astronaut has to cover the body be-
tween the navel and the knees and 
the female her whole body except for 
her face and hands. Nothing is said in 
the guide about gender-segregation, 
which is especially surprising since a 
female Muslim astronaut had already 
travelled to the ISS. But the actions to 
be taken in the case of death in outer 
space have been specified: The dead 
body should be returned to earth so 
that the required funeral can be per-
formed. When this is not possible, it is permissible to perform a “space 
funeral” with a simple ceremony.
The guideline not only gives advice for Muslim religious practice but 
also articulates the main features of Islamic ethics in outer space in the 
section entitled “etiquette of travelling” which states that the Muslim 
astronaut should maintain his relationship with God, sustain “harmoni-
ous relationships among people”, and preserve the space environment. 
Although several Muslim countries among them Malaysia, are mem-
bers of international organizations which address outer space issues, 
such as the United Nations “Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space” (COPUOS), none of them preceded Malaysia in formulating an 
Islamic approach to space ethics.
After his return to earth Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor reported that he 
had no difficulties performing his prayers at the ISS. Meanwhile, the 
“Guideline for Performing Islamic Rites at the ISS” is no longer the only 
Islamic legal opinion on Islamic religious practice in outer space. The 
Islamic scholars Rifaat Fauzi Abd al-Muttalib from Egypt and Sano Kou-
toub Moustapha from Guinea have issued fatwas on how to perform 
the Islamic prayer in this context.  Both these fatwas and the Malaysian 
guideline offer pragmatic solutions for performing the Islamic religious 
practice in outer space. Their solutions stand in analogy to the Islamic 
regulations on travelling. In this respect the guideline does not enter 
unchartered territories but treads the trails of the classical Islamic legal 
opinions. What is new is the fact that the concept of travelling on earth 
is extended to the travelling to outer space and that journeys to outer 
space are explicitly allowed.
In October 2007, Malaysia sent its first 
astronaut into space. The thirty-six year old 
orthopaedic surgeon, Sheikh Muszaphar 
Shukor, was sent to the International Space 
Station on 10 October 2007 and returned to 
earth on 21 October 2007. As the astronaut was 
a practicing Muslim the Malaysian space agency 
provided him with advice on religious practice 
in the form of a guideline for performing the 
Islamic rites at the space station, and adapted 
classical legal opinions on religious practice 
during travel to the new context of outer space.
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ity for Muslims in the West, where the 
“pristine culture” of the parents’ home 
country is diluted, and where Islam is 
no longer embedded in cultural and 
social relationships. Consequently, 
youth start to reflect about their faith 
and to question previously taken for 
granted ideas about Islam and being 
Muslim. Through this process Muslim 
youth tend to distinguish Islam from 
“culture” in search of a “pure” or “true” 
Islam.3 Roy’s ideas have been used in 
many of the Dutch policy reports on 
radicalization of Muslim youth. These 
reports suggest that radicalization is 
the consequence of the process of de-
culturation.4 However, the problem with accounts such as these is that 
the conceptualization of culture and religion is confusing. Notions of 
“pristine cultures” and “deculturation” as used by Roy and others seem 
to be based upon an essentialist notion of culture wherein cultures 
are clearly identifiable and homogenous. Such pristine cultures never 
exist, however, where, for example, Morocco has a complex history of 
conflicts between Arab and Amazigh groups and between critics of the 
Moroccan monarchy and loyalists. 
In order to have a more adequate understanding of Muslim youth’s 
beliefs and practices, Islam can best be seen as a particular kind of cul-
tural repertoire of beliefs, practices, and experiences that enable and 
limit people to navigate in, act in, and give meaning to the social reali-
ties surrounding them. People’s knowledge of how to behave appropri-
ately is formed and informed by the contexts in which they find them-
selves and accordingly a person’s individual cultural repertoire is not 
always consistent and may even appear illogical.5 A girl for example can 
be convinced that wearing the face-veil (niqab) is obligatory in Islam 
but only wears it at religious meetings in mosques and not at school 
or when she is in the presence of her parents because she does not 
want to offend others (in particular her parents) or because (as one girl 
stated:) “I’m not that strong yet.” Such a statement is also an example of 
how the individual subject and her ideas about personal development 
and self-fulfilment have become central to the religiosity of youth. The 
quest for a “pure” Islam is a personal project filled with ideals such as 
self-realization and personal development or, as one boy said: “Islam is 
being yourself.” Making choices from a cultural repertoire in terms of 
“pure” Islam and “being yourself” is then a way of activating and organ-
izing their beliefs, practices, and experiences according to their ideas of 
a “true self” and an authentic Islam. 
Purifying Islam
People do not make choices from a cultural repertoire in a social and 
cultural vacuum. During the last decade both native Dutch as well as 
Moroccan-Dutch youth have interpreted perceived differences be-
tween them in religious terms. According to Moroccan-Dutch youth 
the native Dutch usually categorize them negatively; Islam is portrayed 
as suspicious, related to terrorism, intolerance, and the oppression of 
women. This leads to a confusing situation; the search for a Muslim 
identity means, in relation to native Dutch people, an attempt to tran-
scend the perceived dichotomy between “Moroccan” and “Dutch”. Thus, 
one boy’s statement: “When I’m a Muslim, it doesn’t matter whether I’m 
Moroccan or Dutch.” At the same time it also means trying to maintain 
a certain distance towards Dutch society and their parents. Their views 
on girls’ behaviour and dress are particularly important for preserving 
a distinction between them and Dutch society. “They (the girls, MdK) 
let themselves be influenced too much by western things. People call 
that integration, but I do not call that integration.” In the process of 
negotiating identities girls occupy a central position because they are, 
much more than boys, frequently scrutinized by other Dutch Moroc-
cans and native Dutch people who focus on their behaviour and attire. 
With regard to other Muslims and native Dutch people, girls also use 
In September 2001 (a few days before 
“9/11”) a new imam was appointed in 
a Moroccan mosque in Gouda, a small 
city near Rotterdam in the west of the 
Netherlands.1 Within a short period of 
time, imam Abdallah had gained enor-
mous popularity among Moroccan-
Dutch youth (males in particular). Al-
though the board of the mosque and 
many of the first generation migrants 
appreciated his attracting so many 
young people to the mosque they were 
still wary about his message to these 
youth. This imam did not approve of 
women riding bikes, questioned the 
necessity for women to have a higher 
education, and he abolished several traditions in the mosque which 
he deemed incompatible with “true” Islam. A great controversy arose; 
the older generation rejected his view of the correct Islamic lifestyles 
as being too strict for the Netherlands whereas the young people saw 
that rejection to just mean that he was speaking “the truth”:
There are of course people who have problems with this (what the 
imam is telling, MdK), people who cannot handle the truth… They 
(older Moroccan-Dutch) think he is too strict for the Netherlands but it 
is not about the imam. You have to look at the faith. There is no Nether-
lands, Africa or Morocco, Islam is Islam. Period. (Rachid, 20 years)
The case of the imam is exemplary for Moroccan-Dutch Muslims for 
several reasons. First of all, the controversy about the imam reveals the 
gap between first generation Moroccan-Dutch migrants and Moroc-
can-Dutch youth in Gouda. The latter have since the end of the 1990s 
become more vocal about their quest to purify Islam of what they see 
as the “contamination” of Islam. For this “contamination” they blame 
Moroccan traditions and “bad integration,” especially as pertaining to 
the failure in upholding Islamic rules with regard to gender relations. 
Secondly, imam Abdallah as part of one of the Salafi groups in the 
Netherlands is trying to revitalize Islam by propagating a return to the 
example of the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Mus-
lims. Thirdly, the case also shows the involvement of Moroccan-Dutch 
youth with Islam. Although, like all other people, 
Moroccan-Dutch youth can identify themselves 
on the basis of numerous categories such as “Mo-
roccan,” “Dutch,” gender, youth, rappers and so 
on, since the second half of the 1990s they have 
increasingly identified themselves as Muslim, and 
are categorized as such by outsiders despite the 
enormous discrepancies among them in the way 
they practice their faith. At the same time, not-
withstanding the differences, most of the young 
people in my research expressed the necessity to 
purify Islam from (Dutch and Moroccan) culture, 
something that has been called the process of 
“deculturation” by Olivier Roy and is in public de-
bates often equated with radicalization and a lack 
of integration. But what does separating culture 
from Islam or rejecting culture altogether actually 
mean?
Deculturation
In his well-known and important study Glo-
balised Islam Roy sees the separation of culture 
and religion amongst Muslim youth in the West 
as an example of the process of deculturation: 
decontextualizing and deterritorializing religious 
practices and dismissing culture.2 Roy argues that 
migration from the Muslim world to the West 
and the emergence of global media have created 
a situation where there is no religious author-
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Since the end of the 1990s Moroccan-Dutch 
youth increasingly identify themselves as 
Muslim and are categorized as such. Regardless 
of the way they practice their faith, reference 
to a “pure” Islam and to being Muslim as 
being one's “true” self are the most important 
constituting elements in their identity 
politics. While some scholars and politicians 
see young Muslims’ distinguishing between 
religion and culture as a sign of radicalization 
or lack of integration, the author argues that 
Muslim youth’s reflections on their Islam and 
their practices and experiences are a cultural 
construction grounded in a contemporary 
local and global context.
People’s 
knowledge of 
how to behave 
appropriately 
is formed and 
informed by 
the contexts in 
which they find 
themselves …
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This sought after “pure” Islam is actually a hybrid cultural construc-
tion based upon and emerging within specific historical and cultural 
contexts and relationships. Instead of an indication of crisis of pristine 
cultures, lack of integration, or signs of radicalization, it denotes cus-
tomary processes during which the new generation tries to re-define 
and re-organize different cultural repertoires in response to the chal-
lenges of their lifeworld. Because of the inevitable changes that come 
with this re-interpretation, many older people often experience these 
developments with regret and nostalgia. Sometimes this may lead to 
conflicts over the question of who interprets Islam the right way and 
who represents “the truth,” such as in the case with this imam.
the discourse of true Islam to define themselves and Islam. 
They criticize the stereotypes (such as the oppressed Muslim 
woman) that native Dutch entertain about them and chal-
lenge the gender inequality they sometimes experience in 
their relations with other Muslims. This was clear in Gouda 
where most women did not publicly express their views in 
the conflict with the imam but some of them accused the 
imam of “being ignorant and mixing up Moroccan traditions 
with Islam” while at the same time they remained critical 
about the Islamic traditions of their parents. Instead of creat-
ing an Islam without culture, they are making choices from 
a particular repertoire that is closely related to their cultural 
context and moreover relies on common cultural forms such 
as language (in this case Dutch and sometimes English). 
Connecting individual experiences
The choices Muslim youth make are by definition prod-
ucts of a cultural environment and the way these processes 
evolve is dependent upon the changes in societies.6 The idea 
of a purified Islam makes their faith stand out as a positive 
or even superior benchmark in an environment they ex-
perience as filled with crises: the high crime rates among 
Moroccan-Dutch youth, the attacks against Islam by Dutch 
politicians, the injustice that Muslims, according to them, 
face worldwide, and so on. The questions young people 
have about Islam and how to be a “good Muslim” are derived 
from their daily life; the issues they deal with have to do with 
contemporary political circumstances. They ask questions 
on the Internet in which they compare themselves to na-
tive Dutch youth (for example whether having a boyfriend 
or girlfriend is allowed in Islam or is it permissible to marry a 
non-Muslim); they study texts about the position of women 
in Islam and their relationship to non-Muslims; gather infor-
mation about the conflicts in the Middle East (especially in 
Iraq, the Palestinian areas, and also Afghanistan); and attend 
meetings about “how to be a Muslim in Dutch society?”.7 In 
the process of finding answers to their questions, Muslim 
youth turn to alternative authoritative persons whom they 
think do not dilute the message of Islam; they range from 
the Egyptian Amr Khaled, Tariq Ramadan, Abdullah Faisal to Gouda’s 
imam Abdallah. By asking these questions and turning to new authori-
ties youth connect their own individual experiences to global themes 
and authorities. Thus, instead of a loss of religious authority there is 
emergence of new authorities and hierarchies sometimes resulting in 
conflicts between their rival group followers. 
Practicing Islam
The concept of deculturation seems to reflect the praxis of Moroccan-
Dutch youth proclaiming their construction of Muslim identities as an 
ongoing purification of their cultural repertoires which stresses the sharp 
distinction between them and Dutch society and between them and their 
parents. But instead of creating their own individualized Islam, Moroccan-
Dutch have to find recognition and acceptance for their ideas with others. 
This makes the way they practice Islam much less straightforward and 
rigid than is suggested in their accounts of a “pure” Islam or in the afore-
mentioned conflict with imam Abdallah. For example, during one meet-
ing the girls asked the imam if they were required to wear a headscarf. 
The answer was a clear “yes, it is obligatory.” Although this confirmed the 
opinion of the girls, they still faced a problem because the school in ques-
tion forbids headscarves. After a short discussion the imam again stated 
the norm clearly but also validated the girls’ practice of removing the 
headscarf when they were in school as something that did not violate the 
norm. This was important for them, because they felt guilty every time 
they removed the headscarf and every time they put it back on. The con-
cept of deculturation overestimates the agency of youth who seem to be 
able to create their own Islam regardless of the context. The construction 
of a “pure” Islam in which according to the girls and the imam a headscarf 
is obligatory takes place within different relationships such as with the 
schools and the parents and the girls have to manage all of the loyalties 
that come with it. Paradoxically their quest for a “pure” Islam in daily prac-
tice is neither an expression of breaking up with Dutch society nor with 
their parents, but rather of an ongoing process of negotiation and mak-
ing compromises as a means to carefully balance all their loyalties. 
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crimination they would face. This is not 
to say that all women are able to make 
a free choice to veil; some may suc-
cumb to social pressures. At the same 
time, the veil also protected them from 
the violence they encountered on the 
streets of the banlieues they all lived 
in. The veil, they said, “Serves for many 
things. For one, it shows obedience to 
God … and it protects you from nasty 
looks … if you take two women, one who is dressed up all sexy and the 
other who is covered from head to toe … the one who will be yelled at 
and shouted out to [by the young men on the street] is the one who is 
not veiled.”
Banlieue
It is here where the borders of the banlieue are important and show 
a marked difference between the culture that exists inside and outside 
these imaginary walls. These spaces encourage a distinct culture to 
flourish and this further enhances the feeling of separateness. Living 
inside this particular environment is one factor that helps develop an 
Islam of France. 
Inside the banlieue, the veil protects because it covers women and 
renders them less prone to abuse or harassment. Some women told 
me that the veil made them feel invisible to harassers and provided 
them with a certain security. Outside the banlieue, however, the veil 
is a liability.
Outside the banlieue, the veil is a sign of a lack of integration, an un-
willingness to meet the basic standards of what it means to be French. 
The veil, for many non-Muslims, is not just symbolic of a religious belief, 
but is, at best, considered a sign of non-integration. The veil renders 
the women more visible by the very fact that they stand out. In speak-
ing to non-Muslims, I came to understand that for many of them, the 
veil is symbolic of an “other” who is dangerous in her ambiguity and 
foreignness.
The geographic distinction between banlieue and non-banlieue is 
critical; for there is a specific culture of the banlieue that helps shape 
individual decisions to veil or not to veil. These areas generally exhibit 
increased public and familial violence, lower educational achievement, 
and higher drug presence.2 There is a culture all its own. Students from 
this neighbourhood, for example, developed their own pigeon-French 
language which they learned to speak so quickly that even native 
French speakers could not follow what they were saying. Many wore 
loose fitting, white or baby-blue exercise suits that buckled at their 
shoes and hung from far below their waists. They walked to school in 
groups of two to four and would speak in raised voices and demon-
strate their points by physically touching or shoving their conversation 
partners. These types of interactions differed from how individuals 
from non-banlieue areas would behave.
This culture is important because it helps form, although it does 
not solely determine, how some women view veiling. It is also impor-
tant because this environment is specific to France and thus helps 
foster a particular setting in which Muslim women make decisions on 
the manifestation of faith. That is not to say that there are not other 
areas in Europe which host a high percentage of Muslims and where 
a distinctive culture has developed. However, France is exceptional 
because of the way the state has managed and (in many cases) spon-
sored the building of large housing estates post World War II.3 The 
irony that these neighbourhoods – many of which have degenerated 
considerably over the last decades – were built largely by foreign 
workers whose descendents now call them home, is not lost on these 
generations.
In the face of increasingly vocal minor-
ity initiatives, Europe is trying to come 
to terms with its diversity. Integration 
has become the buzzword of almost a 
decade of politics. The Dutch are try-
ing to reconcile the face-cover with its 
traditionally liberal social policies, the 
British are re-evaluating the meaning 
of a multiculturalism that many fear 
has gone too far toward balkanization, 
and since 2004 the French have banned religious symbols – most nota-
bly the Muslim headscarf – in public schools across the country. 
Although Muslim groups have not been the only minority communi-
ties in question, many of the debates have focused on the building of 
mosques, education, and religious manifestation and attire, including 
the headscarf. What permeates these discussions is an expectation that 
as the minority group, Muslims are expected to adapt their behaviours 
to meet the socio-cultural norms of the society. These discussions, 
however, fail to consider the intricacy of identity. This is particularly, 
but not exclusively, so for second and third generations of people with 
a background of immigration.
Identities
The expectation of integration of Muslims begs the question, what 
does integration in France mean for a group of approximately four and 
a half million people, many of whom are second and third generation 
French nationals whose parents or grandparents hark from 123 differ-
ent countries?1 They come from diverse regions with varying ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, social backgrounds. This va-
riety equips them to understand religion and its 
importance – or lack thereof – in distinct terms 
that affect the way they understand themselves 
in relation to the wider socio-political framework. 
But this is the case only for those who have a di-
rect experience of immigration, which many (if 
not most) do not have. Many people commonly 
referred to as people issu de l’immigration are in 
fact French nationals; bred, born, and educated. 
Some of them argue that a Muslim may identify 
as both Muslim and French (and woman, man, 
student, etc.) and show that they are in constant 
negotiation within these identities. Stephanie, a 
young convert to Islam made this clear during our 
conversations in her apartment located in one of 
the rougher neighbourhoods just south of Paris. I 
asked her to explain what it means to have to integrate into the society 
of her birth.
I met Stephanie at a weekly prayer group where approximately ten 
women would meet to discuss the Quran and the realities of faith in 
their daily routines. All of the women had a different background to 
share: recent immigrant, not-so-recent-immigrant, local, or a French/
Other mix. All of them wore some sort of head covering, either a ban-
dana-like scarf tied just around the hair, a loose fitting scarf that envel-
oped the head and neck, or a black headscarf that tied closely around 
the head, neck, and body.
Stephanie stood out during the first meeting because of her stunning 
and, at times strongly worded, opinions about how she and her veiled 
Muslim sisters were treated on the streets of France. “We’re spit on, and 
harassed,” she said while the others nodded in agreement. The veil, 
they very clearly voiced over many hours of discussion, was for them a 
religious obligation and a choice they made when they were ready to 
accept the responsibility in light of the general and employment dis-
Drawing from the voices of young Muslim 
women living just south of Paris, this article 
argues that Muslims are developing a form of 
Islam shaped by French customs, values, and 
institutions. The development of this form 
of religiosity is apparent in the way French 
Muslims negotiate their multiple identities. 
In this process, space plays a crucial role in 
the form of the banlieue.
muslim identities 
in the Banlieue
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I asked her … 
what it means to 
have to integrate 
into the society of 
her birth.
I S I M  R E V I E W  2 2  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 8  4 3
p
h
o
t
o
 b
y
 J
o
E
l
 r
o
b
In
E
 /
 ©
 a
F
p
, 
2
0
0
5
Notes
1. J. Laurence and J. Vaïsse, Integrating 
Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in 
Contemporary France (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 16-19.
2. Ibid. 38-39.
3. Ibid. 35-43. See also Hacène Belmessous, 
Mixité sociale, une imposture: Retour sur un 
mythe français (Nantes: Atalante, 2006).
4. Leila Ahmed argues that, “meanings of hijab 
… are intensely local.” See L. Ahmed, “The 
Veil Debate – Again,” in On Shifting Ground: 
Muslim Women in the Global Era (New York: 
The Feminist Press, 2005), 153-171.
Melanie Adrian is Lecturer at Harvard University. 
Email: adrian@fas.harvard.edu
tions and social expectations. Thus, the women agreed that it was rea-
sonable to expect them to remove the veil when picking up children 
at school or when posing for identification papers or to be treated by a 
male physician at the hospital. They were very well aware that certain 
concessions had to be made because they are living in France. 
Integrated identities
The women were clear about the concessions and equally as lucid 
about their boundaries. They drew the line, for example, at the prohibi-
tion on getting married in a veil or veiling in school. By not allowing 
young women to veil in schools, French society is making them choose 
between religion and education – an impossible choice, they thought. 
Stephanie, in her typically provocative manner, conveyed her frustra-
tion, “I understand that they [educators] are sick and tired of the issue 
and that they don’t give a shit … but if we need to suppress everyone’s 
liberties, then that’s what I call a dictatorship.”
Identities are complex and are themselves reflections of the incorpo-
ration of various cultures within the individual. In addition, there is, as 
Stephanie and her friends demonstrate, a trend toward the develop-
ment of a specifically French Muslim culture and manifestation of faith 
– a local Islam. It is distinctively French because of the negotiations 
made by believers that both limit and express their faith in this particu-
lar socio-political context. The reality of integrated identities and the 
development of a local Islam show that it is problematic to focus on 
integration as a means to reconcile religious and cultural diversity. 
Personal capacity
Each woman I spoke to made the choice to veil or not to veil. The 
differences were the result of a symbiotic relationship between this 
specific French context and their personalities, value orientation, and 
personal history. For example, Stephanie chose not to veil while her 
sister-in-law took to wearing the veil a year ago. The manner in which 
each person professed her faith lay in her understanding of herself, 
her history, family, comfort level, and ability to sustain the (at times) 
negative repercussions of being part of a visible minority. What was 
common to them all was that they believed that religion should not be 
difficult. As Stephanie said, “Religion is easy – it just has to be adapted 
to your situation. God said that when I give you a situation, do what 
you can … but it should never be hard for you, that’s not the goal.” 
Thus, the veil as it is worn, or not worn, by the women is in some ways 
uniquely “French” because they are responding to the specific context 
in that country. A friend of Stephanie’s explained it to me in this way: 
“We try to advance with the Quran and there are people who take it 
more or less seriously. There is a verse in the Quran which says that 
God gives to each according to one’s personal ability … you see the 
women outside who are completely covered? God has given them the 
capacity to wear all of this … with the gloves and all that. Personally, 
I’m still too little for that. I don’t have the courage to do that … All of 
these things, we try to progress with all of this, according to each of 
our own capacities.”
This understanding of each according to her capacity or ability is an 
important notion used by the women to sustain, encourage, and sup-
port their understanding of religious duty balanced with what they 
see as “fitting in” to French society. The women explained that they 
each had the responsibility to understand their own histories and situ-
ations and made a determination on the manifestation of faith based 
on this complete picture. If someone did not feel strong enough to 
wear the veil given the harassment, or, if she needed to work and this 
proved difficult because of the veil, she might make her choice based 
on these series of factors. That is not to say that these decisions would 
be made lightly or necessarily involved removing the veil, but this un-
derstanding of capacity would allow them to decide for themselves. 
This negotiation with the local culture can be seen as the development 
of a “local Islam,” as Leila Ahmed argues.4 This is an Islam of France as 
opposed to an Islam in France. 
It is through using this logic of capacity that the rules decreed by 
religion are negotiated – within the context of socio-political institu-
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continued along similar lines, arguing 
“take care of your prayers – that is the 
message of Ali. Spend more time doing 
them and your life will change.” 
Such interpretations diverge radically 
from earlier interpretations of Ashura 
in the Middle East. For example, in Iran 
in the mid 70s, religious authorities 
championed Imam Ali’s death at the 
hands of Yazid as part of a discourse re-
quiring dissent and opposition to mo-
narchical tyranny in order to obtain a 
just and Islamic political order. Reflect-
ing the tyrannical practices of the Shah, this interpretation absorbed 
not only the class struggle but also the economic and social cadences 
of the time.
In Britain, individualized interpretations find their way into a variety 
of media, impacting upon the message of Muharram and the nature 
of Shiism. A leaflet drawn up by the AhlulBayt Islamic Mission (AIM 
ISLAM), a Shia organization set up by young professionals and univer-
sity students with the aim of educating Shia, Sunni, and non-Muslim 
students about Islam, describes Imam Hussayn as “a symbol of love.” 
The leaflet does not include traditional pictorial depictions of Hussayn 
at the battle of Karbala, but rather, the text is overlaid above a drawing 
of flowers. Other leaflets produced, also intended partly for Shia con-
sumption, liken Imam Hussayn to internationally recognized figures 
such as Mahatma Gandhi.
Such patterns are mirrored elsewhere. One shaykh, during a lecture 
in the run-up to Ashura, stressed the appeal of Imam Hussayn to “Jews, 
Christians, and Buddhists,” reflecting the exigencies of a globalized, 
multicultural society and giving the Third Imam a patina of deculturi-
zation. This is reflected in the film Karbala: When Skies Wept Blood, a 
commentary by a variety of primarily British, Muslim authorities on the 
chronology of Imam Hussayn’s death. The film, among the first of its 
kind, is intended for the younger generation of British Shia. Made by 
a British–Iraqi university student it has reportedly sold or distributed 
over 5000 copies. One of the main regrets voiced by the film’s director, 
was that there was no time during the filming to include commentary 
by a priest, in order to “add variety.” The stated intention of the director 
was to produce a film that would resemble The Passion of the Christ, 
though he regretted that the budget did not stretch that far. 
Whilst only relatively few in the Middle Eastern community practice 
tatbir (flagellation to express mourning for Imam Hussayn), even this 
practice has been transmuted. One participant describes the practice 
as “a way of cleaning out your head,” thereby transmuting a religious 
obligation into self-help psychology similar to non-religious practices. 
Religious authority
The trend towards post-Islamist individualization is also visible in a 
variety of Shia practices. Notably, the concept of marja‘iyya, the choice 
of religious representation, is undergoing modification. Whereas fol-
lowers once chose one specific authority to follow and adopted his 
ruling, among some in the younger generation there appears to be a 
shift in attitude. In this group, an individual follows different marja‘a 
for rulings on different topics, adopting a bricolage style. According to 
one Shia lay activist, this has become “a personal issue,” an “individual 
In the past few years, lectures, commu-
nity organizations, and films intended 
for the consumption of the younger, 
English-speaking generation of Shia 
in the United Kingdom have sprung 
up. Numbers for the Shia community 
in the UK vary wildly, but estimates 
given by members of the community 
are generally between 200,000 and 
600,000. Whilst the first Twelver Shia to 
arrive in the UK hailed from the Indian 
subcontinent, Iraqis and Iranians form 
the largest groups of UK Shia, followed 
by those from the Subcontinent, the 
Khoja community, Alevis as well as far smaller numbers of Lebanese 
and Shia from the Gulf, and non-Twelver immigrants. Communities 
are, in general, geographically distributed in the UK according to their 
place of origin.
Every marja’a (Shia religious authority) has an office in the UK, from 
the Imam Ali Foundation, the Liaison office of Ayatollah Sistani, to Shira-
zi’s office. The various institutions differ greatly in size, ranging from al 
Khoei Foundation, which has schools attached and maintains relations 
with the government, to smaller hussayniyyat catering for small local 
communities. Some Shia institutions also participate in larger umbrella 
organizations which include non-Shia, such as the Muslim Council of 
Britain. Officially, there are good relations with the Sunni community, 
but privately, many in the Shia community will speak of a souring of 
relations as a result of the large Wahhabi presence in the UK.
Celebrating Ashura
The emergence of post–Islamist patterns among British Shia is most 
evident during the month of Muharram and the time of Ashura, which 
marks the martyrdom of Ali, the Third Imam, and the theological pivot 
of Shiism. In the Shia world, the death of Ali has been recounted in a va-
riety of ways. In the UK, interpretations of Ashura offered to the youth 
portray an individualized and instrumentalized Shiism, a religion seen 
as a tool for self-improvement and personal happiness. This re-reading 
has been fuelled by the desire of Shia activists to 
capture the imagination of the under twenty-five 
generation. 
On the tenth of Muharram, in 2007, in a hall 
in London, one shaykh addressed a gathering 
of around 300 teenagers and young men and 
women in English. He boldly proclaimed Ashura 
has three goals, the first of which is “self-reforma-
tion,” beseeching the crowd to “lets pay attention 
to ourselves.” Near the end of his talk, which de-
liberated on the immorality of drink, drugs, and 
non-marital relations, he declared that the most 
important item at home is a mirror, insinuating 
that its importance supersedes that of a Quran. 
This item, the shaykh continued, will enable us 
to “look inside our heart, so we can improve our 
behaviour.” He compared Ashura to the flight one 
takes towards a holiday destination, arguing that 
“you will enjoy this journey” and emphasising the 
pleasure and reward this will afford the partici-
imam hussayn is love 
Individualization of 
Shia Practices in Britain
Religious Practice & Piety
Britain’s Shia community is currently 
engaged in a process of individualization 
and privatization of religious belief. The 
recent flourishing of lectures, community 
organizations, and films intended for 
youth points to the younger, English 
speaking generation as the primary locus 
of change. Exploring Shia activities during 
Muharram and Ashura, this article traces the 
changing nature of religious authority and 
the structure of community organization 
among the second generation of the Middle 
Eastern Twelver British Diaspora.
… leaflets … 
like Imam Hussayn 
to internationally 
recognized figures 
such as Mahatma 
Gandhi
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Ashura march in 
London, 2006 
tation, and transposes it into a traditional 
student activism framework, not much dif-
ferent from say, environment week. Indeed, 
this year, Ashura Awareness Week in Impe-
rial College University in London, entitled 
“Thirsty for Justice,” focused on water scarcity 
in the region through the prism of the notion 
of injustice, as opposed to more “traditional” 
readings of the sacrifice of Hussayn. Organ-
izers created links with the Environment So-
ciety and instead of showing the customary 
visual images of Imam Hussayn, the stand 
was stacked with water bottles and covered 
with a motif of a green leaf, stickers of which 
were also handed out to passers-by.
These developments mirror post–Islamist 
trends documented in certain Sunni com-
munities in the West and among some so-
cial strata in the Middle East. Olivier Roy has 
argued that an individualization of Islam is 
taking place, whereby “faith is a face to face 
encounter … between individuals and them-
selves,”1 a shift from “religion to religiosity”2 
and the recasting of Islam “in spiritualist 
and moral terms.”3 This argument dovetails 
with Asef Bayat’s thesis on Egyptian society, 
which argues that emphasis in now placed 
on “an active piety concerned with personal 
salvation and culture.”4 It also echoes Patrick 
Haenni’s “Islam du Marché,” which focuses 
upon the quest for individual happiness, in-
cluding ambition and social success.5 It is among the younger genera-
tions in the West, distanced from the “traditional” religious authorities 
held in esteem by their parents and benefiting from the transforma-
tions engendered by new media, that these general trends are most 
perceivable.
The younger generation of Middle Eastern British Shia very much 
reflects these processes. Individualization has found an outlet in the 
message of Ashura and the portrayal of Imam Hussayn in a variety of 
media. It is also reflected in practices intimately tied to Ashura and Shi-
ism in general, including the nature of religious 
authority and the structure of community organi-
zation, impacting upon the shape and form of the 
religion in the UK.
choice,” whereby the believer decides autonomously which 
elements of Islam (s)he considers to be binding.  
Another symbol of this transformation is the growth in lay 
figures delivering what can be termed as religious instruc-
tion to the younger community. Whilst Muharram lectures 
are still delivered by qualified shaykhs, non-traditional, non-
learned figures are also growing in importance. Part of the 
reason for this transformation is a result of the English lan-
guage difficulties of the older generation of clerics and the 
generational gap between them and British Shia youth. “Up 
until five years ago, we were excluded. There was a language 
and generation gap which prevented others from under-
standing what we face, what it’s like, living in a western so-
ciety” pronounces Bushara, a twenty three year old Bahraini-
British Shia dressed in black, sitting in a lecture hall in North 
West London on the eve of Ashura. The use of lay people 
testifies to the fragmentation of authority structures, the 
democratization of the paths to experience religious “truth,” 
and new ways of interaction between religious authorities 
and recipients of religious knowledge. A plurality of voices 
is highlighted and the monopoly of religious truth is broken 
down.
Noor Youth, an organization run by students and devoted 
to young Shia life in Britain, invites not only scholars, but 
also lay people to deal with topics from abortion to drug use 
from the Shia perspective, because, as one of the organizers 
phrased the matter, “we find it really easy to relate to them.” 
An article on AIM ISLAM’s website which stressed the need 
to recruit speakers, both scholars and lay people, argued 
that “no matter what your occupation is, gaining enough 
knowledge to give lectures and preach about Islam isn’t that 
far-fetched.” Although the article distinguished between the 
two categories, it is clear from the comment section that not 
all respondents made the same distinction and that they 
saw little wrong in lay people delivering a form of religious 
instruction.
One student activist at an Ahlul Bayt Society (a Shia stu-
dent society) at a London university phrased the choice of 
speakers as “it depends what you mean by a scholar, we 
obviously wouldn’t take someone off the street, they need 
to have a general understanding of Shia issues” thereby not 
addressing the question of whether a formal Shia education 
is necessary.
In the Karbala film, the focus was as much on lay people 
as on traditional clerics. Out of the various figures chosen to 
give a commentary, several were lay people and women. Al-
though the two groups were dressed differently (the clerics 
wore traditional garb) the film made no distinction between 
the importance and relevance of the lectures by the learned 
and non-learned, with both groups interviewed against a 
background of holy books, thereby equating the type (and 
nature of acquisition) of knowledge of both groups. The 
justification for this, according to the director of the film, is 
that “sometimes a non-‘alim can speak better than a ‘alim.” 
Bushara echoes this argument arguing that “a mixture of scholar and 
non-scholar is ideal.” This overall trend has provoked a response from 
trained scholars, who fear counter claims to their authority. As one tra-
ditionally trained scholar lamented to me following a speech by a stu-
dent activist about Ashura “he is competition for us.”
New activities
Another signifier of the individualization of Shia Islam in the United 
Kingdom is the growth of new forms of organization and activity ca-
tering to the second generation. The launching of “Ashura Awareness 
Week” on university campuses, particularly in the south of the UK, is 
a clear example. This event, which began roughly four years ago and 
takes place during Muharram, is intended for Shia, Sunni, and non-
Muslim students. The aim, in the words of a student campaigner, is to 
“raise awareness of the morals of Karbala” for non-Muslim students, 
and to help Shia students to “relate issues to our own community… 
to benefit itself and its people.” Ashura Awareness Week entails set-
ting up stalls, organizing lectures, and handing out material. As such, 
it detaches Ashura from its religious connotation of a one-day lamen-
Religious Practice & Piety
…“no matter 
what your 
occupation is, 
gaining enough 
knowledge to 
give lectures 
and preach 
about Islam 
isn’t that far-
fetched.”
Dana Moss is Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies 
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Note
1. Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam (London: Hurst 
& Company, 2004), 185.
2. Ibid. 9.
3. Ibid. 191.
4. At http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/639/fe1.
htm.
5. At http://www.monde-diplomatique.
fr/2003/09/HAENNI/10460.
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Students in a 
Tehran park
ing Ahmadinejad’s sense of hygiene 
actually reached him. He did not find 
the joke as funny as many others had 
found it and ordered disruption of the 
mobile text services. The disruption 
of mobile services, in fact, became a 
frequent occurrence, as is the prac-
tice of blocking access to particular 
Internet websites considered harmful. 
Moreover, the young men and women 
who were traditionally stopped and 
searched for badhijabi, or un-Islamic 
dressing by the Basij (auxiliary police) were now searched for jokes on 
sensitive matters on their mobile phones. The chief prosecutor of Te-
hran, Saeed Mortazavi, was reported to have warned those who spread 
jokes and rumours against political leaders with prosecution and con-
fiscation of their phones.3 It is not clear how far the threat was carried 
out, but there were widespread rumours of individuals who were being 
prosecuted for blogging seditious jokes. Though there is no law against 
jokes per se, the sixth article of the Iranian constitution forbids anyone 
from insulting and “instigating individuals and groups to act against 
the security, dignity, and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran” and 
“offending the Leader of the Revolution and recognized religious au-
thorities.” The political/religious leadership as well as “sensitive” gov-
ernment policies, thus, constitute the sacred sphere that may not be 
subjected to ridicule. Yet, jokes, cartoons and satires on such “sensitive” 
political subjects continue to appear unceasingly in the Iranian public 
sphere.  The obvious question is: how to read humour that is at once 
popular and perilous? 
“Reading” political humour in Iran
A particular view gaining ground in the western media is that these 
jokes are evidence of ordinary people’s resistance to the Iranian state 
power.4 The frame of “political humour” is frequently borrowed from 
the former Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean experience to explain the jokes 
as subversive response to “totalitarian 
regimes” like that in Iran. This is partly 
due to the popular discourse on “con-
formism” in communist societies and 
partly because the western gaze on 
revolutionary Iran is largely framed 
through the binary of hegemony/re-
sistance. Even before President Bush 
labelled Iran as part of the “axis of evil” 
in 2002, the Islamic revolution of 1979 
was already viewed suspiciously in the 
West as the harbinger of totalitarian-
ism. Thus, any government post-1979 
is a priori assumed to be in contraven-
tion to the will of the Iranian people 
who could only be in opposition to it. 
This binary neatly split the good “peo-
ple” from the evil “regime,” thereby lay-
ing ground for a possible military inter-
vention to “liberate” the Iranian people. 
The appearance of jokes soon after the 
election of Ahmadinejad conveniently 
fed into this discourse of people vs. 
regime. This article challenges such 
narrow readings of Iranian political 
humour, locating it instead in those 
“One day, Ahmadinejad found lice crawl-
ing on his head. He took a comb and 
made a neat middle parting in his hair. 
Someone asked him why he had done 
that. He replied, ‘One side is for male lice 
and the other for females’.”
“Do you know what caused cholera in 
Tehran? Yes, Ahmadinejad finally took 
a bath and washed his socks in river 
Karaj.”
One of the more entertaining aspects 
of Iranian politics is the burgeoning 
repertoire of jokes and satire it has produced in the public domain. It is 
not unusual to find young people – alone or in groups – hunched over 
their mobile phones in public parks, streets, restaurants, and shopping 
centres dexterously circulating and receiving funny text messages. 
That a new funny joke has just made an appearance is duly noted with 
a burst of laughter and shared smiles. While a wide variety of jokes – 
ethnic and regional stereotypes, sexual proclivities of individuals and 
communities – are available for popular consumption, it is the jokes 
aimed at political developments and personalities that evoke most at-
tention among the youth population as well as the state authorities. 
The Ahmadinejad jokes, for example, have struck a particular cord 
with the youths who form a sizeable proportion of the population and 
whose techno-savvy ensures instant circulation and mass availability 
of these jokes.1 The under-thirty year population reportedly accounts 
for the largest consumer share of a rapidly growing telecom market in 
Iran that records traffic of twenty million text messages per day.2 This 
has spawned an electronic humour loop that, unlike the oral traditions 
of joke-telling, instantly amplifies, archives, and makes available the 
contents in transnational locations. 
That jokes are not just innocuous entertainment became clear when 
in 2005 the telecommunications department tried to disrupt the short 
messaging service (SMS). The story goes that one of the jokes ridicul-
the Politics of humour
in iran
r A V i n d e r  k A u r
Society & the State
Though the genre of political humour is 
popular across different societies, it is 
commonly seen as a product of repressive 
regimes – a mild substitute for free speech 
and public critique denied to people therein. 
Moving away from the binary of totalitarian 
vs. democratic states, this article reads 
the recent spurt in Ahmadinejad jokes in 
Iran as a middle class response to fears of 
a return to the conservative agenda that 
Ahmadinejad’s victory symbolized.  
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Another joke along the same line is:
“If anybody needs more transportation than 
their three-litre coupon affords them, they can 
ride one of those seventeen million asses who 
voted for me two years ago.”
While the first joke displaces the political leader-
ship from its position of comfort to the perils of 
violent contestation over precious resources in 
everyday life, the second locates the source of 
frustration within the people for having brought 
Ahmadinejad to power. The joke tellers often 
laughingly apologise for causing offence to those 
seventeen million people, yet the message is clear 
– these voters had brought in a President who had 
falsely vowed to bring the country’s oil wealth to 
the ordinary people. In other words, it is as much a 
self-critique for bringing the country to the brink 
of disaster as a critique of the leadership. 
A two-fold interlinked conclusion follows. 
Firstly, the object of ridicule in the Ahmadinejad 
jokes presented above is not necessarily the state 
power in revolutionary Iran, rather the represent-
atives of state who are found unworthy of the exalted office they oc-
cupy.  Of all the political leaders of the Islamic republic, Ahmadinejad 
has been a particularly popular figure of lampoon among the youths 
and the upper classes. His street level polemics, ill-fitting clothes, 
unkempt beard, and slight frame offer a study in contrast compared 
to Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, the elegant and erudite former Presi-
dent Khatami. While Khatami’s term is not necessarily remembered in 
glowing terms, he has seldom been subjected to ridicule in the same 
ways. A frequent sentiment expressed is that Khatami with his strik-
ing appearance, flowing robes, and learned disposition was a suitable 
and respectable representative of modern Iran to the outside world. 
Whereas Ahmadinejad in comparison is more a rabble-rouser from the 
congested, less prosperous, lower-middle class South Tehran districts 
than a distinguished statesman. The ridicule that he is subjected to is 
also of a more intimate nature, for example, his lacking sense of hy-
giene, simple-mindedness, and feeble logic. The popularity of these 
jokes, particularly among the urban middle classes, testify to the social 
class distinctions at subtle play in the way Ahmadinejad is identified as 
the object of mockery and consequently unfit to represent the Iranian 
state.
Secondly, the wide popularity of Ahmadinejad jokes signifies both 
the continued disenchantment with the state power and unintended 
corrosion of its visage. These dual processes enable the subjects to re-
figure their own position in relation to the state power through hu-
mour. The ascendance of Ahmadinejad to the state power was a shock-
ing event, representing fear and uncertainty, particularly for the elite 
and urbane upper-middle classes. The depth and intensity of humor-
ous ridicule and the extreme response of Ahmadinejad in closing down 
the mobile networks are indicators of this ongoing political refigura-
tion in Iran.   
aspects of state power that invoke fear, loathing, and uncertainty in a 
given context. Humour is situated here as a fresh vantage point from 
where to view the complicated field of interaction with the state power 
in everyday life. 
A central concern, therefore, to our understanding of political hu-
mour is its “commonsense” association with totalitarian states.  I sug-
gest that the production and circulation of political humour be located 
outside the binary of totalitarian vs. democratic states, and more spe-
cifically in those aspects that invoke fear, loathing, and uncertainty in 
a given context. The genre of political humour – jokes, satires, and car-
toons offering a commentary on political developments – is a familiar 
one in most societies and not restricted to those labelled “totalitarian” 
alone.  For example, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent “war on 
terror,” at once, inhabit an emotive, fearful, and perilous domain within 
the American domestic politics. While serious political critique was 
sparse until more recently, the Internet has long been abuzz with “Bush 
jokes” that ridiculed critical intelligence failures leading up to 9/11, Iraq 
war as Bush’s personal revenge on Saddam Hussein for plotting to kill 
his father, and Bush’s ill-informed and ill-prepared military advisors 
who committed strategic blunders among others.  These jokes make 
possible airing of uncensored opinions, conspiracy theories, rumours, 
and other unacknowledged, albeit highly potent, forms of information 
about a theme that remains “sensitive” in American politics.  
Politics of humour
Since 2005, one of the most visible symbols of state power within 
Iran and outside has been the persona of President Ahmadinejad. He is, 
on the one hand, spectacularly associated with the escalation of inter-
national conflicts over nuclear energy, involvement in Iraq, and rivalry 
with Israel, and on the other, his personification of his government’s 
inability to fulfil election promises to the poorest, rising inflation, fears 
of US military strikes, and internal dissatisfaction.  His ascent to power 
also coincides with the marked increase in production and circulation 
of political jokes. While most political leaders are subjected to ridicule, 
it is Ahmadinejad who has emerged as the favourite figure of utter de-
rision and lampoon in the production of jokes. For example, a popular 
joke connects his personality with the attributes of filth:
“If you want to see Ahmadinejad in your dreams, do not take a show-
er for forty days. Then, for forty nights, right at nine, put the garbage 
bin in the middle of the room. You will see him in your dream on the 
fortieth night.”
This joke takes on a popular tradition of seeking the blessings of re-
vered saints or deceased family members in dreams. To invoke the 
spirits from the other world, many rituals and prayers involving objects 
and practices associated with the desired person’s earthly life are re-
quired. In this joke, Ahmadinejad is inextricably linked with unclean 
bodies and refuse collection, both undesired objects and expendable 
therefore.  The joke bears a double-edged transgressive quality that 
not only dislocates Ahmadinejad from his familiar political habitus into 
the realm of bare and vulnerable, but also allows personal ridicule to 
shape the political field. 
The Ahmadinejad jokes are primarily of two kinds – about his person 
and the governmental policies he espouses.  A good example of the lat-
ter is the recent petrol rationing policy that became a source of discon-
tent in Iran. In 2007, Ahmadinejad announced a small price hike of five 
pence and placed limits on fuel consumption. This was a politically vola-
tile occurrence in a country that reportedly is the world’s fourth largest 
oil exporter and where consumers take cheap fuel for granted. The ra-
tioning system allowed each consumer coupons worth three litres each 
with a limit of 100 litres for private cars and 800 litres for registered taxis 
per month. A major source of livelihood in big cities like Tehran is taxi 
services and often, private cars double up as taxis during peak hours. 
The announcement caused widespread unrest and violence especially 
in Tehran where ten petrol stations were burnt overnight. This mix of 
resentment, frustration, and anxiety over consequences of fuel ration-
ing soon became inspiration for popular jokes. For example:
“A passerby asked a man standing in a mile long queue outside a Te-
hran petrol station, ‘what is this queue for?’ The man replied, ‘a gang 
of thugs has kidnapped Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad and they are 
threatening to burn them alive if we do not pay $30 million before 
midnight.’ The passerby said, ‘Oh, so you are contributing to the ran-
som amount to free them.’ ‘No,’ said the man, ‘we are collecting petrol 
to burn them before the kidnappers do.’”
Society & the State
Notes
1. The 15–24 years old youth population 
is estimated at 25% of a total of ca. 70 
million. The under-15 years population was 
estimated in 2005 at 29% (according to the 
UN Human Development Report 2007). 
2. The number of mobile phone users was 
reported at 21,300,000 in December 2007 
(nearly one third of the population) and 
is projected to reach 36,000,000 by 2009. 
The Internet connections are pegged at 
12,500,000 though it may be significantly 
higher because of the Internet cards sold 
in open market. Performance Report, 
Telecommunication Company of Iran, 
December 2007, at www.irantelecom.ir. 
3. See http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.
aspx?ID=News-544160.
4. See for example, Robert Tait, “Heard the One 
about the President?” The Guardian, 14 April 
2006.
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aggressively pointed out Ahmadiyya’s 
deviancy and that its followers were to 
be treated as apostates. Most remark-
ably, in 2005 the MUI claimed that the 
Indonesian government was obliged 
to ban the Ahmadiyya movement and 
to close down its premises. 
The MUI’s 2005 fatwa was preceded 
by MUI and government meetings on 
Ahmadiyya and some other religious 
groups. Parallel to these meetings radi-
cal Islamic organizations arranged violent attacks against the JAI’s na-
tional headquarters in Bogor, forcing it to close down in July 2005. Ten 
days later, the MUI’s fatwa proposed the banning of the sect as a correct 
response to the anti-Ahmadiyya violence. However, during that time 
the government was not willing to act upon the demand. The MUI’s 
fatwa has been followed by repeated violence against the premises of 
JAI, Ahmadiyya mosques and the private houses of JAI members. In 
Lombok, for example, over two hundred Ahmadiyya members have 
lived in temporary shelters in the provincial capital Mataram for over 
two years due to violent attacks. 
Violence and inflammatory public speeches by radical Muslim lead-
ers were again used to step up pressure in early 2008 to force the gov-
ernment to ban the JAI. In February 2008, a series of public gatherings 
were organized; during one these gatherings Sobri Lubis, the Secre-
tary-General of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), even urged FPI mem-
bers to kill Ahmadiyya followers. These gatherings took place when the 
JAI and Bakorpakem, an ad hoc coordinating body consisting of the 
representatives of Attorney General’s Office, national intelligence body 
BIN, police, military, and the departments of religion and education, 
were in the middle of subtle negotiations over the acceptability of the 
movement’s beliefs and practices. As a result a list of recommendations 
was drafted on how to make Ahmadiyya “correctly Islamic” again.2 
For three months Bakorpakem teams observed Ahmadi mosques and 
JAI premises, but in April 2008 the body concluded that JAI had not fol-
lowed its twelve recommendations. A joint statement by the Ministry of 
Religion, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General’s Of-
fice was considered necessary. According to the law on religious devia-
tion and offence (No. 1/PNPS/1965), such a statement can recommend 
the President to ban a religious organization or sect. For a moment it 
appeared to be simply a matter of time until the demands of the radi-
cals would be fulfilled, and the MUI “solution” – banning Ahmadiyya 
– would be taken to its final conclusion. Meanwhile, however, JAI and 
the supporters of religious freedom had also organized themselves. JAI 
members demanded the MUI to nullify its fatwa. The National Alliance 
for Freedom of Religion and Belief (AKKBB), a civil society network that 
was initiated after the 2005 attacks, published a petition for religious 
freedom in some major Indonesian newspapers that was signed by 
several notable members of the national elite.
Both sides organized street demonstrations. Finally, on the first of 
June violence took place again when radical Muslims attacked the 
AKKBB’s demonstration at the Monas Square in central Jakarta. After 
the incident it was evident that the government could not just ban Ah-
madiyya, but it had to find a compromise that would please all parties. 
A week later a joint statement was announced, but it appeared to have 
left both sides displeased. The statement does not recommend the 
banning of the JAI, but forbids its members from spreading interpreta-
Since the change of regime in 1998, 
Indonesia has reformed its national 
legislation to better correspond with 
international human rights principles 
by introducing new laws, amending 
the Constitution, and ratifying the core 
international human rights covenants. 
Yet the ongoing struggle over the po-
sition of the Ahmadiyya community 
illustrates that no consensus has been 
achieved on some basic human rights 
principles – namely, freedom of religion. On the one hand, the Ahmadi-
yya case shows how both radical Islamic organizations and defenders 
of freedom of religion make use of public space in trying to influence 
the government. On the other hand, it suggests that the Indonesian 
government still hesitates to let go of state con-
trol over religion. 
The Ahmadiyya case, spurred by demands to 
ban the sect by Muslim radicals and the rejec-
tion of this demand by the supporters of religious 
freedom, has been defined by two major series 
of events. The first, in July 2005, culminated with 
a fatwa by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) 
demanding the government to ban Ahmadi-
yya. The second gathered momentum from late 
2007, reaching its peak in early June 2008 when 
a joint ministerial decree was released concern-
ing Ahmadiyya and its teachings. In both these 
situations, tension was built up by radical Islamic 
organizations through lobbying, inflammatory 
meetings, and violence that aimed at present-
ing Ahmadiyya as “a problem” to which MUI and 
government institutions were supposed to find a 
solution. In this process Islamic radicals have also 
had to deal with counter-lobbying from the sup-
porters of religious freedom who are equally or-
ganized and vocal but non-violent in their efforts 
to have an impact on government policies.
The Ahmadiyya controversy
The Ahmadiyya came to the Indonesian archi-
pelago since the 1920s, and the JAI was formally 
registered by the Indonesian state in 1953. The 
current controversy concerns the JAI, which is 
part of the London-based international Ahmadi-
yya Qadiyani Movement and claims to have up 
to seven hundred thousand members in Indonesia. Indonesia also 
has a smaller Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia with approximately three 
thousand members, representing Ahmadiyya’s Lahore Movement. As 
early as 1980, MUI had issued a fatwa on Ahmadiyya. The decree had 
advised ulamas to inform people that the teachings of Ahmadiyya fell 
outside the bounds of Islam and to redirect the members of Jamaah 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) to go back to the “correct form of Islam.” 
During that time MUI was strictly under government control, and the 
fatwa went largely unnoticed. By 2005, the MUI had become a more 
independent-minded actor, and its statements reflected the growing 
influence of Islamic hardliners in its body.1 In its 2005 fatwa, the MUI 
The recent controversy over the Ahmadiyya 
movement in Indonesia pitted supporters and 
critics of the movement against each other. 
This article shows how both sides present 
their own definition of religious freedom 
and how they push forcefully their views 
on the Indonesian government. The author 
argues that what is at stake is not only the 
destiny of a religious orientation, but also 
thexstate’s power in religious matters.
the Ahmadiyya & 
freedom of religion 
in Indonesia
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… the ongoing 
struggle over 
the position of 
the Ahmadiyya 
community 
illustrates that no 
consensus has been 
achieved on some 
basic human rights 
principles … 
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The AKKBB 
demonstration 
of 1 June 2008
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This article has been repeated in the Indonesian Criminal Code article 
on religious offence, which has been used several times to prosecute 
religious orientations that the Bakorpakem has deemed deviant. 
Legal solutions
FPI leader Habib Rizieq and the former Minister of Justice and Human 
Rights Yusril Ihza Mahendra are among those who have stressed that 
the Ahmadiyya case has nothing to do with freedom of religion and 
merely concerns the besmirching of Islam. Both have suggested that 
the easiest solution to the problem would be that Ahmadiyya declares 
itself a new religion outside Islam, referring particularly to the example 
of Pakistan. But as Indonesia currently only recognizes six world reli-
gions, it is difficult to see how this would resolve the problem without 
leading to others.
According to the anti-Ahmadiyya group, freedom of religion means 
allowing individuals to choose one of the recognized religions or to 
establish a completely new religion. But it does not allow individuals 
to make new interpretations of any already existing religion. Religions 
are fixed, unchanging and have rigid boundaries. This view has been 
criticized by Harkristuti Harkrisnowo, the Director General of Human 
Rights Department at the Indonesian Ministry for Justice and Human 
Rights, who has questioned the very existence of an authority able to 
determine the correct form of Islam or any other religion.6 
The AKKBB plans to take the current legislation to the Constitutional 
Court for judicial review. From their point of view, 
these laws contradict with the Indonesian Con-
stitution that guarantees full freedom of religion. 
If Indonesia would indeed abolish the laws on 
religious offence it would follow the example of 
the United Kingdom in making a historic decision 
in May 2008 to abolish the law that criminalized 
blasphemy. Taking such a decision, Indonesia 
would leave behind countries such as Finland, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Pakistan, and Malaysia, coun-
tries that all have laws criminalizing religious of-
fence and/or blasphemy. 
tions and holding activities that deviate from the principal 
teachings of Islam. The statement does not clearly articulate 
a position on Ahmadiyya and whether continued worship 
would be also considered a form of “spreading its interpreta-
tions” of Islam.
Police complicity
The perpetrators of violence against Ahmadiyya and the 
AKKBB are identified as belonging to such radical Islamic 
organizations as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizb 
ut- Tahrir. Of the two, it is the former that is known to provide 
the muscle for street actions. The FPI’s close association with 
the police again became apparent in the anti-Ahmadiyya 
attacks. According to eyewitnesses, during the 2005 attack 
against the Ahmadiyya premises in Bogor the police sup-
ported the mobs carrying out attacks.3 Police also failed to 
prevent the violence during the AKKBB demonstration in 
Jakarta, even though they were well aware of the possibility 
of a clash. 
The history of the FPI’s origins provides some explanation 
for police inaction if not collusion. It is no secret that the FPI 
was created in 1998 with the help of then Commander of 
Armed Forces General Wiranto and the Jakarta Police Chief 
Nugroho Jayusman.4 At first, a “voluntary security force” of thousands 
of petty gangsters and hooligans was a useful tool against the student-
led pro-democracy demonstrations that heavily criticized the first 
post-Suharto government and demanded the perpetrators of human 
rights abuses, including Wiranto himself, to be taken to justice. While 
other such vigilante groups disappeared, the FPI continued its activi-
ties, and became famous for its raids on places of entertainment and 
prostitution. It coordinated its actions with the police, and despite 
some disagreement, the close relations between the two have been 
upheld throughout the post-Suharto years. In 2006, the police even 
sponsored FPI leader Habib Rizieq’s speaking tour in Poso, a region hit 
by communal conflict.5
The raids conducted by the FPI in the name of its populist Islamic 
radicalism may have assisted the police in its efforts to keep criminality 
and murky businesses under some control. But the attack against the 
AKKBB, whose members include prominent Indonesian politicians and 
intellectuals, apparently exceeded the limits of tolerance of state au-
thorities towards their actions. Four days after the Monas incident, the 
Indonesian police organized a spectacular arrest of Habib Rizieq and 
fifty-nine FPI members. It remains to be seen whether the FPI’s warm 
relations with the country’s security forces have now finally turned 
cold. 
What is freedom of religion?
The Ahmadiyya case has led to discussions about the state’s role in 
religious matters. The JAI and the AKKBB insist that the government has 
no right to ban any religious orientation, because it would assault the 
constitutional right of all Indonesian citizens to embrace the religion or 
system of belief of their choice. According to this view, freedom of reli-
gion must be respected at all times, and the substance of any particular 
belief has no relevance. The state should limit its actions to guarantee-
ing public safety and ensure that freedom of religion is respected by 
all. Because Ahmadiyya believers have never caused threat to public 
security, the state has no grounds for forbidding their activities. 
Many AKKBB activists whom I recently interviewed stressed that they 
did not personally agree with the JAI’s religious ideas. They regarded 
Ahmadiyya as a departure from mainstream Sunni Islam that they 
themselves practiced, but they also felt that they had no right or even 
need to interfere with Ahmadiyya’s religious ideas. From their point of 
view, religiosity is creative like any other form of human activity. New 
interpretations of existing religions are acceptable and even welcome, 
but nobody should try to force his own beliefs on anyone else.
Those who support the ban disagree with this view and claim that 
Ahmadiyya’s existence in Indonesia as well as its practices and preach-
ing insults their rights as Indonesian citizens. According to them, the 
state has the obligation to protect religions that are formally recog-
nized in Indonesia from deviant teachings and blasphemy. This view 
is backed with the national law on religious deviation, which prohibits 
anyone from deliberately making interpretations or participating in 
public activities that deviate from the formally recognized religions. 
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the Southern 
movement in yemen
was over and what had come to replace 
it was simply Northern occupation.
With unity came also a political cul-
ture unfamiliar to the South. Corrup-
tion and dishonesty substituted earlier 
good governance.2 It also became evi-
dent that the multi-party system actu-
ally meant choosing the “right” party, 
one that has access to state funds and 
can deliver everything from develop-
ment schemes to land properties and government jobs. Ever since the 
harmony of the early years of unity when government posts were dis-
tributed evenly between Southerners and Northerners, there has been 
no question that the party that delivers is the People’s General Con-
gress, the party of the Republic’s President.
To the disillusionment of the Southerners, the authoritarian system 
of one party rule was simply replaced by clientelism which demanded 
unreserved loyalty to the government in exchange for personal ben-
efits such as a government jobs, expensive cars, or pieces of land; a 
practice they imagined to have originated in the North. Moreover, 
hard-line religious moralizing that spread among the Southerners has 
contributed to the marginalization of women’s earlier visible roles in 
the public sphere.3
There are also economic reasons for dissent. During the 1994 war 
factories in Aden were affected. Machines and raw materials were de-
molished or looted and factories had to send workers, mostly women, 
home. With a salary from the state, these workers just stayed at home 
until years later came their retirement. Now these former factory work-
ers, people in their best productive years, are bitter. With a small pen-
sion that hardly covers daily expenses, they do not waste time in job 
seeking since hardly any new job opportunities have been created. Dr 
Suad Uthman Abdulrahim from Aden University suggests that not only 
rivalry for markets hit the factories but also greed for huge land prop-
erties that the closed factories could release.4 Hunt for lucrative land 
properties has been one of the activities in which the elite has been 
busily engaged. According to some estimates, the Northern elite has 
taken possession of fifty percent of Adeni land. While part of the land 
acquisitions are disputed and some even litigated in court, most land 
distributed is state land without previous private owners.
But political and economic factors are not the only sources of dissent; 
some believe that the two parts of the country have irreversibly differ-
ent cultures, too. While in the North it was common in the early years 
of unity to believe that Southerners are “disbelievers” and that their 
women are “loose,” in the South many viewed Northerners as “ignorant” 
and “looters of state property.” Despite early hope that the two Yemens 
will slowly come together in terms of customs and psychology, South-
erners now think that it is impossible to live with “those people” since 
their culture is entirely different from that of the South. This attitude is 
visible in the manner in which the “South” is symbolically constructed 
in the popular dissent. Bad governance and corruption is thought to be 
characteristic of the Northern culture at large. According to this con-
stellation, the North is imagined as a community of tribes and tribal 
thinking while people in the South are adherents of a nation state ruled 
by state law. Thus the new Southern state is not designed to replicate 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen but to be built according to 
principles of equal citizenship.
Protests
In late spring 2007 dissent started to culminate in public demonstra-
tions and increased criticism was voiced in opposition newspapers and 
civil society media. Popular protests spread throughout the former 
South Yemen and the slogan of infisāl (separation) was also raised 
In a video clip posted on Youtube, im-
ages of mutilated bodies follow one 
another followed by the grim face of 
the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh and the text “In this image he is 
swearing, swearing to clean the land 
from the owners … us!!” It continues 
showing maps of Southern Yemen with 
the text “Our land, our country South 
Arabia” ending with the announce-
ment “We don’t believe in war and power, we will return our land in 
peace.” The background music from the popular rock group Linkin Park 
with the song “In the End” lends a youthful tone to the clip.1
While most of the picture material comes from the London-based 
opposition movement’s Sout al-Ganoub (The Voice of the South) 
website that forms only one arm of the locally rooted movement, the 
sentiments in the video reflect well those prevalent throughout the 
country itself. The video has triggered months-long discussions. One 
participant, Oneyedboxer, expresses sentiments common among 
Adeni youth towards the Northern Yemeni rulers: “don’t you forget 
your Imam(s) locked you for years from civilization; don’t you forget 
that when European officials came to visit North Yemen they used to 
tell you that they are Jinns with blue eyes, so that you don’t talk to 
them… How do you expect a government with ninety percent of its 
people illiterate to rule? Shame on you to have someone rule over you 
who does not even have a high school diploma. This is not a war of the 
South and North, it’s a war of Ideology.”
These and similar voices to be found on the Internet point to today’s 
social and political dissent in what used to be South Yemen, which has 
roots in the uneven state-society relationship and the imbalanced de-
velopment of the two parts of the country. Since Yemeni unification 
this imbalance has to some extent deepened despite opposite expec-
tations, resulting in protests and mass demonstrations. While such pro-
test have been stifled by the government, the movement’s presence on 
the Internet is harder to silence.
Unification of the “one Yemeni homeland”
In the area that forms today’s Republic of Yemen, a centralized admin-
istration and state territorial control have proved to be difficult tasks. 
The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) came into being from a long 
and violent civil war (1962-1969) that brought Egyptian troops and civil 
servants to an area basically untouched by foreign rule. The republican 
state never managed to establish full territorial sovereignty and large 
parts of Northern and Eastern regions still today remain under tribal 
control. In the South, the rulers managed to do something the British 
had failed a little earlier when in 1967 they formed a nation state out of 
the British Colony (Aden) and the two Aden protectorates: the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Whereas the unification in 22 May 1990 was at first enthusiastically 
welcomed by everybody in Yemen, years that followed crushed the il-
lusions in the South. High inflation, inefficiency in running the state 
fiscals, centralization of state bureaucracy and the accompanied mar-
ginalization of Southern administrative centres formed the basis of dis-
satisfaction. Once World Bank policies started to frame socio-economic 
development impoverishment befell not only the poor but also many 
among the middle sectors of society. These were accompanied by kid-
nappings, house robberies, and murders of Southern politicians – pre-
sumably linked to president Saleh. By 1993 it became clear that the 
unity was not on a solid ground and the Southern leaders withdrew to 
Aden. The short but devastating civil war was fought in early summer 
of 1994 between the Northern and Southern army factions. Emerging 
from the war, Southern popular sentiment was that the honeymoon 
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During the past year, people of the former 
South Yemen Republic have joined a popular 
movement demanding fair rule and equal 
citizenship against which the Yemeni 
government has taken harsh methods. While 
the western world concentrates on Al-Qaida and 
kidnapped tourists, the movement has taken 
a visible presence on the Internet, which offers 
a whole new platform for political protest.
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be united with Northern cities where the above demonstrations have 
taken place. A lot will depend on the changes that are evident when Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s presidential term ends in 2013.
Still the Southern Movement has attracted also Northerners in its 
ranks. One of the most well-known is Dr Muhammad al-Saqqaf, law-
yer and university professor who has joined the demands for seces-
sion from the North. When I met him in a sit-in in Aden in March 2008, 
he enthusiastically showed the orange t-shirt and basketball cap that 
he brought from Dhala’. In waiting for international attention, the 
Dhala’ian movement has created a visual image and presence on the 
Internet, inspired by Eastern European popular uprisings. With these 
postmodern elements to fashion the popular uprising, the movement 
wants to show the world that the Southern Yemeni cause deserves glo-
bal media attention, the way of other troubled lands of Tibet, Zimba-
bwe or Ukraine. While the protests have continued a good part of 2008, 
the Southern rebellion finally made top headlines in all international 
news networks at the end of March 2008 to be faded under news about 
the “Yemeni Al-Qaida.”
Parliamentary elections are due in April 2009. However, people joke 
about their need to get to vote in the US elections as whatever hap-
pens on the superpower’s political stage will have a bigger effect on 
their lives than the results of the Yemeni elections.
Meanwhile, in a manner typical to Yemeni politics at large, elite re-
sponse to the problems in the South has been to establish new “civil 
society” bodies. Two competing committees have been established 
to ensure a smooth move towards a democratic process and to end 
the civil unrest. The first one, established by Presidential Decree and 
headed by one of President’s Southern allies, was charged with the 
task to evaluate the situation in the South and to 
find solutions to calm down popular dissent and 
to work towards enhancing national unity. A com-
peting committee, the Yemeni Centre for Histori-
cal Studies and Future Strategies, was to follow, 
set up by prominent Northern army generals, and 
members of the political elite and intelligentsia 
from both South and North. While it is clear that 
the former committee works in close contact with 
the government and the latter one with the op-
position parties, it remains to be seen whether 
this truly Yemeni solution to the problem, setting 
up of new “NGOs” to hold meetings preferably in 
five-star hotels, ever finds feasible solutions to 
the deep-rooted dissent prevalent throughout 
the country.
among al-harakat al-ganubiyyat (Southern movement) as 
the movement is popularly known. The movement is partic-
ularly strong in Hadhramaut governorate to the east where 
most of oil wealth comes from. The activities there have in-
cluded stopping Northern people from buying or confiscat-
ing land, erecting road blocs to harass drivers with Northern 
license plates, and pushing demands for getting at least 
twenty percent of the oil income.
The Southern movement has no national leadership or 
joint organization and locally takes a variety of forms. It has 
been most active in small towns in Dhala’ governorate, some 
hundred kilometres north of Aden where the 1963 Southern 
revolution had its starting point. These locally based initia-
tives are not necessarily connected to exiled Yemenis who 
have formed the Southern Democratic Assembly (TAJ) in 
London, or with the National Opposition Front (MOWJ), an 
older resistance coalition working from outside but active 
on the Internet.
The movement unites people of all social strata. It was 
sparked in spring 2007 by popular protests organized by the 
Yemeni Retired Military Consultative Association, formed by 
former military commanders and army men. Following the 
1994 reorganization of the army, these men feel they have 
faced systematic discrimination. Often accompanied by unemployed 
youth, former civil servants and factory workers, as well as human 
rights activists, demonstrations have been staged in front of local gov-
ernment premises. Due to lack of job opportunities and discrimination 
in access to foreign education, youth with university and high school 
diplomas have also joined the movement. Since the revolution this is 
the first time young people have taken an active role in politics, which 
predicts a good future for civil society activities in the South at large.
Notwithstanding the arrest of leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party 
(YSP), political parties and the opposition united in the Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP) largely remain outside the movement. These parties, most 
notably the Islah Party (Congregation for Reform) and the YSP took a 
long time to announce support to the movement. In addition, activists 
of the movement regard the opposition parties’ cooperation with the 
government with aversion. 
Secession or federation
While most people in the South view that a change is necessary, not 
all agree that secession would be the right solution. Another scheme is 
federation where each governorate (Yemen is divided into 21 governo-
rates) could enjoy autonomy, including deciding on its own norms for 
public morality. A group of religious personalities recently demanded 
the establishment of a state body to monitor public virtues in the man-
ner of Saudi Arabia, causing alarm among Southerners.
In another upsetting incidence Nasir al-Shaibani, the former Minister 
of Religious Endowments (awqaf) and currently preacher in a Northern 
mosque, issued a fatwa against the protestors calling them “Infidels” 
and “Communists” who want to “Christianize and Americanize the coun-
try,” thus applying rhetoric typical to some Islamist groups throughout 
the Middle East. In response, the Coordination Council of Military and 
Civil Retirees Societies, joined by the unemployed youth committees in 
all Southern governorates, filed a lawsuit against the former minister 
accusing him of instigating bloodshed in the demonstrations.
Still the question of secession and re-establishing a state to the terri-
tory that used to be the PDRY is not an uncomplicated issue. Historical-
ly a big number of Adenis have roots in Ta’izz area just across the former 
border. These Adenis object to any secession even if otherwise favour-
able to the Southern cause. While culturally Ta’izz resembles the South, 
inclusion of this fertile area in a secessionist state would be out of the 
question for the mighty Northern highland tribes. To the Yemeni state 
the movement poses a big challenge alongside other problems caused 
by sympathizers of Al-Qaida and the armed conflict that was going on 
in the Northern province of Sa’ada for years, all making foreign ana-
lysts call Yemen a potential failed state.5 It is evident that the govern-
ment cannot just suppress the movement and disregard its demands. 
Throughout Yemen similar anti-government protests have occurred 
where demands for price regulation, fair rule, measures to eradicate 
poverty and equal distribution among regions of national resources, 
and development schemes have been raised. Unless the movement 
stops being framed as a movement for the South it is unlikely that it will 
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not be problematized as incompatible 
with their identity as national citizens. 
In fact, the British government is in-
creasingly recognizing that the fact 
that British Muslims are full members 
of a wider global community can be a 
considerable asset, and includes them 
as prominent British representatives in 
their initiatives to build stronger diplo-
matic ties in the Muslim world.2 
The first two features of agonistic respect open up political space to dis-
agreement rather than enforcing consensus, and use politics to express 
private identity in the public sphere. Accordingly, agonistic respect gen-
erates a more appropriate paradigm for analyzing the place of radically 
“different” group – such as some Muslim – in liberal politics. This analysis 
treats “difference” in the realm of ideas as an advantage rather than a 
problem, and prevents democratic politics becoming a sphere within 
which liberalism is entrenched as the received dogma. Agonistic respect 
enables established concepts, such as what is meant by “gender equal-
ity,” to be problematized and debated in ways that are similar to the 
“free market place of ideas” envisaged by classical liberals such as J.S. 
Mill. Agonistic respect’s implication of non-territorial democratization 
explicitly de-links liberal democracy from geographical limits, thereby 
providing an ideal paradigm for analyzing the global context of Muslim 
politics, as seen, for example, in the Danish cartoon affair.
A model of agonistic respect is valuable not only because it is more 
inclusive than a liberal-consensus model, but also because it strength-
ens liberal values as it defends them. One recent example of this is the 
“veil debate” which has led to a substantial debate about the status of 
women. This heated debate has, in turn, led to Muslims explaining their 
distinct ideas about women’s rights, as well as non-Muslims articulat-
ing and defending their central political commitment to gender equal-
ity. In this way, in addition to providing a model in which liberal democ-
racies can engage with non-liberal ideas, agonistic respect treats the 
constant problematizing of freedom of speech or gender equality as a 
means of strengthening these core values and liberal politics.
Despite its arguable value, a model of liberal democracy based on 
agonistic respect is not a panacea. It raises questions about the impli-
cations of adopting this strategy for liberal politics. For instance, does 
this process of engagement undermine the critical edge of discourse 
in the public sphere? How does a liberal democracy ensure that non-
liberal groups are themselves willing to engage in a relationship of “ag-
onistic respect”? Furthermore, does the model collapse into uncritical 
acceptance of difference? Does liberal politics have to accommodate 
all illiberal practices in the name of tolerance and “respect”? Such dif-
ficult questions must be addressed to move successfully from a dis-
course about the potential of “agonistic respect” towards its practical 
implementation.  
Crucially, this political process of engagement with non-liberals 
does not require an uncritical acceptance of all their ideas. In fact, an 
automatic grant of approval can sometimes collapse into condescen-
sion rather than a genuine engagement with new ideas.  Instead, the 
challenge for those offering a critique of non-liberal ideas and groups 
generally, and Muslims and Islam in particular, is to strike a balance 
between two goals: first, including and understanding new ideas in the 
European public sphere; and second, maintaining an authentic criti-
cal perspective towards non-liberal ideas. A form of European liberal 
politics based on ideas of “agonistic respect” may provide some of the 
resources to meet this challenge.
Recent events in Europe, such as the 
Danish cartoon affair, have offended 
many Muslims and aggravated liberal 
angst about the precise balance be-
tween free speech and civility towards 
non-liberal religious groups. While 
the question of how liberal democra-
cies might engage non-liberal ideas is 
not, of course, solely about Muslims or 
Islam, in practical terms some of the 
most pressing questions of European domestic and international poli-
tics are about Muslims. In order to maintain liberal values in European 
democracies it is necessary to de-link the notion of liberal democracy 
from that of the liberal consensus. A more complex notion, encom-
passed in the relation of agonistic respect, allows for liberal values such 
as free speech and gender equality to be maintained while including 
those groups who may reject the liberal consensus.
In the past, “extremist” challenges were often from anti-system par-
ties who were potentially a viable political threat to European democ-
racies. Today, it is unlikely that those Muslim groups who challenge the 
liberal democratic consensus – and who are usually limited to fringe 
elements within small minority communities – will ever command the 
wide-spread political support to achieve electoral success. The key 
issue is not that certain groups may grasp political power by “playing 
the democratic game,” but how to maintain liberal values while engag-
ing potentially non-liberal Muslim groups.
The traditional approach of liberal political theory presents liberal 
democracy as a “rational consensus” in which all participants agree on 
the key values governing political life. The challenge posed by the pres-
ence of Muslims in Europe is to find a way to respond to those indi-
viduals and groups whose values are radically different from, and often 
incompatible with, liberalism. Such groups frustrate the possibility for 
rational consensus on liberal grounds. Thus, we need a strategy that 
allows liberal principles to be applied to intractable and incomprehen-
sible religious and political differences. This may introduce the risk of 
uncertainty about the outcome of the process, but this destabilization 
of existing political identities can also be an advantage. It can yield 
more complex forms of democratic politics that are more appropriate 
where citizens have widely different sets of beliefs, whilst at the same 
time retaining a core set of liberal commitments, such as to freedom of 
speech and gender equality.
There are a number of routes into this more complex form of politics. 
William E. Connolly has introduced the concept of “agonistic respect” 
into a definition of liberal democracy1 which has three important impli-
cations. First, “agonistic respect” emphasizes that its goal is not to seek 
a rational liberal consensus but to allow discussion and development of 
a complex political identity amongst all citizens. For example, it is more 
important for individual citizens to have a full debate about the Dan-
ish cartoon affair and free speech than reaching an agreement about 
whether it was correct for the cartoons to have been published. Second, 
“agonistic respect” welcomes the introduction of “difference” into the 
public sphere rather than relegating it to the private sphere. Therefore, 
rather than treating the commitment of some Muslims to ideas such as 
the “Caliphate” or “Islamic state” as a problem, agonistic respect encour-
ages Muslims to debate these ideas in public along with all other citi-
zens. Third, agonistic respect moves beyond limiting democratic politics 
to a defined territorial nation state by recognizing that an individual’s 
political identity may transcend national bounda-
ries by drawing on transnational allegiances. This 
allows us to overcome one of the alleged hurdles 
to full Muslim participation in the European pub-
lic sphere, since it challenges the false accusation 
that Muslims in Europe are incapable of loyalty to 
their countries simply because of their allegiance 
to their religion or their ethnic background. Ac-
cordingly, the fact that Muslims strongly identify 
with a world wide community of believers would 
Debates on the role of Muslim citizens in 
Europe question how European liberal 
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migration matters
The Longer View
Doubtless migration has been a con-
stant factor in human history. However, 
with the advent of the modern nation 
state and the construction of “minori-
ties,” migration has become, in post-
colonial times especially, a political 
football. By contrast, in medieval times 
migration often took the form of large 
uncontrolled movements of tribal no-
mads. An illustrative example from 
the fourteenth century involves refer-
ence to the very people that 
inspired the above work on 
migration, that is, Turks and 
at least one Moroccan. The 
Moroccan Ibn Battuta spent 
fifteen months in 1332–33 
journeying through Anato-
lia, a region he calls the Land 
of the Turks, while acknowl-
edging its former Christian 
origins. Ibn Battuta observes, 
“there are still large numbers 
of Christians in Anatolia living 
under the protection of the 
Muslims, these latter being 
Turkmens to whom jizya and 
other taxes are paid.” 
The first migrations of Turk-
ish nomadic pastoralists from 
Inner Asia had begun to pass 
through Transoxania into Per-
sia in the eleventh century. Led by the clan of Seljuks, who were already 
Sunni Muslims, they entered Baghdad in 1055, ousting the Caliph’s Shia 
rivals, the Buyids. Several branches of Seljuks came to dominate the Mid-
dle East opening the way to the Anatolian interior by roundly defeating 
the Byzantine army in 1071. Further penetration of Turkmen groups led 
to the creation of rival principalities chiefly in the central Anatolian pla-
teau. Byzantine hopes of ever recovering Anatolia effectively ended a 
century later. The rise of Mongol power in the Middle East, their destruc-
tion of Baghdad, and the annihilation of the Caliphate in 1258 drove 
further waves of Turks together with Persians westward into Anatolia. 
By the time of Ibn Battuta’s journey through the region, Anatolian soci-
ety had been undergoing ethnic and religious transformation for nearly 
two and a half centuries. The Flemish Franciscan friar William of Rubruck 
(Willem van Rubroeck) passing through the region in 1253 estimated 
Muslims to comprise only ten percent of the population. Twenty years 
later, Marco Polo labelling Anatolia “Turkey,” said it was inhabited by 
three races: Turkmen, a primitive people who worshipped Muhammad; 
then Greeks and Armenians who mingled with the Turkmen in villages 
and towns. 
Ibn Battuta’s account provides many further details. He was over-
whelmed by the kindness of the Turkish inhabitants and notes that 
women were unveiled. The associations of akhis, formed from members 
of the various trades, impressed him owing to the generous hospitality 
and lodging for strangers provided. Their network of hospices provided 
a degree of cohesion in new urban settings as the akhi leaders helped 
protect local populations from injustices. Together the akhis and other 
Sufi leaders provided leadership for Turkish migrants by mediating dis-
putes among tribal factions. 
Ibn Battuta’s Anatolian account contains his only description of a Chris-
tian community.  He describes the great city of Antalia where each com-
munity of foreign Christian merchants, 
Byzantine Greeks, Jews, and Muslims 
occupied separate walled quarters.  He 
marvelled at the famous cotton fabrics 
of Ladhiq (now Denizli) made by Chris-
tian women artisans while equally fine 
fabrics were produced in Arzanjan (Er-
zincan) whose population was mainly 
Armenian. He had travelled on a Ge-
noese boat from Syria to Anatolia and 
took another Greek vessel across the 
Black Sea to the Crimean side 
where he hired wagons from 
Turkmen of Christian faith. 
Nonetheless, his account 
leaves the strong impression 
that the demographics in 
Anatolia had reached critical 
mass favouring the Turkiciza-
tion and Islamization of the 
population. The political end-
game was played out more 
than a century later. Naturally 
unaware of that future, Ibn 
Battuta had enjoyed the hos-
pitality of the sultan of Bursa 
and his wife. He cannily de-
scribes this ruler as the “great-
est of the Turkmen kings.” This 
was Orhan Bey, son of Osman 
whose descendants in 1453 
captured Constantinople, the 
jewel in the crown of then flourishing Ottoman dynasty and the cor-
nerstone of the even greater Empire to come. 
The editors of the Enzyklopadie Migration in Europa caution against 
drawing easy lessons from modern migration movements. Are there 
any to be learned from a medieval movement as described above? It is 
certain mobility and displacement are part of the human condition, re-
flected in the concept of homo migrans. It then matters that both sides 
of the equation – immigration and emigration – or, expressed differently, 
the push and pull factors of migration are considered. Turkish migration 
into medieval Anatolia went unchecked but resulted in one of the world’s 
most formidable empires, succeeding its dying Byzantine predecessor. If, 
however, modern European governments are today genuinely concerned 
about Muslim immigration, they individually and through the European 
Union could do far more than they have ever attempted (or imagined) in 
assisting the development, in every sense, of Muslim countries so that 
the push factors of economic deprivation and political repression are re-
duced to a point where Muslim citizens of these countries are less attract-
ed by the pull of European societies. European politicians who advocate 
draconian immigration policies directed mainly against Muslims, need 
to acknowledge that the bulk of the populations of their own countries 
originated, in some distant past, from somewhere else. Migration does 
matter but only the immigration side of the phenomenon raises political 
passions. On the longer view, migration in both its aspects is basically a 
neutral value in history.  
The editors of the Enzyklopädie Migration 
in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur 
Gegenwart (Munich, 2007) coined the phrase 
homo migrans to describe the phenomenon 
of human migration. This collaboration of 
German and Dutch historians was prompted 
by the current debate in their respective 
countries over Moroccan and Turkish 
immigration. This massive volume, however, 
covers only the past three centuries of 
migration including both to and from Europe. 
Society & the State
David Waines is Emeritus Professor of Islamic Studies at Lancaster University.
Email: d.waines@lancaster.ac.uk
Miniature from 
an Ottoman 
album
F r o M  A l t - s t A m b u l e r  H o f -  u n d  V o l k s l e b e n ,  F .  t a E S C h n E r  ( E d . )  ( h a n n o v E r :  l a F a I r E ,  1 9 2 5 )
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G r e G  f e A ly 
&  m A r t i n 
V A n  B r u i n e S S e n
Studying islam in Southeast Asia
State of the Art & New Approaches
On 7 and 8 July 2008, more than thirty people gathered at the Snouck 
Hurgronjehuis in Leiden for the workshop on “Studying Islam in South-
east Asia: State of the Art and New Approaches,” which was organized 
under the auspices of the Australia-Netherlands Research Collaboration 
(ANRC) and ISIM. Martin van Bruinessen (ISIM) and Greg Fealy (Austral-
ian National University) were the convenors.
The workshop aimed to reflect critically on the current state of schol-
arship on Southeast Asian Islam and consider new approaches and 
possible collaborations to understanding Islamic politics, culture, so-
ciety, and law in a regional context. The workshop was divided into 
three broad themes: (1) governance and bureaucratic administration 
of Islam; (2) transnational Islamic networks in Southeast Asia; and (3) 
Islam, media, and performance. A total of twenty-three participants, 
including seven Australian, four Indonesian, and nine Dutch scholars, 
presented papers on various aspects of these themes.
The discussions in the first panel began with a fresh look at the policies 
of the late colonial state and the under-studied “Guided Democracy” re-
gime (1958-65) and at continuities across historical turning points and 
political divides. The relations of trust established 
in the struggle for independence, e.g. among 
members of the Hizbullah militia, who later ended 
up in the state apparatus or in armed insurgent 
movements, constituted one such continuity that 
came up in several of the papers. Other papers en-
gaged with Indonesian and Malaysian debates on 
the legitimate place of the Sharia in society and state. Close attention 
was given to the modalities of incorporation of elements of the Sharia 
in national legislation and local regulations in both countries, with par-
ticipants putting forward different interpretations of data to support 
arguments about the extent of the impact of Islamic law. A third group 
of papers discussed the elaborate bureaucracies in both countries that 
administer Islamic courts, education, and the hajj, and that occupy 
themselves with the struggle against alleged heterodoxy.
The transnational Islam panel looked at the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Salafism, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat, as well as 
more liberal currents of Islamic thought in various parts of Southeast 
Asia and their networks of communication within the region. The dis-
cussions focused on explaining the remarkable differences between 
the various movements in degrees of adaptation to local cultural tradi-
tions. The relative weakness of intra-region connections as compared 
to linkages with the Middle East was another recurring theme of dis-
cussion. 
The final sessions considered a variety of Islamic cultural expressions 
in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the role of performative arts – including 
dance and musical forms as well as oratory and adaptations of Sufi ritu-
al – in da‘wah, spreading religious messages. Presenters looked at how 
political, religious, and commercial forces, as well as the possibilities of 
old and electronic media – radio, audio cassette, video disc, Internet – 
are shaping these popular cultural forms, and analyzed the rhetorical 
styles and doctrinal content of popular preaching. 
Greg Fealy is Fellow and Senior Lecturer 
in Indonesian Politics at the Australian National 
University. 
Email: Greg.Fealy@anu.edu.au
Martin van Bruinessen is ISIM Chair and professor 
at Utrecht University. 
m A r t i J n  d e  k O n i n G
transnational relations 
and muslim diasporas
The workshop “Transnational Relations and Muslim Diasporas” jointly 
organized by York University, Toronto, and the VU University, Amster-
dam in cooperation with ISIM and the follow up to the one held at 
York University, June 2007, took place in June 2008. Both are part of 
the project “Muslim Diasporas: Religious and National Identity, Gen-
der, Cultural Resistance.“ The convenors of the workshop were Haideh 
Moghissi, Saeed Rahnema, and Halleh Ghorashi.
In the first session Tariq Modood focused on reconciling Muslim 
identity politics and multicultural citizenship while Jörn Thielmann 
explored different sites of conflict in Germany. In the second session 
Annelies Moors examined Muslim fashions and transnational relations 
and Jeanette Jouili discussed the transnational dimensions of cultural 
and artistic scenes among Muslims in France and the UK. Cassandra 
Balchin explored the emergence of a transnational feminist conscious-
ness among Muslim women in Western Europe, North America, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand. In the third session attention shifted towards 
Islamic publics and counterpublics in Alexandre Caeiro’s paper on the 
emergence of an Islamic counterpublic in Europe and Thijl Sunier’s ex-
posé on styles of leadership among Muslims in Europe.
On the next day Jasmin Zine examined the consequences of the 
“war on terror” for Muslim youth in Canada. Jonas Otterbeck and 
Nadia Fadil focused on the intra-Muslim politics. Otterbeck pre-
sented some of the findings of his research 
project which examines how young Muslims in 
Denmark negotiate Islamic traditions in search 
of answers to the question of “true” Islam. Dur-
ing the session on Muslim youth the impor-
tance of the generation gap between youth and parents emerged. 
Nadia Fadil nuanced this gap showing how youth both identify and 
distance themselves from their parents. In the third session Anne 
Sofie Roald discussed Muslim women’s right to divorce in Sweden 
and addressed the question whether collective or individual rights 
should prevail. Schirin Amir-Moazami questioned the liberal politics 
in Germany concerning the position of Muslim women showing that 
the basic assumptions of liberal governance have far-reaching and 
sometimes negative consequences for women. Fauzia Ahmed raised 
the issue of feminist leadership in the Muslim diaspora. In the fourth 
session Elena Arigita showed how the Moroccan Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan 
movement was established in Spain through the use of local struc-
tures while Welmoet Boender discussed the institutionalization of 
Muslim development organizations in the Netherlands.
During the last session, Haideh Moghissi, Saeed Rahnema, and Mark 
Goodman presented their findings of a large study among Muslims in 
Canada while Kamran Rastegar discussed Ebrahim Hatami-Kia’s movie 
From the Karkhe to the Rhine and the different ways of representing 
the traumas of Iran-Iraq war in the diaspora. Halleh Ghorashi, the con-
venor of this workshop, closed the event.
Altogether, the participants tried to explore different modalities of 
opposition against hegemonic structures of inclusion and exclusion 
and expressed the necessity to continue this line of research in the 
future, in particular the assertiveness of Muslims in the public sphere 
against the background of integration policies, radicalization and 
counter-radicalization, and human rights debates. Several of the pa-
pers presented in the workshop will be published.
Martijn de Koning is Postdoctoral Fellow within 
the ISIM/RU project “Salafism as a Transnational 
Movement”. 
Email: m.dekoning@isim.nl 
 I S I M  R E V I E W  2 2  /  A U T U M N  2 0 0 8  5 5
ISIM/News
 
16 October 2008 
Seminar
Jerusalem Seminar
Organizers:  Gemak, ISIM, UCP, 
and NAI 
Venue:  Gemak, The Hague
28-29 November 2008 
Workshop
Understanding Immanent Critique: 
Cultural Politics and Islamic 
Activism
Organizer: ISIM
Convenor: Irfan Ahmad
Venue: Leiden University
16 December 2008
Debate
Moslims als Markt 
Organizers: ISIM, Kosmopolis, 
and De Nieuwe Horizon
Venue: Rotterdam
 
For more information on these and 
other events, including the ISIM 
Ph.D. and Staff Seminars, please 
consult the ISIM website or contact 
the secretariat at info@isim.nl.
I S I M  E V E N T S
– Shereen Abou El Naga  
(Visiting Fellow)
 Women Writers in the Islamic 
and European Tradition
 1 October 2008 –  
31 December 2008
– Alexandre Caeiro  
(Visting Fellow)
 The Constructions of " Europe " and 
"Islam" in Contemporary Muslim 
and non-Muslim Practices
 1 September 2008 –  
31 December 2008
– Jeanette Jouili  
(Postdoctoral Fellow)
 Islamic Artistic Performances and 
the Production of Piety in the UK 
and France
 1 May 2008 –  
31 January 2011
– Nandagopal Radhakrishna 
Menon (Visiting Fellow) 
 Islam, Media, and Religious 
Pluralism in Kerala, India
 1 October 2008 –  
31 December 2008
– Zoltan Pall  
(Visiting Fellow) 
 Salafi Movements in Northern 
Lebanon
 1 September 2008 –  
31 December 2008
– Valeria Saggiomo 
(Visiting Fellow)
 The Role of Islamic NGOs in 
the Somali State Building Process 
1991-2006
 1 October 2008 –  
31 December 2008
– Roshanack Shaery-Eisenlohr 
(Visiting Fellow)
 Cultures of Trauma: The Science of 
Suffering in Postwar Lebanon
 1 June 2008 – 30 November 2008
– Arzu Ünal  
(Ph.D. Fellow)
 Dressed to Differ: Changing 
Meanings of Tesettür among 
Turkish Women in the Netherlands
 1 January 2009 –  
31 December 2011
– Vanessa Vroon  
(Visiting Fellow)
 The Politics of Celebration in 
the Context of Dutch Female 
Conversion to Islam
 1 June 2008 – 30 November 2008
– Ali Zaidi  
(Visiting Fellow)
 Identity Politics, Individualization, 
and the Secularization of Islam 
in Canada
 1 September 2008 –  
31 December 2008
Ahmed Rashid (Rawalpindi, 1948) is an expert on Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Central-Asia and regularly writes for 
major international media. Rashid is also a consultant for 
Human Rights Watch and the UN and the author of Taliban: 
Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (2000). 
In June 2008, his Descent into Chaos: The United States and 
the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia was published.
N E W  F E L L O W S
Nomination for Societal 
Impact Award Junior
Postdoctoral Fellow Martijn de 
Koning has been nominated for 
the 2008 Societal Impact Award 
Junior of VU University Amsterdam. 
He was nominated for the award to 
be given to a Ph.D. student whose 
thesis is of major societal relevance, 
on the basis of his thesis “Zoeken 
naar een zuivere islam.”
Rashid will discuss the failure of nation building in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. For the first time since 2001, the Afghan 
and newly created Pakistani Taliban are on the offensive 
in both countries. It seems that the earlier US-NATO 
solution of more resources, nation building and rebuilding 
the Afghan security forces is not working. How did this 
situation come about? And where will NATO go from here?
Please register before 9 November via registration@isim.nl.
The ninth ISIM Annual Lecture, marking the tenth anniversary of ISIM, will be organized in collaboration with the Mayor 
and College of Aldermen of Amsterdam, Odeon and Atlas Publishers. You are cordially invited to attend.  
Thursday  |  13 November 2008  |  5.00 pm  |  Odeon  |  Amsterdam
ISIM 
Annual 
lecture 
2008
‘The Failure of 
Nation Building 
in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan and 
the Rise of 
the New Taliban’
Ahmed Rashid
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ISIM/Conference
On 9 and 10 July 2008, the Netherlands Science Organization (NWO), in 
co-operation with ISIM, organized a conference titled “Gestures: Religion 
qua Performance” at Utrecht University. This conference, convened by 
ISIM’s Martin van Bruinessen with Prof. Anne-Marie Korte of Utrecht Uni-
versity, is part of the large NWO-funded research programme “The Future 
of the Religious Past,” which examines new forms of the religious. Follow-
ing earlier conferences dedicated to “Conceptualizing Religion,” “Powers: 
Sovereignty, Media and Beyond,” and “Things: Material Religion and the 
Topography of Divine Spaces,” the conference on “Gestures” focused on 
the performative aspects of religious phenomena, from ritual and liturgi-
cal acts to dramatic expressions and various forms of embodiment.
Over thirty papers were presented, about half of them by junior and sen-
ior scholars taking part in the “Future of the Religious Past” programme. 
Major themes were introduced with keynote speeches by John R. Bowen, 
Kim Knott, Brent Plate, and Regina Schwartz, and further fleshed out in 
papers and comments by various other invited scholars, including Peter 
Clarke, Michael Lambek, Yvonne Sherwood, Ward Blanton, Meerten ter 
Borg, Annelies Moors, Christoph Baumgartner, and Thomas Quartier.
The conference was expressly multidisciplinary, with contributions from 
anthropology and sociology, literary studies, ritual studies, philosophy, 
cultural studies, and musicology all discussing religious phenomena in 
four continents and concerning various religious traditions. The “Ges-
tures” discussed included pilgrimage, sacrifice and martyrdom, as well 
as theatrical and musical performances, blasphemy, religious fashion, 
and spirit possession.
Largely thanks to ISIM’s participation in the event, Islam and Muslim 
societies were strongly represented, with papers on religion and secular-
ity in the late Ottoman Empire, martyrdom for love and nation, Sufi ritual 
and modernity in Sudan, Islamic fashion in Europe, musical perform-
ances with an Islamic message, and blasphemy and the ritual of insulting 
Muslims in contemporary European societies. A detailed programme of 
the conference and the abstracts of all papers presented are published 
on the ISIM website.
Martin van Bruinessen is ISIM Chair and professor at Utrecht University.
Gestures 
Religion qua Performance
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
m A r t i n 
V A n  B r u i n e S S e n
ISIM, in cooperation with Pricewater-
houseCoopers Advisory (PwC), has been 
commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to coordinate and admin-
ister its Research Programme “Strength-
ening knowledge of and dialogue with 
the Islamic/Arab world,“ in short, the 
Islam Research Programme.
The general aim of the Programme is 
to strengthen knowledge of, and dia-
logue with, the Muslim world. Against 
this background, the Programme con-
centrates on research in contemporary 
trends in the Muslim world that are rel-
evant to Dutch policy development in 
the field of international cooperation. 
Subjects of research fall within the 
areas of Islamic law, political and socio-
economic development, and culture 
and religion.
ISIM will connect Dutch embas-
sies in various Muslim countries with 
Dutch and local researchers and sup-
port them in formulating research 
questions relevant to policy. The Pro-
gramme’s Academic Advisory Commit-
tee, consisting of nine academics, will 
review research proposals and find-
ings and therewith guarantee their ac-
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n Miriam Gazzah
 Rhythms and Rhymes of Life 
 Music and Identification 
Processes of Dutch-Moroccan 
Youth 
This dissertation is a comprehen-
sive anthropological study of the 
social significance of music among 
Dutch-Moroccan youth. An emerg-
ing Dutch-Moroccan music scene 
in the Netherlands includes the 
development of events and web-
sites, while Dutch-Moroccan youth 
are also pioneers of the Dutch 
hiphop scene. They (re)present 
and position themselves in society 
through their music and musical 
activities. This study provides in-
sight into the development of the 
Dutch-Moroccan music scene, the 
construction of Dutch-Moroccan 
identity, the impact of Islam on 
female artists, and the way Dutch-
Moroccan rappers deal with 
stereo types of Moroccans.
Miriam Gazzah was ISIM Ph.D. Fellow 
from 2003 to 2007.  
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2008 
ISBN 9789089640628 
280 pages 
€ 39,50
n Een keuze uit 10 jaar ISIM Review
To mark ISIM’s tenth anniversary, ISIM 
publishes a selection of ISIM Newsletter 
and ISIM Review articles from its begin-
ning up to now. The volume will be 
published in Dutch, in order to dissemi-
nate the insights of ten years of inter-
national scholarship to the Dutch gen-
eral public. The articles reflect a decade 
of innovative, comparative, and inter-
ISIM Publications
n Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand,  
and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.)
 The Madrasa in Asia
 Political Activism and 
Transnational Linkages
Since the rise of the Taliban and 
Al-Qaida, the traditional Islamic 
schools known as madrasas have 
frequently been portrayed as hot-
beds of terrorism. For much longer, 
modernisers have denounced 
madrasas as impediments to social 
progress, although others have 
praised them for their self-sufficien-
cy and for providing “authentic“ 
grassroots education. For numerous 
poor Muslims in Asia, the madrasa 
still constitutes the only accessible 
form of education. This book sheds 
light on the dynamics of Muslim 
education and activism at the grass-
roots and provides an overview of 
the social, educational, and political 
roles of madrasas across Asia, from 
China and Indonesia to Iran.
Martin van Bruinessen is the ISIM 
Chair for the Comparative Study of 
Contemporary Muslim Societies at 
Utrecht University. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2008
ISBN 9789053567104
304 pages
€ 39,50
disciplinary research on contemporary 
Muslim societies and communities. 
Covering a broad range of topics, from 
the war on terror and Salafism to youth 
culture and Islamic philosophy, and 
exploring current debates on Islamic 
NGO’s, popular piety, and reproductive 
technology, this collection represents 
the diversity of Muslim societies, as well 
as the diversity of ways to approach 
these.  
ademic quality. The research projects 
will be planned and carried out in close 
consultation with Dutch policy officers 
stationed in the participating embas-
sies with the aim of gaining, sharing, 
and using knowledge of develop-
ments in the Muslim world. In this way, 
partnerships between researchers and 
embassy staff would expand. Likewise, 
the Programme will contribute to a 
further strengthening of the quality of 
Dutch policy and to the linking of sci-
entific research and policy-making. In 
this light, knowledge activities such as 
conferences and networking meetings 
will be organized.
A Project Office has been established 
by ISIM and PwC to manage the Re-
search Programme. The academic im-
petus of the Programme is provided by 
ISIM, involving, among other activities, 
the coordination and review of indi-
vidual research projects. PwC bears 
responsibility for the Programme’s fi-
nancial management.
n For more information please contact 
Dennis Janssen at:  
ProjectofficeIRP@isim.nl.
All ISIM publications published by 
AUP can be ordered online through 
www.isim.nl or www.aup.nl or by 
email: orders@aup.nl.
New Project
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Editors’ Picks
Badlands of the Republic: 
Space, Politics, and Urban Policy
By Mustafa Dikeç
Malden (MA): Blackwell, 2007
This book is the first comprehensive 
account of urban revolt in French 
banlieues in a close examination of 
urban policy in the French Republic. 
It represents a fresh approach to space 
and politics, and the struggles of the 
marginalized groups, exploring the 
meaning of citizenship and the right 
to the city.
Secular and Islamic Politics in 
Turkey: The Making of the Justice 
and Development Party
Edited by Ümit Cizre
London and New York: Routledge, 
2008
This collection of articles examines 
the evolution of the Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey since 
it came to power in 2002 and its 
retreat from a reformist agenda to 
a conservative-nationalist outlook. 
Contributions discuss the party’s 
historical background, political 
agenda, social bases, and its relations 
with the Kemalist establishment, the 
military, and the European Union. 
Signal and Noise: Media, 
Infrastructure, and Urban Culture 
in Nigeria. 
By Brian Larkin
Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2008
This book is a fascinating historical 
ethnography of media technologies in 
the Muslim city of Kano in the north of 
Nigeria. Focusing on radio networks, 
mobile cinema units, and the building 
of cinema theaters, Brian Larkin 
investigates technology’s encounter 
with norms shaped by colonialism, 
postcolonial nationalism, and Islam. 
Next, he examines how media 
technologies produce the mode of 
leisure and cultural forms of urbanity 
by analyzing the circulation of Hindi 
films to Muslim Nigeria, the leisure 
practices of Hausa cinemagoers in 
Kano and the emergence of Nigerian 
video films. 
Political Islam in West Africa: State-
Society Relations Transformed
Edited by William F.S. Miles
Boulder and London: Lynn Rienner, 
2007
This volume explores political Islam 
in key countries of the Sahel region. 
It discusses the transformations 
in the relationship between 
religion and state in nations with 
sizeable Muslim populations. The 
chapters examine those ongoing 
transformations and the changing 
nature of domestic politics and 
foreign policy since 2001. 
Descent into Chaos: How the War 
Against Islamic Extremism is Being 
Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Central Asia
By Ahmed Rashid
London: Allen Lane, 2008
Rashid chronicles the US and 
European attempts at nation-building 
in Afghanistan, attributing their failure 
to an insufficient commitment to 
development and reform, not only 
in Afghanistan, but in the region at 
large. The book documents how the 
war in Afghanistan is no longer a war 
against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in 
one country, but has become a far 
wider regional conflict which also 
involves Pakistan and the five Central 
Asian states. 
Muslim Modernities: Expressions of 
the Civil Imagination
Edited by Amyn B. Sajoo
London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2008
This book is about Muslim encounters 
with the modern: how Islam and 
those in its orbit have shaped and 
been shaped by histories that are 
overlapping and distinctive. Identity 
and citizenship, poetry and protest, 
music and mode of dress are explored 
as expressions that bear on the 
making and remaking of the modern 
public sphere. 
Arts
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H a s a n  &  H u s a i n  E s s o p
Hasan and Husain Essop 
(Cape Town, 1985) 
studied printmaking 
and photo graphy 
respectively at the 
Michaelis School of Fine 
Art in Cape Town. The 
fraternal twins construct 
and perform roles in 
staged scenarios that 
explore sibling rivalries, 
opposing beliefs and 
cultural systems, the 
politics of public space 
in Cape Town, and larger 
global conflicts from the 
perspective of Muslim 
youth. Their work, which 
combines photo graphy 
with graphic design 
manipulation, has been 
featured at Goodman 
Gallery Cape, among 
others, and they have 
been selected for the 
2009 Havana Biennial.
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Pit Bull Fight / Lightjet C Print on Fuji Crystal Archive Paper, 60 x 84 cm and 84 x 118 cm
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Photo Commentary
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Afghan sportsmen exercise at a martial arts club in Kabul.
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